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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study was to compile and analyze existing Illinois laws 
relating to highway and agricultural drainage and assemble this information into 
a single source. 
Drainage law is derived mainly from t ,,.o sources: (a) common and (b) stat-
utory law . Common law, the body of principles that develop from long usage 
and custom, receives judicial recognition and sanction through repeated appli ca-
tion. These principles develop independently of any legislative act and arc 
embodied in the decisions of the courts. This type of law provides a large and 
important segment of the drainage law sin ce it generally applies to ad joining 
areas having sufficient differences in elevation to cause natural drainage. Statt1-
tory laws of drainage a re enacted by the General Assembly and apply to areas 
where drainage cannot be obtained under the rules of common law. This type of 
law is derived from constitu tions, statutes, ordinances, and codes. 
A very importan t part of this study is the bibliography. Th e authors do not 
pretend that all ca cs have been included in this report. Ho\\·evcr, if further 
information is desired on a particular point, the cited case in the report may be 
referred to in Shepard's Illinois Cita tions, whi ch lists other cases and sources of 
material relating to the point in question. 
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GLOSSARY 
1. Acquiescence Cone! uct recogmzmg the exist-
ence of a transaction and intended, in some 
extent at least, to carry the transaction, or per-
mit it to be carried, into effect. It is some act, 
not deliberately intended to ratify a former 
transaction known to be voidable , but recog-
nizing the transaction as existing, and intended , 
in some extent at least, to carry it into effect , 
and to obtain or claim the benefits resulting 
from it. Thus it differs from "confirmation ," 
which implies a deliberate act intended to re-
new and ratify a transaction known to be void-
able . 
2. Artificial Watercourse Watercourses generally 
owing their origin to acts of man. Examples 
arc canals, drainage ditches, and subsurface 
drains. 
3. Basin A natural or a rtificially created space 
or structure which is capable, by reason of its 
shape and the character of its confining mate-
ri a l, of ho lding water. The surface area within 
a given watershed. 
4. Common-Enemy Rule Surface water is a com-
mon enemy, and a landowner may lawfully 
protect his land from surface water flowing up-
on it from adjoining higher lands. Under this 
ru le, the owner of high lands cannot improve 
natural channels or construc t a rtifi cial channels 
on his own land, if by so doing he cas ts the 
surface water upon his neighbor to his injury , 
unless he secures an casement from his neigh-
bor. 
5. Common Law The body of principles which 
developed from immemorial usage and custom 
and which receive judicial recognition and sanc-
tion through repeated application. These prin-
ciples develop independently of any legisla-
tive act and are embodied in the decisions of 
the courts. 
6. Condemnation A legal proceeding to secure 
land for a public purpose upon payment of the 
land 's reasonable value. Condemnation pro-
ceedings arc used when the owner wi ll not vol-
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unta rily convey title. Eminent domain proceed-
ings are condemnation proceedings. 
7. Dicta An observation or remark made by a 
j uclge concerning a question raised by the case 
but not necessaril y invoked in the case or essen-
tial to its determination. 
8. Ditch An artificially constructed open drain 
or a natural drain \Yhich has been art ifi cially 
improved. 
9. Diversion The deflection of surface waters or 
stream waters so that they discharge into a 
1rntcrcoursc to which they arc not naturally 
tributary. 
10. Dominant Estate or T enement That to \Yhich 
a crvituclc or casement is clue, or for the benefit 
of which it exists. The term is used in relatin g 
to servitudes, meaning the tenement or subj ect 
in favor of which the sen·icc is constituted , as 
the tenement over which the se rvitude extends 
is called the "scrvicn t ten em en t." 
11. Dominant Land Property so situated that its 
owners have rights on adjacent property, such 
as a right-of-way, or a right of natura l drain-
age. (The adjacent land is called the se rvicnt 
land .) 
12. Drain Any ditch, watercourse, or conduit, 
whether open, covered, or enclosed, natural or 
artificial, or partly natural and partly artificial, 
by which waters coming or fa lling upon lands 
a rc carried away. 
13. Drainage Structures Those structures other 
than drain , levees, and pumping plants which 
arc intended to promote or aid drainage. Such 
structures may be inclcpcnclcnt of other drain-
age work or may be a part of or in cidental to 
such work. The t erm includes, but is not re-
stricted to, catch-basins, bulkheads, spilhrnys, 
flumes, drop-boxes, pipe outlets, junction boxes, 
and structures, the primary purpose of which 
is to prennt the erosion of so il into a drain. 
14. Drainage System The system by which lands 
are drained or protected from overflow, or both , 
which includes drains, drainage structures, lev-
ees, and pumping plants. 
15. Easement An interest in the land of another 
which gives to the owner of the easement a 
right to use the other's land for special purposes 
not inconsistent with the general property rights 
of the other, for example, the right to the flow 
of water across a neighbor's land. 
16. Eminent Domain The power of the state to 
take private property for public use. 
17. Equity A system of jurisprudence administered 
by courts of equity as opposed to courts of law. 
Equity jurisdiction operates in circumstances 
where the generality, rigidity, and inflexibility 
of law do not permit a court of law to provide 
an adequate remedy. Among the most impor-
tant of the remedies granted by a court of 
equity is the injunction. 
18. Heri tage Every species of immovables which 
can be the subject of property, such as lands, 
houses, orchards, woods, marshes, ponds, etc., in 
whatever mode they may have been acquired, 
either by descent or purchase. 
19. Highway Any public way for vehicular travel 
which has been laid out in pursuance of any law 
of this State or of the T erritory of Illinois, or 
which has been established by dedication or 
used by the public as a highway for 15 years, 
or which has been or may be laid out and con-
nects a subdivision or plotted land with a public 
highway and which has been dedicated for the 
use of the owners of the land included in the 
subdivision or plotted land where there has been 
an acceptance and use under such dedication 
by such owners, and which has not been va-
cated in pursuance of law. The term highway 
includes right-of-ways, bridges, drainage struc-
tures, signs, guardrails, protective structures, 
and all other structures and appurtenances nec-
essary or convenient for vehicular traffic. A 
highway in a rural area may be called a road, 
while a highway in a municipal area may be 
called a street. 
20. Highway Authori ty The department with re-
spect to a state highway ; the county board 
with respect to a county highway or a county 
unit district road if a discretionary function is 
involved and the county uperintendent of high-
ways if a ministerial function is involved; the 
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highway commissioner with respect to a town-
ship or district road not in a county unit road 
district; or the corporate authorities of a mu-
nicipality with respect to a municipal street. 
21. Injunction A judicial order requiring the per-
son to whom it is directed to do or refrain from 
doing a particular act. When the injunction 
commands the performance of a positive act, it 
is termed "mandatory." 
22. Landowner The owner of real property, in-
cluding an owner of an undivided interest, a 
life tenant, a remainderman , and a trustee 
under an active trust, but no t including a mort-
gagee, a trustee under a trust deed in the nature 
of a mortgage, a lien holder, or a lessee. 
23 . Natural Drainage Rule Where two adjoining 
pieces of land are so situated that one is domi-
nant and the other scrvicnt, the dominant land-
owner has the right to have water flow naturally 
from his land to th at of the scrvicnt landowner. 
24. Natural Watercourse If the conformation of 
land is such that it gives water a fixed and de-
terminate course and discharges it uniformly 
upon the servient tract at a fixed and definite 
point, the course followed by the water in its 
flow is a watercourse. 
25. Paro! Oral or verbal. 
26. Prescriptive Rights An casement of drainage 
through a ditch , drain , or culvert to or across 
the land of another. In order to acquire this 
right, there must be an open, adverse, and unin-
terrupted use of the drainage faci lity under a 
claim of right for the required time. 
27. Proprietor An owner or a person who has legal 
title or exclusive right to some property, 
whether in possession or not. 
28. Quasi-Corporations Organizations resembling 
corporations; municipa l societies or similar 
bodies which, though not true corporations in 
all respects, are yet recognized, by statutes or 
immemorial usage, as persons or aggregate cor-
porations, with precise duties which may be en-
forced and privileges which may be maintained 
by suits at law. They may be considered 
quasi-corporations, with limited powers, co-
extensive with the duties imposed upon them by 
statute or usage, but restra ined from a general 
use of the authority which belongs to those 
metaphysical persons by th e common la\\". 
29. Servient Land If two adjoining pieces of land 
are so situated that one piece is at a lower ele-
vation than the other, the lower piece of land is 
considered to be servient. 
30. Servient T enement An estate in respect of 
"·hich a service is owing, as the dominant tene-
ment is that to which the service is due. 
31. Statute of Limitations An act of the legislature 
that sets a period of time \Yithin which a legal 
action must be brought. In the case of interests 
in land, the period is usually twenty years from 
the time the right to sue first arose. The effect 
of the statute is to make the wrong doer im-
mune from suit after the term has expired. 
32. Statutory Law Laws enacted by the General 
Assembly to either enlarge or change the com-
mon law. 
33. Surface Water Waters which fall on the land 
from the skies or arise in springs and diffuse 
themselves over the surface of the ground, fol-
lowing no defined course or channel and not 
gathering into or forming any more definite 
body of water than a mere bog or marsh, and 
are lost by being diffused over the ground 
through percolation, evaporation, or natural 
drainage. 
34. Writ of Mandamus A writ which issues from 
a court of superior juri diction and is directed to 
a private or municipal corporation, or any of its 
officers, or to an executive, administrative, or 
judicial officer, or to an inferior court, com-
manding the performance of a particular act 
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therein specified, and belonging to his or their 
public, official, or ministerial duty, or directing 
the restoration of the complainant to rights 
or privileges of which he has been illegall y 
deprind. 
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I. OBJECTIVES OF STUDY 
A certain amount of confusion and misunder-
standing exists concerning the application of drain-
age laws and practices to highway and agricultural 
lands. The legislature has enacted statutory laws 
with respect to the general subject of drainage, and 
courts have made decisions interpreting the stat-
utory laws for specific cases. Until now the basic 
points of law and their application to highway and 
agricultural drainage have not been assembled into 
a single source of material. Therefore, misunder-
standings arise because of the incoherency of infor-
mation relating to the treatment of mutual problems 
of highway and agricultural drainage. The prob-
lems arc bilateral, and each of the involved parties 
has responsibilities that must be accepted before 
satisfactory agreements can be reached. 
It is generally recognized that the Illinois drain-
age laws should provide protection to all parties, 
but often there is only a limited knowledge of the 
real implications of these laws. Thus the involnd 
parties are inclined to engage in objections, com-
plaints, and litigations that might be prevented if 
the basic principles of highway and agricultural 
drainage law were better understood. 
Because the Illinois Division of Highways and 
others have become aware of the growing impor-
tance of these problems, a cooperative investigation 
was initiated with funds supplied in part by the 
Bureau of Public Roads, the Illinois Division of 
Highways, and the University of Illinois. The 
Agricultural Engineering Department at the Uni-
Yersity of Illinois was given the responsibility for 
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conducting the study. It is expected that the re-
sults of this study will provide a means for handling 
controversial drainage problems more effectively 
for the benefit of all concerned. 
The objective of this study was to compile and 
analyze existing Illinois laws that apply to highway 
and agricultural drainage. Since there is a certain 
amount of interdependence between subject matter 
and parties involved in highway and agricultural 
drainage, considerable thought was given to the 
most logical manner of making the study. One 
method "·as to outline the subject matter and then 
cover the duties and responsibilities of all interested 
parties under each subject. Another method was to 
determine the interested parties and then discuss 
their duties and responsibilities as to subject matter. 
Further analysis showed that with either of 
these two methods there would be a considerable 
amount of duplication. Therefore it was considered 
advantageous to discuss the main body of the study 
in terms of natural and statutory drainage and 
to add smaller sections to include miscellaneous 
topics not previously covered. 
Natural drainage includes all phases of drain-
age where water naturally flows from the dominant 
to the servient estate. This includes artificia l drains 
constructed within the premises of individual dom-
inant lando"·ners and discharging into a natural 
outlet prior to its departure onto the servient land. 
Statutory drainage includes all other types of drain-
age where the rules of natural drainage do not 
apply. 
29. Servient Land If two adjoining pieces of land 
are so situated that one piece is at a lower ele-
vation than the other, the lower piece of land is 
considered to be servient. 
30. Servient T enement An estate in respect of 
"·hich a service is owing, as the dominant tene-
ment is that to which the service is clue. 
31. Statute of Limitations An act of the legislature 
that sets a period of time within "·hich a legal 
action must be brought. In the case of interests 
in land, the period is usually twenty years from 
the time the right to sue first arose. The effect 
of the statute is to make the wrong doer im-
mune from suit after the term has expired. 
32. Statutory Law Laws enacted by the General 
Assembly to either enlarge or change the com-
mon law. 
33. Surface Water Waters which fall on the land 
from the skies or arise in springs and diffuse 
themselves over the surface of the ground , fol-
lowing no defined course or channel and not 
gathering into or forming any more definite 
body of water than a mere bog or marsh, and 
are lost by being diffused over the ground 
through percolation, evaporation, or natural 
drainage. 
34. Writ of Mandamus A writ which issues from 
a court of superior jurisdiction and is directed to 
a private or municipal corporation, or any of its 
officers, or to an executive, administrative, or 
judicial officer, or to an inferior court, com-
manding the performance of a particular act 
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therein specified , and belonging to his or their 
public, official, or ministerial duty, or directing 
the restoration of the complainant to rights 
or privileges of which he has been illegally 
deprived. 
SOURCE OF DEFINITIONS 
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Co. , 1936-1958. 
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cular 751, University of Illinois College of Agricu l-
ture, 1956. 
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Brooklyn: The American Law Book Co.; St. Paul , 
~Iinn.: West Publishing Co.; Chicago: Burdette 
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I. OBJECTIVES OF STUDY 
A certain amount of confusion and misunder-
. tanding exists concerning the application of drain-
age Imm and practices to highway and ag ricultmal 
lands. The legislature has enacted statutory laws 
with respect to the general subj ect of drainage, and 
courts have made decisions interpreting the stat-
utory laws for specific cases. Until now the basic 
points of law and their application to high,rny and 
agri cultural drainage have not been assembled into 
a single source of material. Therefore, misunder-
standings arise because of the incoherency of infor-
mation relating to the treatment of mutual problems 
of highway and agricultural drainage. The prob-
lems are bilateral, and each of the involved parties 
has responsibilities that must be accepted before 
satisfactory agreements can be reached. 
It is generally recognized that the Illinois drain-
age laws should provide protection to all parties, 
but often t here is only a limited knowledge of the 
real implications of these laws. Thus the involnd 
parties are inclined to engage in objections, com-
plaints, and litigations that might be prevented if 
the basic principles of highway and agricultmal 
drainage law were better understo.od. 
Because the Illinois Division of Highways and 
others have become aware of the growing impor-
tance of these problems, a cooperative investigation 
was initiated with funds supplied in part by the 
Bureau of Public Roads, the Illinois Division of 
High \Yays, and the University of Illinois. The 
Agricultural Engineering D epartment at the Uni-
Ycrsity of Illinois was given the responsibility for 
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conducting the study. It is expected that the re-
sults of this study will provide a means for handling 
contronrsial drainage problems more effectively 
for the benefit of all concerned. 
The objective of this study was to compile and 
analyze existing Illinois laws that apply to highway 
and agricultural drainage. Since there is a certain 
amount of interdependence between subject matter 
and parties involved in highway and agricultural 
drainage, considerable thought was given to the 
most logical manner of making the study. One 
method ,,·as to outline the subj ect matter and then 
cover the duties and responsibilities of all interested 
parties under each subj ect. Another method was to 
determine the interested parties and then discuss 
their duties and responsibilities as to subject matter. 
Further analysis shO\YCd that with either of 
these t\\'o methods there \\'Ould be a considerable 
amount of duplication. Therefore it was considered 
adYantageous to discuss the main body of the study 
in terms of natural and statutory drainage and 
to add smaller sections to include miscellaneous 
topics not previously covered. 
Natural drainage includes all phases of drain-
age where water naturally flows from the dominant 
to the servient estate. This includes artificial drains 
constructed within the premises of individual dom-
inant lando"·ners and discharging into a natural 
outlet prior to its departure onto the servicnt land. 
Statutory drainage in cludes all other types of drain-
age where the rules of natural drainage do not 
apply. 
II. HISTORICAL REVIEW 
Drainage law in Illinois is determined by two 
bodies of rules, common and statutory law. These 
two sets of rules are neither independent nor con-
flicting and, \\·hen taken together, form a compre-
hensive body of law systematica lly providing for 
drainage. 
In general, the common-law rnlcs of drainage 
predomina te unless they have been enlarged or 
superseded by statutory law. Jn most instances 
where statutory provisions have been enacted, it is 
possible to determine the intent of the law. If, 
hov-·cver, there is a lack of clarity in the statute, the 
point in question may have been li t igated for clari-
fication. In the absence of both clarit~· of the 
statute and li tigation, a definite statement of the 
law is not possible, although the factms that arc 
likely to be controlling may be indicated. 
A. COMMON-LAW DRAINAGE 
The term common law, as distinguished from 
statutory law, refers to the body of rules that have 
originated through custom and usage and have been 
adopted through repeated application by the courts. 
Through usage, the rules have become preceden t 
and are known as the doctrine of stare clecisis. The 
term stare clecisis refers to the concept that once a 
court has laid down a principle of law applicable 
to a certain sta te of facts, it will adhere to that 
principle and apply it to a ll future cases where facts 
a re substantially the same. <1 l .,, 
Under the system of common law, brn opposing 
rules regarding the drainage of surface waters have 
developed. The titles given to the two principal 
rules have created confusion surrounding their 
origin and development. 
The two rules are known as the civi l law (or 
natural-drainage rule) and the common law (or 
common-enemy rule). The rule that has been 
adopted by any given state is the "common law" 
of that state in the sense that it is the one adopted 
and repeatedly applied. It is unfortunate that one 
of th e two surface water drainage rules was called 
* :-- upen;criµt nun1IH"rs in parl•nthC'sis rcfC'r to Sc•ct ion \TfI -
Hefercncc8 Cited. 
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the common- la w rule in vi ew of the fact that legal 
wri ters doubt whether that particular rnlc was ever 
the law of England. <2 l To avoid confus ion, these 
tlrn rules will be ca lled the common-enemy rule 
and the natural-drainage rule. 
B. THEORY OF THE COMMON-LAW 
DRAINAGE RULES 
In tracing the development of the bYo opposing 
rules relating to the drainage of surface waters, it 
is necessary to state the t'rn basic rules and then 
point out the differences bcbYecn their underlying 
theories: 
[The basic rule of natural drainage is that,l as be-
t 11·ern the O\n1ers of higher and 10\rrr ground, the upper 
proprietor has an casement lo haYe surface 'rnter flow 
naturall y from his land onto the land of the lower pro-
1wieto r, and that the 101rer proprietor has not the right 
to obstruct its flow and cast the 1rnter back on the land 
aboYe.<3) 
I The basis of the common-enemy rule is th::t t surface 
\\·ater isl a common enemy which every proprieto r may 
fight as he deems be,.:t, rrg;::t rdless of its effect on other 
prorl!'ietors; ... the lo\\·er proprietor may take any 
measures necessary for the protect ion or improYCment of 
his property, although the result is to thro\Y the 1rntrr 
b::tck on the land of I the upper proprietor l .« > 
The theor>· of the natural-drainage rul e for 
deposition of rnrface water is to require the main-
tenance of natural drainage rather than to permit 
each possessor to handl e the surface 'rnter problem 
as he deems most ach·antageous. This in effect is 
judicial enforcement of physical la \\·. Two maxims 
arc often quoted as justification for the theory: 
aqua currit et clebet currere, ut cwTere solebat 
(water runs, and ought to run, as it has used to run) 
and sic utere tuo ut alicnmn non laeclas (use your 
01Yn property in such a manner as not to injure 
that of another). 
The natural-drainage rule is traceable to the 
continental civil law. Domat 's \Yark, The Civil 
Law in I ts Natural Orcler,< 5 ' was a seventeenth 
century attempt to set down the then exist ing civil 
law of France as it had been adapted from the old 
Roman Law. At this time Domat stated the 
natural-drainage rule as fo li o\\'~: 
I I. HISTORICA L REVI EW 11 
If rain-m1 ter or other \rnters have their course rcgu-
latccl from one ground to another, whether it be by 
nature of the place, or by some regulation, or by a title, 
or by an ancient possession, the proprietors of the said 
grounds cannot innovate any thing as to the ancient 
course of the waters. Thus, he who has the upper 
grounds cannot change the course of the \Yater, either by 
turning it some other way, or rendering it more rapid, 
or making any other changes in it to the prejudice of the 
O\rner of the 10\rnr grounds. Keither can he \\·ho has the 
lo\\"Cr estate do anything that may hinder his grounds 
from receiving the water which they ought to receiYe, 
and that in the manner "·hich has been regulated. 
It is to be noted that the words "have their 
course regulated" imply something more than 
diffused water merely finding its way from higher 
to lo"·cr ground without a definite course. Later 
statements of the law found in the French Civil 
Code of 1804 (also called Code Napoleon) and the 
Louisiana Civil Code purport to be the same rule 
but are actually broader than that stated by 
Domat. Louisiana's Civil Code reads: 
It is a servitude clue by the estate situated below to 
receive the water which runs naturall y from the estate 
situated above, provided the industry of man has no t 
been used to create that servitude. <•> 
The American jurisdictions which have adopted 
the rule of natural drainage have taken this state-
ment of the rule rather than the true statement of 
Domat. <» This, then, is the natural drainage rule 
as it exists in the United States today, having been 
introduced into the country in 1812 by Louisiana. 
The common-enemy rule is of more recent 
origin. The first statement of the rule appears in an 
1865 Massachusetts case, <5> indicating that the rule 
is of American origin and not of English common 
law. Under the theory of the common-enemy rule, 
a possessor of land bas an unlimited and unre-
stricted legal privilege to deal with the surface 
\rntcr on his land as he pleases, regardless of the 
harm that may be incurred by others. The maxim 
justifying this theory is cujus est solum, ejus est 
1lsque ad coelum (whose is the soil, his also it is up 
to the sky). 
A third rule of surface water drainage, knmrn 
as the rule of reasonable use, should be mentioned 
although it is not widely applied. Under this rule, 
each possessor is legally privileged to make reason-
able use of his land even though the flow of surface 
waters is altered thereby and causes harm to others. 
The landowner incurs liability only when his inter-
f ercnce with the flow of surface water is unreason-
able. Two states, Minnesota and New Hampshire, 
claim to use this rule as a modification of the two 
basic rules. <0 > 
1\Iost states have adopted one of these rules to 
be followed as their common-law doctrine. <10 > 
C. ILLINOIS' ADOPTION OF NATURAL 
DRAINAGE RULE 
Since it \ms well in to the nineteenth century 
before Illinois became thickly settled, drainage lmv 
did not dC\·clop at an early date. As land use 
intensified and land values increased, drainage 
problems became more apparent. Consequently 
liti gation and legislation establishing some type of 
drainage rule was necessary to solve some of the 
arutc problems. 
lllinois numbered itself among the states ad-
hering to the natural-drainage rule. This rule was 
adopted in Gillham '"· J1I adison County R .RYn in 
1869 "·here the court held: 
I A-[ person cannot, by an embankment or other arti-
ficial means, obstruct the \\·atcr in it s natural fl0\1", and 
thus throw it hack upon the upper proprietor. 
Another case the same year again provided the 
court \Yith an opportunity to invoke the natural-
drainage rule. In Gormley v. Sanf ord,< 12 > the court 
justified the rule by explaining: 
The right of the 01rncr of the superior heritage to 
drainage is ba~ecl simply on the principle that nature has 
ordained such drainage, a nd it is but plain and natural 
.iu~ticc that the incli,·idual O\rncr::;hip arising from social 
l:1w~ f'houlcl be held in accordance \rith pre-existing laws 
:1 nd arrangements of nature. 
As 1rnter must flow, and some rule in regard to it 
rnu~t be established 11·hcrc land is held under the artificial 
title~ created by human law, there can clearly be no 
other rule at once so equitable and so easy of application 
a~ that \rhich enforces natural laws. There is no sur-
pri"e or hardship in this, for each successive owner takes 
1rith \rhatc,·cr adYantagcs or inconveniences nature has 
~lamped upon his land. 
D. EARLY ATTEMPTS AT COLLECTIVE ACTION 
The inadequacies of the natural drainage rule 
\\"ere recognized at an early date, although the rule 
was not statutorily enlarged until 1885 and 1889. 
In the period leading up to 1870, which marks the 
Lurning point in effective drainage legislation, three 
parallel attempts to provide adequate drainage 
were made in the form of collective action. The 
three forms of action \vcre (a) utilization of private 
chartered drainage companies, (b) procedure under 
the Swamp Land Act of 1850, and (c) drainage by 
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existing governmental units. Between 1818 and 
1869 the General Assembly passed some 48 acts in 
these areas. The nature of these three collective 
actions and their effectiveness will be examined 
briefly. 
The Constitutions of both 1818 and 1848 gave 
the General Assembly the power to grant private 
charters for various purposes, including drainage. 
In general, these charters were granted to enter-
prising citizens who made application to the Gen-
eral Assembly. Apparently there were hundreds of 
these ventures which, although successful in theory, 
seldom accomplished any actual results. c13 l The 
legislature expanded the powers granted to the pri-
vate corporations until in one case the corporation 
\ms made a taxing unit. The property O\Yncrs had 
no voice in the taxing procedure, and the corpora-
tion members had the right to name their own 
successors. C14 l Before holding that these powers 
granted to the corporation were unconstitutional, 
the court commented that the mere statement of 
the substance of the extraordinary legislation would 
seem almost sufficient in itself for a disposition of 
the case. The court held: 
Without expressing an opinion as to the power of the 
legislature, itself, directly to impo ·e a corporate tax for a 
corporate purpose, and without denying its po,1-cr to 
create a district for special purposes, from portions of 
contiguous counties or towns, and provide for the election 
or appointment, in some proper mode, of public officers 
in such district, to be clo thed with the power of levying 
taxes for such special purposes, we nevertheless are 
clearly of the opinion that this clause does forbid the 
legislature to grant the power of such local or corporate 
taxation to any other persons than the local or corporate 
authorities. Under our constitution, the right of taxation 
cannot be granted either to private persons or priYate 
corporations.<"> 
This decision, plus the Constitution of 1870 pro-
hibiting the use of private charters, ended this 
form of collective action. 
The second form of collective action resulted 
from the Federal Swamp Land Act of 1850, which 
granted to the states a ll of the swamp land in need 
of drainage and reclamation within the state's 
boundaries. Land was granted in fee simple with 
the "suggestion" of Congress that proceeds from 
the sale of the land be used for drainage and recla-
mation. Illinois deeded the lands to the counties, 
originally requiring the counties to sell an amount 
sufficient to pay for draining the entire a rea, the 
remaining land to be granted to the townships for 
educational purposes. (lG) This policy was modified 
by subsequent lcgif'lation until in 1859 the proceeds 
from the sale of such lands \Ycrc made subject only 
to the discretion of the county court. This change 
of policy gave rise to litigation. Landowners \Yho 
had purchased swamp land under the original policy 
brought suit to force the counties to use the proceeds 
for drainage and reclamation. These suits were not 
successful because the court held that state policy 
was a political question not subject to judicial 
action. cin 
Thus \Yhi le large areas of land \\"ere sold under 
the S1rnrnp Land Act and a considerable amount of 
money ,,·as realized, the drainage that was effected 
was negligible. Operation of the federal act in 
Illinois can therefore be said to have contributed 
only slightly to reclamation or land drainage. c 18 l 
The third type of collcctiYc action involYcd the 
use of existing governmental organization. Appar-
ently little is known of these efforts or of thei r 
cffccti,·encss. cio) It is kno\\·n that in one case an 
attempt to substitute local taxation for state taxa-
tion \ms declared unconstitutional. <20 l In another 
situation, a proposal for action b)· the local govern-
ment was submitted to the Yotcrs and dcfcated.c 21 l 
E. STATUTORY ENLARGEMENT OF NATURAL 
DRAINAGE RULE 
The rule of natural drainage, as interpreted by 
the court, did not provide for a completely ade-
quate system of drainage. For example, natural 
drainage depends upon a difference in the elerntion 
of lands; where lands arc le,·cl , the rule of natural 
drainage is ineffective and such lands arc unpro-
tected. Another example of inadequacy is the com -
plete prohibition against changing in any way, 
cutting through, or removing a natural barrier. 
The state legislature faced the problem of en-
larging the rule of natural drainage to conr such 
situations by the enactment of statutory law. This 
type of legislation is readily justified. Where lands 
arc Yaluable for cultivation and the country depends 
largely upon agriculture, the public welfare de-
mands that an adequate system of drainage be 
provided. The creation of conditions favorable to 
the maintenance of a large and prosperous popula-
tion is an object to which a government may right-
fully direct its attention. c22 l 
To help meet the needs of improved agriculture 
and sanitation, the General Assembly enacted two 
la\\"S whereby, apar t from drainage district organi-
zation, a landom1er could improve or maintain his 
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drainage across the lands of another. The substance 
of the t\rn statutes (essentially retained in the 1955 
Code) will be discussed in later sections. The por-
tions of those laws related to drainage are contained 
in Sections 4-11 of · the Farm Drainage Act of 
1885 <23 > and Sections 1-4 of an 1889 act concerning 
drains constructed by mutual license or agree-
ment. <24 > These acts substantially improved the 
drainage rights of landowners by enlarging the rul e 
of natural drainage. 
F. STATUTORY DRAINAGE LAW 
BccauRc of the numerous fai lures to achieve 
adequate drainage, sentiment had been aroused for 
a clause in the new constitution that would permit 
the establishment of governmental units knO\rn as 
drainage districts .<2°> The Constitution of 1870 
therefore included a clause intended to allow legis-
lative action to provide for effective drainage. 
Article IV, Section 31, read: 
The General Assembly may pass laws permitting the 
O\rncrs or occupants of land to construct drains and 
ditches for agricu ltural and sanitary purposes across the 
lands of others.<26> 
On the authority of this section, the legislature 
enacted the Drainage Law of 1871. <2 n The pro-
cedures found necessary and expedient through 
Yarious experimental attempts of earlier years were 
incorporated in to this law. This drainage act be-
came the subject of an important Supreme Court 
case in 1876. In Updike v. TVright, <28 > the court 
held that the General Assembly possessed no power 
under the 1870 Constitution to vest commissioners 
or juries with authority to assess and collect taxes 
or special assessments for contemplated improve-
ments. Under no circumstances could a municipal 
corporation (other than a city, town, or village) 
or private corporation be vested with the power to 
levy special assessments. 
This decision made it impossible for the General 
A sembly to enact an effective law under Section 
31. While the decision did not deny the power of the 
legislature to pass laws permitting the formation 
of drainage districts, it did deny the right of such 
districts to levy special assessments. It thus became 
apparent to drainage interests that the only course 
that lay open to them was an amendment to the 
Constitution. Article IV, Section 31, was therefore 
amended in 1878 to read: 
The General Assembly may pass laws permitting the 
01rncrs of lands to construct drains, ditches, and leYccs 
for agricultural, sanitary, or mining purposes, across the 
lands of others, and provide for the organization of drain-
age districts and nst the corporate authorities thereof 
with power to construct and maintain levees, drains and 
ditches, and to keep in repair all drain s, ditches, and 
levees heretofore constructed under the laws of this 
8talc, b:< specia l assesrn1enls upon the proper ty benefited 
thereby. <"> 
Simply stated, the General Assembly \\·as given 
the power to pass la\\·s providing for the organiza-
tion of drainage distri cts and to grant to such dis-
tricts the power to construct and maintain levee:; 
and drains by special assessment. With the consti-
tution thus amended, the General Assembly passed 
tlrn di stinct and separate drainage laws in 1879. 
The underlying purpose of both acts was to provide 
landowners with a legal entity or organization that 
could be used to force unwilling owners into joining 
the district. Both acts embodied the same general 
proYisions as those contained in the Drainage Law 
of 1871. 
Each act \\"US intended to scn·e a distinct drain-
age need. The Levee Act of 1879 (3°> \ms intended 
to provide districts that would offer flood and high-
watcr protection by constructing projects of con-
siderab le magnitude. The Farm Drainage Act of 
1879 (" 1> (subsequently codified and known as the 
Farm Drainage Act of 1885) <32 > was intended to 
provide districts that \YOuld drain , rather than pro-
tect, the lands within the district. 
Although hrn separate drainage la1rn appeared 
to be justifiable at the time of their enactment, by 
1920 the legal difficulties created by repeated litiga-
tion and legislation raised quc::;tions concerning the 
adequacy of the acts. Increased disrntisfaction 
created agitation toward codification of the laws. 
Jn 1941 the Illinois Tax Commission reported: 
The confusion in legal proYisions resulting from this 
original diYi~ion of drainage la11· into tlrn major and sev-
rral minor l'Cts of procedure has gr01n1 with each passing 
:-·t'ar. Jn spite of the original difference in the type of 
dra inagc intended to be proYidcd by the districts organ-
ized under each act, there is li ttle or no legal distinction 
m pu q1osc .... 
Amendments to the statutes have been numerous and 
romplic:1 tcd, sometimes inYoh·ing enactment, repeal, and 
re-enactment in addition to Yarious changes. Much of 
the l cgi~ l ation and many of the amendmen ts \\"Cre passed 
for a particular drainage dist rict which desired to per-
form a certain act or had already performed it and 
needed rnlidating legislation. Because of the court deci-
sion ::i declaring drainage districts un constitutional prior 
to the amendment of 1878 and scYcral subsequent deci-
~ions interpreting the law and inYa!idating prior assc~s­
mcnts and operation~, the statutes are cluttered with 
1·a!idating clauses of no present sign ificance. 
1Iuch of the drainage legal code is now found in court 
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cases rather than in the statutory provisions themselves. 
In interpreting this court law, continual reference must 
be made to the statute, since subsequent amendments 
may have rendered particular court decisions meaning-
less. Moreover, because of the numerous procedures de-
pending upon the type of organization of the district. 
invoh·ed in a given case, it is not always clear to which 
type or types of districts a particular interpretation ap-
plies. The ruling of the court in one case might not hold 
for other types of districts. 
Because of this legal confusion, drainage district pro-
cedure is unnecessarily complicated and expensive. This 
has hampered the real function of the laws, which is to 
make possible the drainage and flood protection of farm 
lands by cooperative effort. Codification and clarification 
are imperativeY" 
The existing situation was summed up in these 
words: 
The practice of drainage law in the state of lllinois 
has become almost the work of a specialist. There is so 
much confusion in the decisions; there have been so many 
changes in the statute law and there are so many intri-
cate, in vol vcd forms of procedure that unquestionably 
the drainage of lands in this State has been impeded by 
the legal difficulties. ('4> 
In 1950 the Section on Drainage and Levee Law 
of the Illinois State Bar Association began working 
on a solution to the existing confusion. The result of 
this group's work was the 1955 Drainage Code (Ch . 
42 of the Illinois Revised Statutes). The code is 
not a mere codification of existing law, but rather 
a complete revision of all drainage statutes. While 
it retains the essentials of the two 1879 acts, the 
extreme confusion has been eliminated. 
The Drainage Code, however, is not the sole 
source of statutory drainage law in Illinois. The 
1959 Highway Code supplies additional drainage 
provisions. T his code allows the highway authori-
ties of the state to secure adequate drainage for 
Illinois' highways. It also specifies the rights and 
duties of adjoining landowners, apart from natural 
drainage, in regard to drainage onto the higlrn·ay. 
Finally, it in part deals \\·ith the relationship be-
tween highway authorities and drainage dislricts. 
The history of the Highway Code (Ch. 121 of 
the Illinois Revised Statutes) is comparatively 
simple. Principal highway laws \\·ere enacted in 
1879 <3si and 1883. <3 GJ A major revision was made in 
1913, "·hen all prior laws were repealed and a new 
law was enacted embodying all highway provi-
sions. <3n This law \ms amended and supplemented 
unti l 1959, when the most recent codification was 
enacted. The 1959 law, as the 1913 law had, re-
pealed the existing highway law and beca me the 
source of highway regulation. 
G. SUMMARY 
Drainage law in Illinois consists of two bodies 
of law, common law and statutory law. The com-
mon- law rule adopted by the state of Illinois as de-
terminative of surface water drainage rights is the 
rule of natural drainage. In the absence of statute, 
this rule prevai ls; if enlarged or superseded by 
statutory law, the statute is deciding. 
Of particular importance to this study is the 
drainage law as it pertains to the highways of 
Illinois. For present introductory purposes it may 
be stated that the highway authorities of Illinois 
are generally treated as any other lando\Yner. <3s 1 
The highway authority is therefore subject to the 
ru le of natural drainage and to the 1955 Drainage 
Code. In addition, the 1959 Highway Code con-
tains statutory provisions that affect the drainage 
of highways and the relationships between highway 
authorities, indi,·idual landowners, and drainage 
districts. 
Ill. NATURAL DRAINAGE 
A. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL DRAINAGE 
A nry important part of the drainage law in 
Illinois is contained in the decisions of our courts. 
Th ese decisions established the rights of natural 
drainage long before any statutes were enacted by 
the legislature, and they have formulated much of 
the present-day natural drainage policy. 
Under the rule of natural drainage as adopted 
by the Illinois Supreme Court, the right of drainage 
i gonrned by the law of nature. <3nl The courts 
ha,·c stated that: 
The right of the O\rner of the superior heritage to 
drainage is based simply on the principle that nature has 
ordained such drainage, and it is but plain and natural 
justice that the individual ownership arising from social 
la\l'S should be held in accordance with pre-existing !mi's 
and arrangements of nature. As \rater must flow, and 
, ome rule in regard to it must be established "·here land 
as held under artificial titles created by human law, there 
can clearly be no other rule at once so equitable and so 
easy of application as that \l'hich enforces natural Ja,1·s. 
There is no surprise or hardship in this, for each succcs-
:::i\'C owner takes \1·ith \1·hatevcr adYantages or incon-
Yenicnces nature has stamped upon his land.c"> 
It has been further stated that natural drainage 
is necessary to render land fit for the habitation 
and use of man. "The streams are the great natural 
sewers through which surface waters escape to the 
sea, and the natural dcprcs ions in the land are the 
drains leading to the strcams."< 4 n 
The principles of natural drainage apply when 
one piece of land is so located that it is at a higher 
clcrntion than the adjoining land and thereby al-
lo\\':3 \1·atcr to flow from the higher to 101Yer estate. 
:-1uch natural flow may consist of either surface 
water derived from rain or snow falling upon the 
dominant field, or of water in some natural water-
course feel by remote springs, or rising in a spring 
upon the dominant field itself. <• 2 > 
In respect to the rights and burdens of drainage, 
individuals hold their ownership of land in accord-
ance with the natural conformation of the ground. 
Therefore, the right of the owner of the dominant 
heritage to drain upon and over the scrvicnt heri-
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tagc is based wholly on the principle that nature 
has ordained such drainage. <43 > 
However, if adjacent lands owned by different 
proprietors arc upon a common level, there being no 
natural drninage from one to the other by a smfacc 
channel, the land of neither proprietor will occupy 
the position of servicnt heritage. Under these cir-
cumstances there is no right at common law to cast 
water onto adjoining land or to dig a ditch through 
adjoining land C4 4 l even though for lack of drainage 
both parcels may be rendered useless . <45 > 
The right to drain upon or over lower or servient 
lands without making compensation for f:Uch privi-
lege is the same whether the dominant land is the 
farm of an individual 01rncr or is a public high-
\\'ay. <•G> The courts have indicated that the same 
rules apply to both road and farm drainage, since 
one is fully as important as the other. <47 l There-
fore highway authorities have a right to have sur-
face waters, falling or coming naturally upon the 
high,1·ay, pass off through the natural and usual 
channels or outlets upon and over 101Yer lands. Also 
they have the right to construct ditches or drains 
for the purpose of conducting surface and im-
pounded water contained on the high\\'ay right-of-
way into a natural and usual channel or outlet, even 
if the water thus carried upon lower lands is in-
creased. c4 s> 
In this discussion, a distinction "·ill be made as 
follo1Ys between natural and statutory drainage: 
(a) natural drainage \\'ill encompass all types of 
drainage that naturall~· occur bet\Yeen the dominant 
and servient land and \1·ill include artificial drains 
that aid natural drainage and that are constructed 
\\'ithin the premises of the dominant tenement; 
(b) statutory drainage will refer to artificial sys-
tems built under the provisions of statute. 
B. LEGAL CLASSIFICATION OF WATER 
1. Categories 
W atcr generally moves from the dominant to 
the scn·ient heritage in one of the following ways: 
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(1) channel \rnters, (2) surface waters, (3) flood 
waters, and ( 4) percolating waters. 
2. Relationship 
I n Illinois there appears to be no distinction in 
application of the rule of natural drainage between 
channel, surface, and flood waters. The rule of 
natural drainage as first announced in Gillham v. 
Madison County R.R.« u> is usua lly stated as 
follows: 
[W]herc the two fi elds adjoin, and one is lm1·cr than 
the other, . . . the owner of the up11er field has a natural 
casement, as it is called, to have the water that falls upon 
his own land flow off the same upon the field below, 
11·hich is charged with a corresponding servitude in the 
nature of dominant and scrvicnt tenements .... [T ] hc 
owner of the lower ground has no righ t to erect embank-
ments \\·hereby the natural flow of the waters from the 
upper ground shall be stopped ; nor has the O\rncr of the 
upper ground any right to make cxcaYations or drains 
by which the flow is directed from its natural channel, 
and a new channel made on the lower ground, nor can he 
collect into one channel waters usually flo11·ing off in to 
his neighbor's fields by several channel s and thus increase 
1 he 1rnsh upon the lower fields. 
The courts have indicated that surface waters 
arc governed by the rule applicable to waters flow-
ing in a natural channel. The reason and basis of 
this rule is stated in Gormley v. Sanford:< 00 > 
In our judgment, the reasoning which leads to thr 
rule forbidding the owner of a field to overflow an ad-
joining field by obstructing a natural water course, fed by 
remote springs, applies, with equal force, to the obstruc-
tion of a natural channel through which the su rface 
waters, derived from the rain or snow falling on such 
field, are 1rnnt to flow. What difference does it make, in 
principle, whether the water comes directly upon the 
field from the clouds above, or has fallen upon remote 
hills, and comes thence in a running stream upon the 
surface, or rises in a spring upon the upper field and 
fIO\\"S upon the lower? The cases asserting a diffcren t 
rule for surface waters and running streams, furnish no 
satisfactory reason for the distinction . . .. The right of 
the O\rner of the superior heritage to drainage is based 
simply on the principle that nature has ordained such 
drainage, and it is but plain and natural justice that the 
individual ownership arising from social laws should br 
held in accordance with pre-existing la 11·s and a rrange-
ments of nature. As water must flo\\·, and some rule in 
regard to it must be established where hnd is held under 
the artificial t itles created by human law, there can 
clearly be no other rule at once so equ itable and so easy 
of application as that which enforces natural law~. There 
is no surprise of hardship in this, for each successive 
owner takes with whatever ad n rn tagcs or incom·cni enccs 
nnture has stamped upon his land. 
The question of whether or not the same rule is 
applicable to flood waters wa>' first considered by 
the Supreme Court in the case of Pinkstaff v. 
Steffy: <511 
It might with equal force be inquired here 1rhat dif-
ference it can make, in principle, whether the 11·atcr that 
submerges the land of Steffy comes from the hill s aboYc 
the land or comes from the 01·crflo11· of a stream along 
the same. \Ve are unable to sec either the distinction 
or the ground for one. Both arc natural consequences. 
Both are burdens cast upon the adjacent lands by the 
la1\"S of nature, and as applied to such creeks and streams 
as the one in question 11·0 haYc no doubt that the correct 
rule is "that waters \Yhich have overflowed the banks of a 
st ream in times of freshet, in consequence of the insuffi-
ciency of the natural chnnncl to hold them and rarry 
them off, are surface wnters, within the meaning of the 
rul es of law relative to such 1rnters." 
Th ere has been some question concerning the 
app lication of the rules of natural drainage to in-
termittent as \\·ell as continuous flo\Ying channels. 
It has been held in Illinois that the same rule is 
appli ed to :-urfacc 1rntcr flowing in a regula r chan-
nel that is applied to a watercourse continuously 
or u s u a l!~· flmY ing in a pa rticular direction. <021 
The fourth type of 1rnter is percolating water. 
This is the type of water that passes through the 
ground beneath the earth's surface without a defi -
nite channel. (.> 3 > Percolating water is part of the 
land itse lf and belongs absolutely to the owner of 
the land. The landowner, in the absence of any 
grant, may intercept or impede such underground 
percolation cYen though there may be interference 
" ·ith the rnurcc of supply of springs and \\·ells on 
adjoining premises.CS•> 
The rules of natmal drainage apply to channel, 
surface, and flood \\"aters, and they will be treated 
together in this report under surface water, since 
11·e arc primarily concerned with drainage. There 
arc some variations in the Civil Law Rule as ap-
plied to surface and channel waters relative to 
ripari an rights , but again the concern is with the 
use of the water rather than drainage and therefore 
1Yill not be considered in thi" report. 
C. WATERCOURSE 
1. Natural Watercourse 
A watercourse , according to the ordina ry sig-
n ifi cance of the term , must be a stream flowing in 
a particular direction and in a definite channel, and 
it usually discharges into some other stream or body 
of \\·ater. t 33 > A natural watercourse is one \\·hose 
origin is the result of the forces of nature. An arti-
ficial \rntercourse generally owes its origin to acts 
of man and includes drainage ditches, canals, etc. 
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:.Inny natural \Yatcrcourses have been widened, 
deepened, or straightened, and these alterations do 
not change the classification of the watercourse 
from natural to artificial. <0Gl 
Illinois' courts have enlarged the basic definition 
of a watercourse when the term is applied to the 
drainage of surface \Yater: 
lf the conformation of the land is such as to gi\·e to 
the urface \rater flowing from one tract to the other a 
fixed and determinate course, so as to uniformly discharge 
it upon the servient tract at a fixed and definite point, 
the course thus uniformly follO\red by the \rnter in its 
flow is a watercourse ... .<"> 
The same court went on to explain that it is 
probable that such a watercourse can exist only 
where there is a ravine, swale, or depression of 
greater or lesser depth, extending from one tract 
onto the other and so situated as to gather up the 
surface water falling upon the dominant tract and 
conduct it along a defined channel to a definite 
point of discharge upon the scrvient tract. The 
court also mentioned that it docs not seem to be 
important that the force of the water flo,Ying from 
one tract to another has not been sufficient to make 
a channel having definite and well-marked sides or 
banks. Therefore, if the surface water moves uni-
formly or habitually over a given course ha,·ing 
reasonable limits as to width, the line of flow is, 
within the meaning of the law applicable to the 
discharge of surface water, a watercourse.<"> 
Another court held that: 
f llt is not necessary that ... r a] watercourse 
should have a definite channel usually flowing in a par-
ticular direction and discharging into some other stream 
or body of water; but if it be surface water flowing in a 
regular channel it will be a sufficient watcrcourseY'> 
The use of the expression "natural watercourse" 
or "watercourse" in conjunction with natural drain-
age channels has been somewhat confusing, since 
this terminology can apply to either riparian mrncrs 
or dominant and servient owners. However, it ap-
pears that in most cases where the courts use the 
terms "watercourse" and "natural \ratcrcoursc" in 
connection with the obstruction or drainage of sur-
face 'rnters, they arc thinking of watercourses in 
the sense of drainways or drainage channels rather 
than in the sense of streams or ancient water-
courses. <Go> 
A slough or depression that carries water only in 
rainy seasons is not a watercourse within the re-
stricted sense in which the term is used with respect 
lo riparian rights. However, it is a 'rntcrcoursc 
\Yithin the mcanmg of that term as used in the 
drainage la1Ys of this statc.< 6 1 > 
Therefore it may safely be expressed that the 
term "watercourse" has come to have two distinct 
meanings: one when referring to a watercourse in 
and to which riparian rights may attach, and 
another "·hen referring to a \\·atcrcourse through 
which an upper landmrncr may discharge water 
from his land. This report will concern itself \Yith 
the type of \Yatercoursc draining surface \Yater from 
the upper to the lower landO\Yncr. 
Past experience has shown that natural water-
courses require maintenance and improvement. 
Therefore, the courts have held that a natural 
\rntcrcoursc is not required to be used only in its 
natural state, but may be improved either by being 
deepened or widened by artificial means or by the 
construction of a drain along the course of its chan-
nel to more cffcctiYely carrv the surface \Yater off 
the land. The construction of such improvement 
docs not create a ,;ubstantially new \Yatcrcourse, 
nor docs it amount to an abandonment of the nat-
ural watercourse. <" 2 > 
2 . Artificial Watercourse 
T n this phase of the study an artificial water-
cour~e will refer only to a man-made channel on 
the land of a single lando\rnc1-. Artificial water-
courses extending through the lands of t\yo or more 
landowners will be discussed under the heading of 
stalutory drainage. 
There has been some feeling in the past that 
improvements to a natural watercourse create a 
new watercourse. However, the courts have held 
that a natural watercourse docs not lose its char-
acter because it \ms a ided by man during its crea-
t ion or because part of its channel was artificially 
created. <6 3 > Simply cleaning out a natural drain 
docs not make it an artificial ditch.<G•> Also a 
natural watercourse docs not lose its identity by 
being deepened or widened by artificial means or 
by installation of a subsurface drain along the 
course of its channel. (G:;) Wh en an individual has 
constru cted an a rtificial drain on his own land for 
the discharge of surface waters, he is not obligated 
to keep the drain open for the purpose of draining 
the lands of others unless it is a substitute for a 
natural drain.< 66 > 
Under certain conditions, an a rtificial water-
course may be considered a natural watercourse. 
The qua lifications arc that the artificial 'rnter-
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course must han served principally in lieu of a 
natural channel for the presc ribed period, ancl must 
have all of the Cf'scntia l clements of a watercourse. 
Likc\Yisc , if drainage ditches lrnvc been comtructed 
by common consent and used for the prescribed pe-
riod , they become waterrourses as fully as though 
they were not of artificia l origin. crn 
Artificial watercourses may be constructed by a 
landowner on his property if, in the ab~encc of an:< 
contractual or prcscrirtivc right, an added burden 
is not imposed on the property of another .<1; 8 ) 
A landowner may change the direction of Dow 
by artificial means on his land proYidccl the water 
is restored to its natural or original channe l before 
it leaves the property. <Go) In doing so, hO\rcnr, the 
landowner must be sure that the capacity of the 
artificia l ch annel will accommodate the waters 
handled by the natural watercourse. <70 > 
The mn1cr of a superior heritage cannot by an~· 
act acquire the right to collect surface \rnter by 
artificial channels on his own land, and thus flood 
scrvicnt land without consent.< 71 l The general pub-
lic can acquire rights in an artificial ditch on]~· by 
deed , prescription, or condemnation. <72 > 
D. WATER MOVEMENTS 
1. Definition of Surface Water 
The type of water often referred to b~· the Illi-
nois Courts in connection with natural drainage is 
surface water. An expli cit definition of surface 
water has not been found in an~· of the Illinois 
decisions. However, statements from Illinois court 
decisions have often referred to surface water, and 
these statements agree with definitions contained in 
other references. Comparison of the quotations 
from Illinois decisions and other references shows 
that the terminology relating to surface water is 
similar. The fo llowing are quotations from Illinois 
cases : 
The rule undoubtedly is, that the owner of a higher 
tract of land has the right to have the surface 1Yatcr fall-
ing or naturally coming upon his prcmi~es by rains or 
melting snow pass off through natural drains upon or 
OYcr the lower or scrvient lands next adjoining ... Y'> 
LThe natural flow of water which the servicnt O\rncr 
is bound not to obstruct] consists either of surface 1rntcr, 
deriYcd from the rain or snow falling upon the dominant 
field, or of the water in some natural watcr-co1m:c, fed 
by remote springs, or rising in a s11ring upon the dom-
inant field itselfY'> 
These definitions are quoted from other sources: 
The term 'surface \Yater ' is used in the law of 11·aters 
in reference to :1 dist inct form or rl:i~s of \r:itrr 1Yhich is 
gencrall~- defined :is that which i,; deriYccl from falling 
rain or melting rno1r, or 11·hich ri"r" to the ~mracc in 
']wing~ and is <liffu~ccl orrr the sml"are of the ground, 
1Yhilc it remains in such diffused state or condition."'' 
IS [urface \rntcrs ... [arc 1 tho!'c casu:1I 11·atcr,; 
11·hirh accu mul::lt c from natural rnurce,; and 11·hich haYe 
not ~·rt c1·aporatecl, been absorbed into the earth, or 
found their 11·a~· into a st ream or lake. The term dor." 
not comprehend 11·atc rs impounded in :irtificial pond", 
tanks or 11·ater mai nsP'> 
Surface \Yater is th:1t which i,; diffu,ccl oYcr the sur-
farc of the ground, dcri1·ccl from falling rains and melting 
c; no11·,;, and continues to he c;uch until it reaches some 11·r!l 
defined channrl in \1·hich it is accu,tomccl to, and docs 
flo11· 11·ith other 1rntcrs, whether clcriYcd from the surfa ce 
or spring~; and it then hccon1rR the running watrr of a 
Rtrcam and ceases to be surface m1tcr.( 11 > 
Surface 11·atcrs arc thm:c 11·hich fall on the land from 
the ~k i cs or aric;c in spring~ and diffw;c thcmsch·r6 onr 
the Rurfacc of the ground, foll01ring no dcfinrd course or 
channel, and not gathering into or forming any more 
definite body of 1rntrr tk\11 a mrrr bog or rnnrsh, and arr 
lost by being cliffusrd 01·cr the ground through prrcola-
tion, c1·aporation, or natural drainagcY'> 
I Surface 11·atcr,; 1 aR the name implies, cxi,;t on the 
fare of the cart h hut not rontainrd in clcfinccl Rt rearn~, 
clwnncls, or h:1,in,, and thr natm c thereof is such that 
the landO\nlC'r 111n\· make use thereof :1bsolutclyY'> 
Surface 'rnters do not lose their character by 
reason of flowing from the land on \\·hich they make 
their appearance onto ]01,·er land in obed ience with 
the law of gravity, or by flowing into a natural 
basin from 11·hich they normally disappear through 
c\·aporation or percolation, or merely by being col -
lected and absorbed by marshy or boggy land. 
Ho\\'C\·er, surface ,,·aters cease to be surface \raters 
when they empty into and become a part of a 
natural stream or lake. <80 > 
The preceding definition of the term surface 
\Yater implies that it is derived from falling rains 
or melting snows or that it rises to the surface in a 
spring. It also implies that surface \rntcr may be 
in a diffused state, either flO\Ying naturally from 
the dominant to the scrvient hmd or confined in an 
area that has no natural drainage. It is not exactl:,-
clcar ,,·hen surfarc \raters cease to b e s uch and 
become part of a running stream. Ho11·cyer, the 
courts in Illinois stated that they could sec no 
reason \Yh:· the same rule should not apply to sur-
face \\·ater as to running streams or watercou rscs. <81 l 
Prc,·ious discuf'sion indicates that the same rules of 
drainage should apply to the various types of \rnter 
rnonment except percolation. "YVith this explana-
tion ,,.c shall make no further distinction bct\Yccn 
surface and rnnning \Yater. 
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2. Diffused Surface Water 
The broad classifications encompass all \rntcr 
found on the surface of the ground. The first cate-
gory consists of bodies of water to which riparian 
rights attach and includes rivers, streams, lakes, 
and ponds. The second category comprises all other 
\Yaters on the surface of the ground ,C 82 > which are 
interchangeably referred to as " surface \Yater" or 
"diffused surface 'rntcr." It is in this scn~c that 
surf ace water is defined on page 18. 
Although surface water in its broadest sense 
refers to either surface \\·atcr or diffused surface 
\rntcr, the t"·o must be separated to determine tltc 
app licability of drainage rules. In thi::; finer brcak-
do\\·n, surface water is limited to \\'ater flo\\·ing in 
a channel , regardless of how slight that channel 
may be. Diffused surface \\'atcr (or simply diffu~ed 
\rntcr), on the other hand, is \rntcr that is not con-
fined to a channel. (83 > In this discussion and in 
succeeding sections, the term surface \\'atcr will be 
used in its narrow sense, i.e., water flo1,·ing in a 
channel. 
The question arises whether the rules of natural 
drainage apply to diffused water as well as to sur-
face water when the te rms arc broken down as 
shown above. Because Illinois courts have not yet 
anS\Yercd this question, no rule can be stated. Con-
flicting arguments can, ho\\·cvcr, be prcscn tcd. 
One contention is that the rule of natural drain-
age is confined to surface \1·atcr and docs not apply 
to diffused water. Two Illinois author::;, F. B. 
Leonard and H. W. Hannah, have cxprcs::;ed this 
opinion, of which the following is an example: 
I \VI here surface \Yater floll'S from hi1.d1er to lo11·cr 
l:rnd in n:-ttural channels or dcpn·~~ions , the lo11·er 01rncr 
i~ under a duty to rcceiYc this 11·atcr and cannot dam 
againO't it, or do anything that \\'ill !Jack ~uch \rnter up 
on the higher land. It 11·ill be not iced that this du[\· of 
the "cn ·ient 01rner docs not extend lo rcceiYing ~ u1~fare 
"·atcr flo11·ing; in a cliffu~ecl state, !Jut only lo that 11·hich 
flo11·;; in marked channels or depressions formed by it-
~elf or by nature. These channcb , ho1YeYer, do not h:wc 
to be streams 11·ith definit e h::tnb or 11·ith :1 rontinuou :; 
flow of irater. c••> 
Leonard and Hannah base the ir opinion pri -
marily on two appellate cases. In 1V agner v. 
Chaney/ 85 > an upper owner artificially collcdcd 
diffused 'rntcr and conducted it onto the lmYer land 
through a tile drain. The court held that the case 
did not fall within the Illinois rule that allmrn an 
upper o\\·ncr to collect \Yater and discharge it on lo 
the lo\\'cr owner through the natural channel be-
cause the facts showed that there was no such 
channel. Apparently the Illinois authors inter-
preted the court's opinion as implying not only that 
the collection and discharge aspect of the natural 
drainage rnlc docs not app ly to diffused \Yater, but 
that diffused \rnter is completely outside the opera-
tion of the rule. 
In the second case, Bischmann v. Boehl,( so> the 
court held that \rhcther the \rntcr is spread out or 
is floll'ing in a channel is a question of fact fo r the 
jur>-. l3y relying on this case to support their 
opinions, the Illinois \\'riters must have assumed 
that there \\·ould be no need to make a distinction 
if the same rnle applied to both surface \rnter and 
diffused \\·atcr. 
The basis for the contention that surface water 
and d iffused \\'ater arc subject to different rul es is 
mo~t clearly explained in Farnharn's The Law of 
Waters and TVater Rights.< sn Domat's statement 
of th e ciYil la\\· rule contains a prerequisite to appli-
eation of the rule, \\'hic:h is that the \rntcrs must 
"ha,·c their course regulated from one ground to 
another."( 8 '> The inference is that there mu~t be 
more than a general diffusion of water over the 
ground that merely finds its \\'ay without definite 
course from higher to lower land. Later statements 
of the rule, ho\rcvcr, were broader and did not 
inelucle the regulated channel requisite. The French 
Civil Code of 1804 read: 
The 011·ncr of the lo1Ycr ground is liound to rcceiYe 
from thP higher ground the \\':tlC'r \\'hirh naturally flows 
d01rn 1rithout the human h:rnd ronlributing to its 
roursc. csoi 
Louisiana 's Civil Code reads: 
lt is a scn·itude clue hy the estate siltmtcd below to 
recci1·e the 1Y:-tter \rhich rnns n:-tlurally from the estate 
~iluatcd abol'C, ])l'OYided the industry of man has not 
hcC'n u~cd to create that i"CI'l·ituclc .<""> 
li'arnham contends that these latter sources 
misstate the rule and that under the true civil law 
rule there is no servitude unless there is a regulated 
course in which the \rntcr flo\\'S. 
Farnham further justifies his position by claim-
ing that, C\'en though diffu::;cd \\'rttcr may flow from 
one piece of land to the adjoining piece, the flow 
at all points is uniform and the vo l umc is not great; 
therefore no injury can result to the upper O\Yncr 
if he allo\\'S the lo\\·er mrncr to obstruct.(ni> Farn-
ltarn 's explanation of the lower o\\·ncr's right to 
obstruct diffused 'rntcr is as follows: 
\\' atcr 11·hich is the rc~ult of rains or melting snow, 
\\'hen diffu ~cd O\'Cr the face of the cnrth, is materially 
different from lh:-tt 1rhich is flo\\'ing in a definite channel. 
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While it is in this condition most of it will percolate into 
the soil or evaporate before it becomes united 1Yith suffi-
cient other water to form a stream. In this form it is not 
of sufficient quantity to do material harm to the Jand 
upon which it falls, even if it is compelled to remain 
there. When t\\·o lots subject to water in this condition 
adjoin each other ... neither has a right of drainage 
over the other and the O\rncr of either may make any lt-c 
of his property which he chooses, regardless of the cff cc ts 
of his acts upon the urfacc \\·atcr, so long as he docs not 
collect it and cast it in a body on the other property. li e 
may build upon his property, raise its grade, or paYc it. 
And the fact that the lots arc on a different level, so that 
there would be a natural flow of the water in its diffused 
state from one to the other, is immaterial. The owner 
of the lower one may, by improYcmcnts, prevent the 
water from flowing onto his property . ... [S]o long a~ 
the water is spread out the neighbor is under no obli-
gation to permit the water to flow upon his property 
from higher ground although the grade is such as to 
make the flow from one parcel to the other a natu ral 
one.<•2> 
The contention that diffused water is not sub-
ject to the rule of natural drainage may be 8U tn-
marized by the following statement: 
[1] With respect to water as it falls from the clouds 
the burden must rest where it falls so long as the water 
remains in a diffused state, without being gathered into 
any channel. In such condition, the water will ordinarily 
do no particular harm, and if it is necessary to obtain 
drainage for it, resort must be had to the aid of the state 
by means of public drainage proceedings. L2J While the 
water is in that condition any JandO\rncr may make such 
improvements upon his property as he chooses. llc may 
build upon or change the su rface at pleasure, 1rithout 
liability for the incidental effect upon adjoining property. 
[3] He cannot, however, by artificial means gather the 
water upon his property together and throw it upon 
the property of his neighbor, whether the grade of the 
latter's land is higher or lower than his .<'"> 
A second argument is that the rule of natural 
drainage is applicable to diffused water. A:; pre-
viously noted, Domat's statement of the natural 
drainage rule follows the theory that water flowing 
from higher to lower ground in a regulated course 
cannot be interfered with to the prejudice of the 
owner of the lower ground. I-fo1yever, later state-
ments of the law found in the French Civil Code of 
1804 (or Code Napoleon) and the Louisiana Civil 
Code are broader. These two codes simply state 
that a possessor of lower land is not pri 1·ileged to 
obstruct the natural flow of surface water; neither 
code contains a requirement that the flow be in a 
regulated channel. Farnham concedes that the 
courts which have attempted to adopt the civil law 
rule have actually followed these broad statemenb 
rather than the true rule. <94 l 
Since the American courts han derived their 
concept of the civil law rule of drainage from the 
Code N apolcon and the Louisiana Civil Code, the 
argument to be made is that diffused water that 
passes from one landowner to another is flowing in 
a state of nature, eyen though not in a regulated 
channel, and therefore must be accepted by the 
hmer mrner. ca.;) Furthermore, at least one j urisdic-
tion committed to the c:i 1·il la\\· rule has taken the 
position that the 01rncr of lo\\-cr land is not priv-
ileged to obstruct the natural flow of irater from 
adjoining higher land, not only where the flow is 
through natural draimrny:;, but also "·here it Jlow;; 
in a diffused state over a wide area. (!JGJ 
Since American jurisdictions adopting the nat-
ural drainage rule have stated it in its broad form 
and since Illinois is among these jurisdictions, it 
may be argued that the rule in Illinois should be 
that the dominant lanclo1rner is pri1·ileged to have 
surface 1rnter flmring in a diffused state 01·er his 
land enter the land of the servient tenement rega rd-
less of whether a discernible channel exists. This 
argument may be supported in at least three way s. 
First , this argument finds support in the lan-
guage of the Illinois Supreme Court in the case 
adopting the natural drainage rule: <9 'l 
The right of the O\rncr of the superior hcriL1gc to 
drainage i" ba::ccl f'imp h· on the principle that nature ha" 
ordained such drainage, and it is but plain and natural 
justice that the incli1·idual 01rncr~hip arising from soc ial 
lairs should Le held in accordance \\·ith preexisting la\\"~ 
and arrangements of nat ure. 
As \\·atrr mu"t !lo\\·, and ~omc rule in regard to it 
must be c~tabli:;hccl \\·here bnd is held under the artifici~tl 
titles created by human law, there can clearly be no 
other rule at once ,.:o equitable and so easy of applicatio n 
a:; that \\·hieh enforces natura l lm\"S. There i~ no surprise' 
or hardship in this, for each succcf'SiYe O\rner takes \\·ith 
\\·hatcYer ad 1·antages or inconYcniences nature ha~ 
stamped uron his land. 
The flow of diffused 1rnter is just as much 
ordained by nature as is the flow of surface water. 
Furthermore, there is no language in this opinion 
that expressly or impliedly excludes diffused water 
from the natural drainage rule. 
Second, Wagner v. Chaney(as) is subject to an 
interpretation substantially different from that 
made by Leonard and Hannah. The holding of the 
case 11·as simply that diffused 1rnter cannot be col-
lected and di scharged onto lower land 11·hen there 
is no natural channel leading from the upper land 
to such 1011·er land. There i:; no indication, how-
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ever, that the entire natural drainage rule is inappli-
cable to diffused water. 
Third, one of the principal justifications offered 
by Farnham for his position that diffused water 
may be obstructed by the lower lando\rncr is the 
contention that diffused water causes no material 
injury and that the upper owner is therefore not 
incon\·cnienccd or injured by being forced to retain 
it. (D•» The question is whether this contention is 
universally true; in a situation \\·here it can be 
shown that retention of diffused \rater \vill sub-
stantially injure the upper owner, can the Farnham 
po ition be justified? 
As previously stated, Illinois has not established 
its position on the applicability of the natural 
drainage rule to diffused water. Final determination 
of this question remains for future litigation. 
3 . Rights to Natural Flow of Surface Water 
When two adjoining fields arc so situated that 
\rater naturally descends from one to the other, the 
lmvcr field must accept all water that naturally 
flows from the upper field if the dominant land-
owner so desires. (looJ The owner of the upper field 
has a natural casement to have the water that falls 
upon his land flow onto the field below. <101 J Therc-
f orc, a party purchasing land over "·hich surface 
\\·ater naturally flmvs, assumes the burden of receiv-
ing such surface water and cannot obstruct, impede, 
or stop such natural drainage to the injury of the 
011·ncr of the superior hcritagc.< 102 J 
4 . Use of a Watercourse for Draining 
Surface Water 
It seems to be a well-established rule in Illinois 
that the owner of lands through which a natural 
\rntcrcoursc flows may accumulate surface waters 
falling upon his lands and cast them into such 
watercourse. He may do so without liability, cYCn 
though the flow of "·ater is accelerated and the 
volume increased, (io3J provided the natural capacity 
of the channel is not exceeded, causing injury to the 
lower owner. C1°·1J The courts have stated that the 
owner of a dominant heritage may accumu late such 
waters by means of ditches and drains on his own 
land and discharge the water into the natural and 
usual channel or watercourse. <105J Further, such 
watercourse need not have a definite channel usually 
flowing in a particular direction and discharging 
into some other stream or body of water, but will be 
a sufficient watercourse if it contains surface water 
flO\\·ing in a determined course. (loGJ 
In many of the court cases, the first point in 
question is whether the location where the surface 
water is discharged is considered a natural water-
course. The courts have follo\vcd the definitions of 
a watercourse giYcn in a preceding section to deter-
mine the privilege of the dominant mrncr to drain 
surface water upon the scrvicnt owner at a partic-
ular location . 
The follo\ving case shows how this definition has 
been applied in the past. One of the parties im·olvcd 
\\·as a railroad rather than a highway, but it appears 
that the same rnlc \rnuld apply to either of the two. 
A railroad embankment \\'US placed across a piece 
of land, and the surface \\·atcr from t he higher 
ground was collected and passed through a cu lvert 
in the embankment onto the lower land. The ser-
vicnt landowner contended that the erection of the 
embankment caused surface \\·atcr from abo\·c to 
be collected and wrongfully diYCrtcd from the 
natural \Vatcrcoursc and then allO\\·cd to run 
through a cu!Ycrt in the embankment and spread 
oYcr the lo\\·cr owner's land. The court held that 
the culvert \\·as placed in the exact line of a natural 
\rntcrcoursc and the rai lroad had the privilege of 
draining the surface \rntcr from the higher land 
into such watercourse. The court explained that it 
was not necessary that there be a channel with wcll-
definccl banks . If the surface \\·atcr flO\YS along a 
fixed and determined course, it constitutes a \rnter-
coursc into \Vhich the owner of the dominant heri-
tage has a right to discharge surface \Yater that 
flO\YS naturally in that direction. (1on 
It appears to make no difference what means 
arc used to bring water from the surrounding area 
to a natural \vatcrcoursc. The bro most common 
methods arc surface and subsurface drains. The 
courts have stated that the rnlc of law undoubtedly 
is that an O\Yncr of land may empty waters into a 
natural \rntercourse by ti le or open ditches. <108J 
E. ACCELERATION 
1. Permissibility 
Since drainage is concerned with removal of 
water from the land, the question that often ari,;c,; 
is how fast and in what quantities it can be rc-
mond. In the first cases that arose, the Illinois 
courts apparently felt that the water on the dom-
inant land could not be collected by artificia l 
ditchc:'l and drained into natural draimrnys leading 
onto the 10\YCr land if the flow "·as thereby ac-
cclcratedY0DJ In one case the court held that the 
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owner of the superior heritage could not, by any 
act of his, acquire the right to col lcct the surface 
water upon his land by artificial channels and thus 
cause it to flow across hi s neighbor's land in larger 
quantities or at different times than it would nat-
urally flow. (uo) This opinion was modified some-
what in a later holding: 
l W Jhile it is ... proper for the o\rncr of land to 
use and cultivate it according to the ordinary methods of 
good husbandry, although by doing so it may interfere 
\\·ith the natural flo\1· of su rface water in pa~sing over 
his O\rn land, so as to increase or diminish the amount 
that otherwise would reach the land of an adjacent pro-
prietor and thereby cause him an injury for which the 
law would afford no redress, yet such owner has no right, 
by the construction of ditches and embankments or other 
artificial structures of a ~im il ar character, to coll ect to-
gether the su rface waters from his O\rn lands or those of 
other persons, and precipitate them in undue and un-
natural quantities upon the lands of his neighbor to his 
injury.< 111 > 
Later cases held that the owner of the dominant 
heritage had the right to have surface waters pass 
off through natural drains upon and over the lower 
or scrvient lands. Also, the owner of the dominant 
heritage has the right to drain his mrn land into 
natural channels, even if the quantity of water 
thrown upon the adjoining lower lands is thereby 
increased (l1 2 > and the flow accelerated. (i io) These 
rights are possibly restricted to situations wh ere 
acceleration is for the sake of good husbandry. ( 11 •l 
2. Collection 
All lands lying within a natural basin may be 
drained into the tributary watercourse draining that 
basin. The lower landowners cannot object to in-
creased flowage caused by artificial ditches con-
structed by the dominant owner so long as the 
artificial ditches drain only the natural basin. (1 ir.) 
Therefore, the owner of the dominant estate has 
no legal right to collect and discharge water onto 
lower land if the water would not flow naturally in 
that direction. Furthermore, the dominant owner 
has no legal right, by means of drains, ditches, or 
otherwise, to collect even the water that would 
naturally flow toward the scrvient estate and dis-
charge it in a body except in a natural channel or 
watercourse. (llGJ 
The courts have held that dominant landowners 
have a right to discharge water over the natural 
surface of their lands onto the highway, with the 
stipulation that they do not bring water to that part 
of the highway that would naturally be delivered at 
a different place. (m) W atcr sto red in pockets a lon g 
natural depressions and \1·atcrcourscs can be 
drained along the natural course of drainage, but 
new excavations must not be made on the lower 
lands. ( 118 > 
In one case where the higll\rny authority a nd 
another dominant landmrncr constructed a series of 
ditches leading to and through a natural \Yatcr-
coursc and thus increased t he ,·olume of water on 
the lo\\·er landowner, the court held: 
It may be true, in this ca~c, that the construction of 
the higlnrny ditch , and the ditches connecting; therC\rith 
... han increased the Yolume and flow of \1·ater into the 
ditch on appellant"s land, and that it now empties into 
the same \rith greater force t han it \rnuld in a state 
of nature. Dut this cannot be aYoided. It is one of the 
ineYitable results experienced in the drainage and im-
]JroYement of land, \1·hich the de\·elopment of the coun-
try cannot ahrnys 11crmil lo remain in a state of n;1ture. 
It has therefore frequently been held in this State, that 
the O\Yners of the dominant hNitage may make such 
drains or ditches for agricultural purposes on hi;; 01\·n 
land as may be requi red by good husbandry, although b~· 
~o doing, the flo\1· of \l'ater may be increased in the 
natural channel \\·h ich ca rries \rnlcr from the uppC'I" to 
the 10\Yer fieldY"' 
In the case of Kankakee & Seneca R.R. v. 
Horan,( 120 > the railroad \1·as sued for an injury to 
land caused by the use of too small a culvert in an 
embankm ent. B ecause of the insufficient size of the 
culvert, waters of a stream \\"ere obstructed and 
thereby caused flooding on an adjoining farm . One 
argument of the defense was that the culvert was 
large enough to ca rry off al 1 the water of the ::;trcam 
before the embankment was erected, but that flow-
age had since been increased by the collection of 
water in artificial ditches on the lands of upper 
owners and that the railroad \ms not liable for such 
increase. The court said: 
The Parker slough \1·as a \1·atercour~e, and il \\"as the 
legal right of any one along its line for miles aboYe 
the railroad, \rhere the \Yater naturally shed tO\rnrd the 
slough, to drain into it, and no one bclo\\·, O\rning land 
along the slough, \1·ould haYe any legal remedy against 
such person so draining \rater into the slough above him , 
for any damage done to his inheritance by means of an 
increased flow of \1·ater caused thereby. In other \YOrds, 
the slough \\":J.S a legal watercour~e for the drainage of all 
the land the natural tendency of \rhich \\"US to cast its 
su rplus \rnter caused by the fall ing of rain and snow 
into it; and this, \rhether the flo\\. \l"as increased by arti -
ficial means or not. 
The court decided that the railroad, in building 
a culvert, "·as bound to anticipate and provide for 
any such legal increase in the flow. 
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3 . Acceleration as Required by Good Husbandry 
It has been sta ted th at the dominan t landowner 
may accelerate the movement of wa ter on his 
own land for agricultural purposes as required by 
good husbandry. c121 > The question then ari ses : 
what docs good husbandry mean ? No defini te 
rul e:; have been established to define t his term . 
LeonarcJC 122 > ·mentioned th a t any improvement in 
the course of bona fide fa rming \YOtdd be uph eld, 
since farming is so important in Illinois. Leonard 
fm ther t hought that it \Yould be safe to say that 
any legit imate fa rming operation would sanction 
an in crease of th e flow in natural drainage ch annels. 
4. Injury Caused by Acceleration 
A problem that the courts have not ans\Yered 
is " ·hether t he lower owner is entitled to any relief 
"·hen he is substantially injured by the acceleration 
of \nt t cr on the upper estat e. Lconarc](1 23 l stated 
that: 
Peck \' . Herrington dealt with the question of accel-
erat ion and affi rmed t he righ t to increase the fl o1Y in t he 
interests of good husbandry, t hough no limits to thnt rule 
11·cre considered . Now such acceleration is usunlly a ncg-
ligil le affair. The natural swalcs or dcprc~s i on s can easil y 
accommodate the excess procluccd by "feed di tches" on 
the upper tenement and wi thin the natural !Jas in in n ine 
en ·es ou t of ten. So t he right to accelerat ion should he 
su tni ncd . But where t hat acceleration nlonc caw-cs 
water to sp read ou t oYcr t he lower fiel d and injm c t he 
crops there, the in terests of good husbandry on t he upprr 
estate come into confli ct with the in terest of good hu '-
hnndry on the lower estate, and no good rcnson is pcr-
cci1·ccl 1Yhy t he upper 011·ncr should be preferred. We 
must remember that accclcrn ti on is the 1rn rk of mnn, not 
of nature. So fa r as d rainngc in a state of nature is con-
cerned , we may say that we onl y recogni ze a 8C rvi tudc 
whi ch na ture has imposed and t hat therefore the lower 
owner takes his land 1Yi th knowl edge tha t such a burden 
ex ists. Bu t such reasoning docs not reach t he case where 
mn n increases the burden below fo r his mrn benefi t 
nboYc. I submi t, t herefo re, that our cour ts 11·ould be 
ju:;tified in awa rding dn mages in such a case . It 1rnuld 
be urnYisc to enjoin an um1cr owner from improYing h i~ 
land hy more minu te d rainage there, bu t it 1rnuld be un-
just to compel the lo11·c r owner lo submi t to damage 
caused by wo rk of the dominant owner fo r his own bcnr -
fi t solely. While no au thori ty exists fo r the conclusion, 
it i submi tted that three rul es may very 1rnll be adop ted 
11·hcn the cases come before our cour ts tha t \\"C have been 
considering: ( 1) If the acceleration caused by t he upper 
01rncr in the natural basin should be so great as to 
utterly destroy the 101rnr tenement, an injunction might 
be granted and the u pper O\\"ner compelled to condemn 
a drai nngc d itch ac ross the lower land under the natural 
drai nage section of the F a rm D rainage Act . (2) If the 
accelerat ion d id not destroy the lower estate, bu t did ma-
teria ll :< damage it, then an nction fo r damages migh t be 
all o\\"ed 1rhich 1rnuld include permn ncnt damages. If the 
nccclcrat ion d id not mate riall y ;ickl to the burden of the 
lmrcr O\\"ncr, then neither injunct ion nor tor t action 
~hould lie. (3) It could nry well include the case 11·here 
the burden on the lower 01rncr 1rns only temporarily 
incre::i scd , ::is in the d rninngo of small ponds, if this wore 
done in a cn rcful and prudent mannrr. 
Whether the Illinois courts " ·oulcl consider this 
a rgument is open to question in Yicw of scnral past 
dec isions. F or example, t he court held th at if an 
ox-bo"· loop had been fo rmed in the natural course 
of d rainage upon the dominan t. landO\Yner's prop-
erty , the dominant landom1cr \\'ould be within his 
right to cut a ditch through the loop and discharge 
the water on the scrvient land even though this 
shor t cu t greatly accelera ted the flow of water. Th e 
court justified this reasoning by the following 
remarks: 
Another object ion urged to the dec ree \\"ith great 1·e-
hcmoncc is t hat it i ~ un just fo r the reason that the new 
ditch \\"ill carry dmrn to the lands of appellants brush 
::incl other debris t hat nonr coul d reach t here if t he 1rnter 
fo ll owed tho natural couriir. Any d ra in thnt accelerates 
the fl ow of wa ter \\·ill increase the ::i moun t of solid mat ter 
tlrnt it c::i rrics to the serl"icnt c~tatc , and we do not think 
it is a good obj ec tion to the exercise of t he right of a 
domin n n t p roprietor to say th ::i t the increased flo\\· 11·ill 
ca rr ~· debris beyond the bound n n · line, 1rhich would not 
rrach there except b~· rcnso n of the nr t ifi cial drainage.<"'> 
Another court fur ther stated: 
Lll n la\\· there could be no cl anwge resul ting to ap-
pcll ce, no mntter h01\" mu ch ndunl damages 1rcrc suffe red 
by him by means of m1 incrcn. eel fl ow of water .<'"> 
5. Acceleration of Water into Established Streams 
Lconard (1 2 Gl stated that Ycry few cases con-
cerned with the acceleration of water into estab-
li :;;hcd strea ms haYe been brought before the courts 
of the United States and England . He pointed out 
t hat in ninety -nine cases out of a hundred there is 
no obj ection to draining into a creek or river be-
cause the increase in Yolumc of flowagc is almost 
negligible. When such a stream ove rflows its banks, 
it is likely th at the overflow is caused by the " ·a ters 
th at drained na turally into the creek or stream and 
th a t art ificial \YOrks on th e dominant land do not 
make any appreciable difference. 
There is one case in Illinois th at deals with this 
pro blem. In K ankakee & Se neca R .R . v. H oran(12 n 
the upper lando,rner ar tifi cia lly collec ted and ac-
celerated \rnter into a stream. The lmYer o\\·ner, a 
ra ilroad, had previously constructed a culvert that 
was suffi cient to carry the water flowing naturally 
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to the stream. However, this same culvert "·as not 
sufficient to handle additional water caused by 
collection and acceleration of water into the stream 
on the upper lands. The court stated that the lmvcr 
landowner was bound to anticipate and must pro-
vide fo r any legal increase in the flow. 
The question that arises is what constitutes a 
legal increase of the flow. Leonard C1 2 s> stated that: 
[T]he only limitation suggested \l"aS that the "nat-
ural watershed" should be observed. Since, as \1·c haYc 
seen, the dominant owner can drain and accelerate the 
flow in natural drainways, which are not streams, this 
limitation against cutting through a watershed seem~ 
sensible. Of course, as said before, if a watershed were 
cut through and some su rface water were drained into 
a creek, t he lo\rnr owners would rarely complain, but if 
the \rnters of the stream were unduly swollen by such a 
diversion, the upper owner would probably be enjoined 
or held for damages. 
But assuming that the dominant owner confines his 
artificial, minute drainage to the natural basin drained 
by the stream, how much \1·atcr can be cast into the 
trcam against the objection of lower O\rners? All cases 
agree that up to the capacity of the streams no Jo,,·cr 
owner has a right to complain. It can make little difTer-
cnce to a riparian owner \rhcthcr a stream is half full or 
three-fourths fu ll ; indeed, most of the litigation has been 
over the question of taking water from a stream rather 
than the question of putting more in. 
But when the result of the acceleration is to produce 
an overflow on 10\rnr lands \vhich \rnulcl not have oc-
curred except for the artificial drains cut in the natur:1l 
basin by the upper dominant owner, there is a square 
conflict of authority. New York holding that no right 
exists under any circumstances to cause the stream tl111:; 
to overflow, and North Carolina holding substantially as 
in the case of natural drainways that in the interests of 
agricultu re, swamp lands may be drained into a stream 
if natural barriers arc not cut through, even though th is 
rauses an overflow on the lands of lower riparian O\rn-
crs. This "license is conceded with caution and prudence." 
Such being the state of the authorities, \rhat cour:;c 
will our Supreme Court adopt if this question comes 
before it? The North Carolina rule has the merit of 
being easily applied, and the difficulties pointed out, in 
their opinion, with the application of the Kew York rule 
are not insignificant. Streams become choked \rith sand 
and sed iment when land is cleared, and the quest ion may 
become very vexing as to whether the artificial \rnrks of 
the upper owner caused an overflow below or not. Then 
there wi ll be great difficulty and much injustice in fixing 
the blame if many riparian owners artificially drain into 
the stream and an overflow occurs below. But in spite of 
these practical difficulties, isn't there something to be 
said for the lower owner whose fields are flooded in order 
that his neighbors above may "practice good husbandry" 
for the general welfare? This looks a little as if ,,.c arc 
robbing Peter to pay Paul. ;.Ioreover, so far as taking 
water from a stream is concerned, ,,.c have developed the 
general rule that the lower riparian owner has a right to 
ha,·c the stream flow by his Janel in its natural state; 
aml if this rulr applies to the adding of \1·atcr to a 
"(ream, "·e would have a conflict bet11·cen the extended 
principle of Peck v. Herrington and this settled rule of 
the common law of waters. It would seem then that 
there is a great deal of likelihood that our Supreme Court 
\1·01ild allow an action for damages in ca:::e of an onrflow 
of the lo\1·cr riparian Q\rncr's land 11·as rauscd hy artificial 
acrrlcration of the flo11·ag;c of a strPam. 
F. DIVERSION 
l. Definition of Diversion 
Di,·ersion, as applied to a watercourse, is defined 
as a turning aside or altering of the natural course 
of the stream.< 120 > The term is chiefly used in law 
to mean the unauthor ized changing of the course 
of a stream or clrainway from the natural condition 
to the prejudice of a lower proprietor. 
Om1ers of land may drain in the course of nat-
ural drainage by constructing open or covered 
drains and discharging them into any natural water-
course or into any natural depression provided the 
\1·atcr will be carried into some natural water-
coursc.< 130J Property owners arc not authorized to 
cl rain areas in other than the course of natural 
drainagc.< 131 > 
2. Point of Discharge 
The privilege of diverting 1rnter depends on the 
nature of the dinrsion. Diversions can be made 
wholly within the premises of indiYidual landO\rners 
provided the water empties into a regular channel 
leading from the upper to the lower field. The 
courts have upheld the privilege of di,·crsion on 
private propert)· provided new artificial channe l ~ 
arc not created on the lower lands. <132 > T he courts 
in Illinois han held that a proprietor of land may 
change the location of a natural 1rntercoursc within 
the limits of his own land if the channel is restored 
to the original location before the "·ater reaches 
the lands of another.< ' 3 3 > ·w atcr must pass from the 
higher to lo1Ycr O\rner at the precise point of natural 
drainage, and at no other location-°34 J 
The dominant landowner is not permitted to casl 
water upon the land of an adjo ining proprietor that 
would not reach this land in a course of natural 
flow. Water a lso cannot be emptied out of a ditch 
or drain into a natural channel in such quantities 
as will cause OYcrfl.ow upon the lands of another 
at a place 1Yherc it would not naturally fl.ow.<1 35 > 
The law states that the flow of surface water 
from the dominant estate upon the servient estate 
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may, in the interest of good husbandry, be increased 
by ditches and drains. HmYcvcr, the natural flow 
in one channel cannot be diverted into another and 
different channel in such a way as to increase the 
flow from that channel upon the scrvicnt estate. <136> 
:\or can the dominant landowner collect into one 
channel \rntcr usually flowing onto his neighbor's 
fields in several channels and thus cause the water 
to flow in undue and unnatural quantities and 
injure the neighbor's lands. <13n 
3 . Diversion as Related to Highway 
and Agricultural Drainage 
The rules of diversion apply to both highway 
authorities and individual landowners. The courts 
haYc held that landowners have the right to accel-
erate the natural flow of water by means of ditches 
and al low it to discharge itself over the natural sur-
face of their own lands onto the highway. This 
right includes accelerating the flow along natural 
dcpres ions and watercourses and thereby precip-
itating onto lower lands 'rntcr that would naturally 
evaporate or seep into the soil. Hmrnnr, land-
owners are not permitted to bring water to the 
highway that would naturally be delivered at a 
different place. <138> 
According to the principle of natural drainage, 
landowners adjoining the highway have a right to 
drain their lands across or along highways with or 
without the consent of the highway authorities pro-
,·idcd they follow the natural depression of the sur-
face. But when a landowner attempts to divert 
"·ater and cast it upon the highway out of its 
natural course, highway authorities have a right to 
prevent such action, especially when such diversion 
is likely to endanger the highway by increasing 
the width and depth of a ditch along the highwa:>. 
If a proposed drain is not a natural \Yatercourse, 
the adjoining owner must obtain consent from the 
highway authorities. <139> 
When highway authorities undertake to drain 
a public highway, they possess the same rights and 
arc governed by the rnmc rules as adjoining land-
owners who undertake to drain their own lands.< 140> 
Therefore, highway authorities must take care not 
to divert water from the general course of drain-
age<141> and to keep such courses free and open, 
without obstruction by any work or structure upon 
the public highway. <142> 
Under the rules established by the courts, water 
accumulating in a particular part of a highway and 
naturally running off in a certain channel or water-
way is subject to natural drainage. Therefore all 
portions of the highway that lie in a position to 
drain naturally in a certain channel may drain in 
that direction. The highway authorities have no 
right or po\Yer to collect and carry along a highway 
a quantity of water that \\"Ould naturally drain off 
in another direction and discharge such accumulated 
water on an adjoining landowner. Nor have the 
higlmay authorities the right to divert water from 
its regular channel and carry it along the line of 
the highway for such a distance as they may desire 
and then discharge that water upon the land of an 
individual. This action would be imposing a burden 
upon the landowner that the law wi ll not 
tolerate. <143> 
The court has mentioned that a situation could 
arise in which the highway authority might, if it 
>'aw proper, divert the water along the highway 
from its natural flow and carry it along the line of 
the road, to be discharged into some large stream 
of water that crosses the higlw.-a)·. The court ex-
pressed the opinion that such an act might be 
allowed if the discharge of diversion water did not 
ciamage the adjoining landowner or other property 
owners located along such stream.<1• 4 > If such 
drainage did injure an adjoining O\rner, it could not 
be justified by the claim that it was necessary or 
was done in good faith. <145> I n any event, drainage 
by a highway authority contrary to the direction 
of natural drainage would be restrained if it were 
:<olcly for the benefit of landmrners on the opposite 
side of the highway where an outlet a lready 
existed. <14 GJ 
When existing channels that carry natural drain -
age water adjacent to the highway arc eliminated 
by improvement to the road and subsequent damage 
is caused to adjoining landmYncrs, there is good 
C'ause of action based upon the wrongful diversion 
of water. An example was presented in H argadine 
v. 8harkey.< 147 > A highway passed over a bluff anci 
dmrn through a valley that contained a river. There 
\Ycre ditches for draining the highway and su r-
rounding area along each side of the highway, 
extend ing from the top of the bluff to the river. 
The highway \\"aS improved to eliminate the chan-
nels along the roadbed carrying the water from the 
road and surrounding area to the river. As a result, 
water flmycd onto the bottom area farm land from 
each side of the road. The comt restrained the 
higlnrny authority from diverting water onto ad-
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joining lands and ordered it to construct adequate 
ditches to carry the water coming from the hill and 
road directly to the river. Thus action may be 
taken where water has been diverted in such a wav 
as to cause damage to a landmYncr in a place \\"here 
it would not have dra ined naturally. 
4. Insufficient Channel 
Since the right of drainage through a natural 
1rntercourse is an casement appurtenant to each 
tract of land through 11·hich the 'rntcrcour~c runs. 
each 01rner is bound to take notice of the ca,,cmcnt 
possessed by other owners. The ref ore, a natural 
watercourse cannot be changed by a scrvicnt owner 
to deprive upper landmrncrs of their legal ri ght to 
have the channel kept open when it would dcpriYe 
them of their legal right to drainage. It h a~ been 
held that an old watercourse cannot be replaced 
by a new channel that is not :::ufficicnt to ca rry the 
increased flow of water resulting from properly 
constructed artificial drainage on dominant lands 
and the upper landmrners then required to pay for 
removing obstructions to such drainage. c 149 > It 
appears from this statement that an artificial chan-
nel legally being used in place of a natural drain 
must be of such capacity that it 11·ill adequately 
drain all water under the na tural drainage rule. 
5. Natural Barriers 
The owners of higher ground arc not authorized 
by law to remove natural barriers and thereby 
allow water to flow out of its natural course onto 
ad joining and lower lands. This action 11·ould :::ub-
jcct the servicnt heritage to an unreasonable burden 
that the law wi ll not permit.c 1• 0 > 
Landowners do not have the right to divert 
surface waters from their natural channels and 
thcrcb~· cause overflow on the lands of another 
ll"ithout making proper compensation for damages 
caused by such over flow. I n a ra e where a railroad 
company diverted the flow of a watercourse through 
a natural barrier to a point where the land of an-
other was overflowed , the railroad was held liable 
for damages. The court stated that the fact that 
such waters were first conducted into a natural 
watercourse leading to or through the damaged 
lands did not change the liability if such waters 
caused the natural watercourse to ovcrflo11· ib banks 
and cause damage to other landowners. c150 > 
Another case, where two adjacent valleys were 
crossed by a higlrn·ay, further explains this point. 
A small ridge between the valleys k ept the 11·atcr 
from flowin g from one valley to the other exce pt 
at high 'rntcr JcycJ. The water flmrcd natural!~· 
through the yaJlcys across the highway onto adjoin-
ing landmYncrs. From time to time material was 
excavated from the ridge in the higlnrny ditch 
bcb1·ccn the brn valleys to proYidc added fi 11 on 
the road embankment. This action continued until 
the ridge 1rns 101rcrcd to the point where ponded 
water in one valley flowed into the other val ley anci 
then onto a different proprietor . The 11·atcrs final!>· 
discharged in a basin on a plo1Ycd and culti,·ated 
field that had no outlet until the water reached the 
height of 12 to l 4 inches. Thus the la nd bccairic 
useless. 
The court stated that the public, represented by 
the higlllrny authorities, had a ri ght to pass surface 
1rntcrs falling or coming naturall~· upon the high-
way t h rough the natural an cl usual channel or out-
let. They also had a right to construct ditches or 
drains to concluct surface and ponded water on the 
higl11rny into natural channels even if the quantity 
of "·atcr thus ca rried upon the l01rnr lands 1yas 
thcreh:'>' increased . HmYevcr, the O\\"ner of the 
higher land was not authorized by law to dig 
through or remove natural barriers and thcrcb» 
all o11· 'rntcr to fl air onto adjoining lower lands 11·hen 
it would not naturally flow in that direction. The 
publi c had no lawful right to obtain ben efi ts b>· 
injuring the wsted property rights of 101Ycr land-
owner:'. C151 > 
6. Rights of Diversion by Prescription 
If the 01rncr of the dominant estate voluntarily 
changes the course of natural drainage so that water 
ceases to f101\' over the scrvicnt estate without in-
terruption for l\Ycnty years, mutual and reci procal 
rights are acquired by prescription. This action 
exempts the dominant O\Yncr from restorin g the 
11·atcr to its original channel and forcnr re lease~ 
the se rvicnt estate from the burden of the original 
casement. c152 > 
G. DRAINAGE OF PONDED AREAS 
1. General 
Since " ·atcr descends by nature, the Oll"ncr of a 
dominant or superior heritage has an casement in 
the scrvient or inferior tenement for the cfochargc 
of a ll waters that naturally rise in , or f1011· or fall 
upon , the superior estate . This casement in fayor 
of the dominant heritage is not confined or limited 
to the discharge upon the sc ffient estate of all 1rntcr 
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that may flow from the dominant estate \rhilc the 
natural surface of the ground remains undisturbed, 
but extends to waters that mny be collected in 
ponds and low and marshy areas.< i :;:l) Therefore, 
the general principles of natural drainage also apply 
to ponded areas. 
It has been stated earlier that the O\\'ncr of the 
dominant heritage has the right to ban surface 
\\'atcr coming upon his premises pass off through 
natural drains upon and over the loll'cr or scrvicnt 
lands. Also , the O\rncr of the dominant heritage 
ha· the right to drain his own land into the chan-
nels that nature has prnvidcd, cnn if the quantity 
of \\'ater thro\n1 upon the adjoining 101rcr land,; i:; 
con::;eq uen tly increased. l3 u t at the snmc ti me 
the O\rncr has no right to open or remove natural 
barriers and let onto such lo\\'Cr lands \\'ater that 
would not otherwise naturally flo\\· 111 that 
direction. <154 > 
2. Removal of Pond Barrier 
Ponded areas arc an exception to the rule con-
cerning removal of natural barriers. A landowner 
has a right to remove the natural barrier surrnund-
ing a pond or series of ponds formed by the collec-
tion of surface \rntcr upon the dominant land, pro-
,·ided the pond is situated on a grade descending 
tO\rnrd the 10\Yer land and the rcmornl of such bar-
riers \\·ill allow the water from the pond~ to drain 
into a natural watercourse.< i :;oi 
The court has indicated that ponds arc generally 
~urrounded by \\·hat properly may be called a rim. 
At some point on the circumference of the rim, there 
is usually a slight depression that allows overflow 
and is considered the natural outlet of the ponded 
area.< '"6 > This point of discharge can be disconrcd 
if the ponded area is filled with dirt and the water 
is forced to onrflow into the natural channel of 
drainage. <1"7l To determine the direction of natural 
flow from the ponded area, it is the usual and not 
lhc extraordinary overflow that is considered. <1·' 8 > 
Therefore the owners of lands on which ponclc·d 
areas exist have a lmdul right to cut dO\rn the rim 
and deepen the depression upon their own land lo 
entirely drain the basin at the point of 10\rcst clc-
rntion on the rim. However, no authorit)· cxisb 
to allow the dominant owner to cut through the 
rim at wme place other than the lowest point and 
thereby drain the water upon the land of another 
at a point that could not be reached if the \rnter::; 
1rcrc to overflow naturally. As long as the drainage 
carries the \rntcr along the natural course, the 
sen·icnt pmprietor may noL complain, c\·cn though 
natural barriers on the high er Janel have been cut 
d01rn and the flo\\' of \\·alcr ha~ been both acccl-
eralccl and increased. ""\Y ere the rule otherwise, 
there \1·otild be no method by ll'hich any one mrncr 
C'ould in1pro\·c his land b>· the construction of 
dilC'hc~ and drains \\·hich \\·mild carry the drainage 
upon another·s property, because the purpose of 
::;ueh impr01·ements in c\·cry in:::tancc is to hasten 
and increase the flow of \\·atcr, ancl this object is 
onl.\· attained by the removal of natural bar-
ripr:::;. "( 1.i!)) 
3. Manner of Conducting Water on Dominant Land 
In Illinois it is recognized that the manner in 
ll'hich t!tc O\rner of the dominant heritage conducts 
1rnter o\·cr his land before it reaches the land of 
another docs not concern the 10en·ient O\Yner so 
long as t!tc \\·atcr reaches the lo1rer lands in the 
"amc cour~c it \Yould haYc taken naturally. In 
in~l:mce,; \1·here ponded 1rntcr lies on the highway 
and flo1,·s natural!:; in an open ditch through the 
adja<:ent landO\rncr's field, highway aut!torities arc 
a l lo\\"ed to diYert the \\'atcr along the highway to an 
outlet "0 long as it is the same as the original 
oullet. < 100 l 
It ha,; been held that highway authorities liaYc 
a right to lay a tile through a se ries of depressions 
in a natural \rntercoursc along the higll\rny to 
drain the higlnrny and high\\'ay right-of-\rny and 
('111Pl>· the \rnter into a more defined natural 
11·alneou rse. < '"' > In situations where a higlrn·a>· 
diYidcs the dominant and scrvicnt land, and ponded 
a rea:; dc1·clop in the higlnrny because of imperfect 
drainage, the la\\' authorizes that these ponded 
area:; be drained in t!tc general course of natural 
drainage for the benefit of the public.< 1 u2 > It is \\-ell 
c,;tab li :::hed that the water lhat accumul ates in a 
ponded area may be drained in the direction that 
it "·ill naturally flo\\' , CYCn though the flow upon the 
,;cn·ient lancloll'ner may be increased. <'" 0 > Since the 
rules of natural drainage apply to high1Yays,< 164 > it 
l!lay be a~sumed that this rule app li es equally . 
4. Pond Size 
The size of the pond that can be drained upon 
and O\'Cr the adjoining O\rner is a question that ha:; 
not been clearly an::;\1·ercd. It has been established 
that small ponds located on Lhc dominant estate 
may be drained in the general course of natural 
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drainage. The court has also stated that the mrncr 
of the superior estate probably has no right to 
destroy the land of an adjoining mrncr by draining 
a large body of water or lake. cias) In Peck v. H er-
ring ton, cissJ the leading case on pond drainage, the 
court held that the dominant owner could drain 
the type of pond that merely collected surface \rntcr 
from rain and melting snow, but it implied that a 
"natural pond" would not come \\'ithin this right. 
This distinction, however, bcbrncn a "natural 
pond" and a collection of surface water from rain 
and melting snow cannot be laid clo\\·n as an Illinois 
rule because other factors aided the court in hold-
ing that the ponds in question could be drained. 
First, the largest pond contained only three ac res. 
Second, these ponds made much of the land unfit for 
cultivation, and good husbandry required that they 
be drained . 
Although no definite limits \Yerc placed on the 
maximum size of the pond that may be drained, 
the court stated that it might be true that the 
owner of the higher tract did not haYc the right 
to drain a lake or other large body of water upon 
the land of an adjoining owner and thus destroy it. 
This point was furth er made in H icks v. Silli-
man, <mJ where a large pond covering about 100 
acres had stood upon the tract for many years. It 
\Yas a natural reservoir and receptacle for water 
flowing through a creek. The ponded area became 
substantially dry during part of the year, but when 
freshets or sudden heavy rains occurred it was 
able to impound a vast amount of water before it 
overflowed. Therefore drainage of this area would 
have caused large quantities of water that other-
wise were confined to the ponded area to be thrown 
upon the lower land. 
The upper landowner intended, by artifici al 
means, to conduct the water from the large pond 
to a point on his own land near the adjacent land 
and thereby permit it to drain naturally upon the 
lower owner. The adjoining lanclmrner objected to 
this action and took his case to the court. The 
court ruled that this water, if collected and dis-
charged, would certainly flow upon the adjacent 
land in unnatural and undue quantities. It also 
held that in instances where the scrvicnt Janel was 
unusually low and wet, making it barely suscep-
tible to cultivation, the court \Yould be fully \rnr-
rantecl in disallowing the drainage of undue 
amounts of surface water. 
It appears from these statements that the dorn-
inant landowner i:; entitled to drain ponded areas 
created by collection of surface \\'atcr from rain 
and melting snow where such drainage is for rea-
sons of good husbandry. But when such ponded 
areas are natural and large enough to overburden 
the lo\Yer land if drained, the dominant landO\\·ncr 
can be restrained from draining them. 
H. OBSTRUCTION 
1. Illinois Rule 
The courts recognize t\rn distinct rnlcs with 
respect to the right of a lO\\·cr lando\\'ncr to obstruct 
and repel surface water flowing from the lands of 
a higher O\Yner. These rules, as stated earlier. a rc 
the ci\·il law and the common law. The civil law 
is appl ied in Illinois. According to this doctrine, 
the O\rncr of the dominant estate has a legal and 
natural casement in the sc1Ticnt estate. The scrvicnt 
lando\\'ncr takes the Janel \\·ith the burden of re-
ceiving surface "·atcr. Therefore the upper land-
O\\'ncr may discharge owr the lo\\·er land all waters 
fa lling or accumulating on his land in a natura l 
state. The scrvicnt mrncr cannot intcrrnpt or pre-
vent such natural flow or passage to the detriment 
or mJury of the estate of the dominant proprie-
tor . c1Gs) 
2. Obstructing Natural Water Flow 
i\Iany of the cases concerning obstruction of 
natural flow haYe inYoh·ccl higl1\rn:'·s constructed 
across agricultural Janel. In the case of To u·n of 
Bois D 'Arc v. Convery,< 1GDJ the lo\Ycr landO\rncr 
obstrnctcd a natural watercourse at a point \\'here 
it crossed a public highway. The upper landO\rncr , 
the higlmay auth ori ty, petitioned the court to 
luwc the lo\Yer landO\rner remove such obstruction 
from the \Yatcrcoursc . The court first determined 
that the 'rntercoursc \\'as natural and then held that 
the higlmay authority had the right to haYc the 
waters falling upon the highway flmy off in the nat-
ural 1rntcrcoursc. The court fu rther stated that if 
the water falling upon land on one side of a high-
way natmally flowed across the highway thrnugh a 
swale or depression onto the lands on the other 
side of the higlmay, a natura l watercourse did cxi:;t 
even t hough it might not have well-defined bank:; 
and bed and the water might not flow through the 
swalc at all times of the year. Therefore, the right 
remained to have the flow of \rnter from the high-
1rn.\· unobstructed in such instances. 
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In the case of Town of Nameoki v. Buenger,("0 ' 
under somewhat similar circumstances, a higlrn·ay 
divided t\vo pieces of land, one of which was higher 
than the other. \Vater drained naturally across the 
highway from the higher to the lmvcr land. The 
lmvcr owner built a levee across the watercourse 
bclmv the highway and thereby obstructed the 
\\·a ter coming from the higher land. This obstruc-
tion caused \rntcr to back up, making the highway 
muddy and S\rnmp~' and the high er land unfi t for 
cultivation. The court found that a natural \rntcr-
coursc existed and therefore held that the O\rncr of 
the scrvicnt heritage had no right, by crnbank111cnl::i 
or other artificial means, to obstruct the natural 
flow of the surface water from the dominant heri-
tage and thus throw it back upon the latter. 
Where 'rntcr has been discharged from a culvert 
under a road upon the scrvicnt land for a long pe-
riod, causing the elevation of the \rntercourse to 
become lo\ver than it originally was, the lmver land-
owner has no right to impede the present flow by an 
obstruction or embankment even though such ob-
struction is no higher than the original surface of 
the waterwayY" ' The courts have explained that 
it \\·ould be extremely difficult, if not impossible, 
to ascertain what the natural surface originally \ms 
and th erefore it would be dangerous to allow the 
\\·atercourse to be clammed on the assumption that 
the water would thereafter flow as it did na t -
urally. <172 l If an obstruction impairs the natural 
drainage of highways, a mandatory injunct ion may 
be used to compel the removal of :rnch obstruc-
tion. ( 1• 3 l 
On the other band, where a n embankment ha::; 
been maintained across a channel for longer than 
twenty years, the servient mrner has a right to re-
sto re this embankment to its original height even 
though it has been \\'ashed out by ovcrflm\'. How-
ever, the owner does not have the right to incrca~e 
the height above that of the original embank-
ment. <1 " 1 l 
The courts have held that highway authoriti e::; 
have no more right to ob::>truct natural watercom::;c::; 
to the damage of landowners than do private 
persons. Nor can highway authorities authorize 
another person to do so and thereby escape respon-
sibility for doing the wrongful act. The highway 
authority may drain the roads but, in so doin g, 
must be careful to keep watercourses free and 
open, without obstruction by any work or structure 
upon the public higlnvay. < ""' 
Where "·ater has been wrongfully diverted on 
upper land and drained into and along the high,rny 
and thereby discharged upon the land of the lower 
owner at a point where it would not naturally flow , 
the court has held that the lower owner may law-
fully obstruct the wrongful flow of such waters upon 
his premises. cirnJ However, the existence of a nat-
ural obstruction on the scrvicnt land is not a viola-
tion of natural drainage by the scrvient owner. 
Therefore, "the owner of the higher land cannot 
rompel the owner of the lo"·er land to remove 
natural obstructions, such as shrubs, \vecds , brush-
\\·ood, cornstalks, or other crop residues, that may 
accumulate and impair natural clrainage."(1 77 l 
3 . Provision for Sufficient Openings 
A cause of action exists when flooding results 
from in adequate openings in embankments crossing 
\\'atercourses. The case selected as an example con-
cerns a railroad, but perhaps the courts \rnuld have 
handled the problem in a similar manner had it 
invoh·ed a public highway. In this case the rail-
road po~ses:;cd a right-of-way that crossed some 
natural depressions through which surface water 
naturally flowed. An embankment constructed 
across the natural drainway did not have sufficient 
openings to allow \Yater naturally cast upon the 
land aboYC to pass through the depressions as it had 
in the past. Later hea,·y rains caused damage from 
floodin g because of inability of the water to escape. 
The court held that parties changing or restrain-
ing the fiow of \rntcr must provide for the conse-
quence::; of unusually heavy rainfalls and are liable 
for damage to the lands of others caused by failure 
lo make such provision. The court further stated 
that whether the rainfall was so heavy and un-
precedented that the damage from overflow might 
be considered an "act of God," and thus relieve the 
defendant from liability, is a question of fact to be 
dete rmined by a jury. Also, each overflow of the 
lands of an adjoining O\rncr caused by negligent or 
improper construction of an embankment is a fresh 
nuisance ancl creates a new cause for action.<1' 8 ' 
I. OVERFLOW 
1. Natural Flow 
The rule of civil law as adopted in Illinois states 
that the right of drainage is governed by the law 
of nature and therefore the O\rncr of the dominant 
heritage has a natural casement for the flow of sur-
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face \Yaters oYer the land of the servient owner. The 
servient mvner cannot do anything to obstruct the 
natural flow of surface \vater and cast it back upon 
the land above.< 110> It has been stated in Illinois 
that water overflmving the banks of a small slrcarn 
because the natural channel is not adequate to 
carry off surface water comes within the law relat-
ing to natural drainage.<180 > Therefore, where the 
natural slope is such as to make land on one side 
of a small stream the dominant heritage and that on 
the other side the servient heritage, the servient 
owner has no right, by embankments or other arti-
ficial means, to stop the natural flow of flood waters 
over his land and thus throw them back upon the 
dominant heritage.< 181 > 
Even the interest of good husbandry doc not 
justify construction of a lene by the servicnt owner 
to protect his land from overflow in times of flood 
if it interferes with the natural flow of water to the 
injury of the dominant owner.<18 2> 
The court further stated: 
It might with equal force be inquired here \\"hat dif-
ference it can make, in principle, \\"hcthcr the \1·atcr that 
submerges the land of Steffy [the scrvicnt landowner] 
comes from the hi lls above the land or comes from the 
overflow of a stream along the same. W c arc unable to 
see either the distinction or the ground for one. Both 
arc natural consequences. 11• 3 > 
In another case the court held that a riparian 
owner has no r ight to construct an embankment or 
barrier along the normal bank of a stream to pro-
tect his land from onrflow if it \\·ill cau~c the 
waters of the stream, in times of ordinary flood~ , 
to damage the land of other riparian O\rncrs. < 18 4 > 
The civil-law rule of drainage carries with it the 
implication that one must so use his mm propcrt~· 
as not to injure or deprive another of the right of 
natural drainage that the lm1· guarantees to him.<' ~'» 
Therefore, it may be concluded that where natu-
ral flow conditions exist, the scrvicnt lando11·ncr 
docs not have the right to obstruct natural drainage 
and cause overflow upon the dominant estate. 
Nevertheless good husbandry may dictate and 
justify some actions concerning overflow. The land-
owner, in the inte rest of good husbandry, is entitled 
to maintain levees to protect crops from inunda-
tion by overflow from watercourses under the con-
dition that no injury 1rill be caused to others. But 
if a landowner benefits himself and injures anotl1cr 
by depriving him of the enjoyment of the right of 
natural drainage, the plea of good husbandry is not 
justified. <186> 
' Vhcrc a levee or an embankment causes a 
greater quantit)· of \rater to ovcrnow upon adjoin-
ing scrvicn t land than \\"OU le! occm under natural 
conditions, the scrvicnt 01rner has a right to bui ld a 
levee to prcnnt this additional 1rnter from ovcr-
OmYing his land. The fact that the servicnt owner 
has constructed a Jene. hmYeYcr , docs not defeat 
the dominant mrner of the right to benefit from 
natural dra inage o\·cr the scrvient land in times of 
flood. <1sn 
2. Obligations of Highway Authorities 
and Adjoining Landowners 
Adjacent landowners sometimes believe that 
highway authorities are obligated to drain their 
land and protect it from the overflow of water 
naturally thrmrn upon it. The court has held that 
higlma.1· authorities do not ban the rc:;:ponsibility 
of providing adequate drainage to protect the ad-
jacent landom1er from the natural overflow of 
\rnter. <t s~ > Also, they cannot bind themselves by 
agreement to furnish drainage for areas not being 
onrflowcd to a greater extent than they originally 
"·ere unless such drainage i::; made necessary b~· 
their acts. On the other hand, they cannot cau::Jc 
the land of the adj accnt mrncrs to be onrflowed to 
a greater extent than it had been in the natural 
state. <180 > 
J. EASEMENT 
1. Definition 
An casement is a right or privilege in the land 
of another that can be created by grant or prc::;crip-
tion. < 100 > It is an interest in the Janel of another that 
gives the mrncr of the casement a right to use 
another person's land for special purposes not in-
consistent with the general property rights of the 
other person. <101> Generally the clements necessary 
for creation of a drainage casement arc "a domi-
nant tenement," to which the right belongs, and a 
"servient tenement," on \Yhich the obligation 
rests. <102 > 
2. Natural Easement 
The subject of natural easements was discussed 
earlier in this report. However, some of this in for-
mation may be worth repeating to clarify other 
phases of easements. 
The courts have established that the dominant 
mrncr has a natural casement over the land of the 
sctTicnt owner for the flow of surface \Yaters.<rn :n 
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Therefore, the servient owner cannot, b>· embank-
ment or other artificial means, interfere \Yith or 
di,·crt such flow and throw the \Httcr back upon the 
dominant owner. C19•> The relative positions of the 
lands directly determine natural casement rights 
and responsibilities, just as they arc the ba~is for 
much of the natural drainage ]m,·. Other types of 
ca~cmcnts haYc been established to work in con-
junction "IYith natural casements in handling drain-
age problems most cffcctivcl>· for the welfare of all 
concerned. 
3. Prescription 
a. ELEC-IENTS OF PRESCRlPTIVE RrGI-ITS 
The general rules governing acquisition of rights 
by prescription apply to certain drainage righfa. 
:-Iutual and reciprocal rights can be acquired b>· 
prescription that will forcYcr release the sc1Ticnt 
c~tatc from the burden of the original cascment.< 10 ·» 
In order to be applicable to the right of prcscri p-
t ion , the lands must have been used adnrscly and 
uninterruptedly for twent>· years or more. cine> These 
clements arc essential in determining the right to 
prescriptive privileges. The case of Tatel v. Bonnc-
f oy(1 9 7l provides an illustration: An mrncr of land 
had used a particular ditch from 1861 to 1877 to 
clrain \Yater from his land over that of another. A 
nC\Y ditch "·as constructed nearby and \ms used in 
place of the old ditch from 1877 until sometime in 
1882. The landom1cr brought suit to use the nc11· 
ditch on the theory that he had acquired prcscrip-
ti,·c rights since he had been draining over his 
neighbor's land for more than fo·cnty years. The 
court held that the landowner had not acquired a 
prescriptive right to have the \Yater from hi;;; land 
drain over the adjoining lands b>' "·a>· of the 
ditches because there wa no continuous and un-
interrupted use of either ditch for a period of 
bYcnty years, and that the time of use of the nc"· 
ditch could not be added to the time of use of the 
old one to make up the prescriptive period of 
b1·cnty years. 
b. APPLICATION 
Applicability of prescriptive rights depends up-
on the parties involved. Certain parties have privi-
leges over other parties, and an understanding of 
these principles is important to a complete undcr-
~tnnding of the application of prcscriptiYc rights. 
For example, in Savoie v. Town of Bourbon-
11ais, < 19s > highway authorities purchased a strip of 
land that was located on the property line between 
two adjoining landmrncrs. This strip led from the 
higl11rn)· right-of-\rny to a natural stream . The>· 
constructed a ditch a long this strip and maintained 
it for forty years. This ditch collected all the \rntcr 
that accumulated on one side of the higll\rny and 
dcpo~itcd it in the natural \rntcrcour~c. Later the 
higlmay authorities abandoned the ditch. As a 
rc:::ult it became filled \\·ith debris, and \rnter 01·cr-
fl01rcd scnral time;;: a year across the plaintiff's 
land , creating gullies, 1rnshing a 11·a>· topsoil, and 
causing irreparable damages. The plaintiff claimed 
his prescriptive right entitled him to force con -
tinued maintenance. 
The court stated that the ditch had diverted 
'rnter for more than 40 years and it appeared that 
the plaintiff had acquired prescriptive rights against 
certain individual defendants, prohibiting them 
from restoring the \rntcr to the origina l course. 
Ho1Ycnr, it appeared that the plaintiff \\·as trying 
to force the defendant to JWo\·idc continued main-
tenance rather than restoration of the original 
channel. The court therefore ruled that the dc-
dcndant \rnuld not haYc to proYidc continued main-
tenance , since prescriptive rights merely impose a 
dut>· not to restore the original watcreoursc by any 
1nongful onrt act. Sinrc this case inYolnd the 
public a;;: defendant, there \YflS al,;o a factor of im-
munity that \mule! not allo,,· the use of prescriptive 
rights and this point 1rill be discussed in the fol-
lo11·ing section. 
The court held in a similar case that \1·hcrc the 
01rncr of the dominant estate diYcrts the \Yater from 
its natural course by constructing an artific ial chan-
nel through which the \rntcr flmrn uninterruptedly 
for more than twenty yea rs, other proprietors \1·ho 
benefit thereby arc deemed to have an casement by 
prc;;:cription in the new \1·atcrcoursc and the \rntcr 
may not be restored to its original coursc.< 199 > This 
rule applies cYen though the affected landom1ers arc 
not contiguous. <200 > 
C. bDIUXITY 
The state and federal gonrnmcnts are generally 
considered immune from the appl ication of pre-
scriptive rights, since their actions concern the pub-
li c as a \1·holc. However, the courts liavc held that 
exemption of counties, cities, to\rns, and other minor 
municipalities from operation of the Statute of 
Limitations extends on l>· to matters affecting their 
public rights as distinguished from priYate and 
local rights. c201 > The courts have expla ined that 
municipal co rporations. as contrasted \rith the state 
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and federal governments, may be subject to the 
Statute of Limitations to the same extent as priYatc 
individuals. <202 > However, they do mjoy immunity 
in matters involving public rights. < 20 ~ > 
The courts have distinguished bct,,·cen public 
and private rights by holding that public rights or 
uses arc those in which the public has an interest 
in common with the people, \Yhcrcas private rights 
or uses arc those which the inhabitants of a local 
district enjoy exclusively and in which the public 
ha no interest. <20 •> 
Although governmental bodies arc generally im-
mune from the operation of the Statute of Limita-
tions, these bodies may nevertheless acquire rights 
by prescription. The courts have held that under 
our statute the continued and uninterrupted use of 
land as a higlrn·ay for the statutor.Y period, in the 
absence of proof to the contrar.'", "·ill be presumed 
to have been under a claim of right and \\·ill create 
a prescriptive right in favor of the publir without 
further proof of acts of recognition on the part of 
authorities. <205 > However, the private indiYidual is 
not immune from the operation of the Statute of 
Lim itations when the public is involved. 
cl. PAROL LICENSE 
A license is an authority to perform a particular 
act or series of acts upon another's land "·ithout 
possessing any estate therein . It may be created by 
parol, and is genera lly revocable at the \\·ill of the 
1 iccnsor. <2 0 6 > H O\rcvcr, an agreement, though not 
under seal , \\·hen ~upportcd by a valuable considera-
tion is held to create a vested right in the nature 
of an casement and is not revocable as is a mere 
license. <20n 
4. Maintenance 
Ro fn.r as maintenance of the drain is concerned, 
it has been recognized that it is the duty of the 
O\rncr of an casement to keep it in repair, and no 
obligation to make repairs is generally imposed 
upon those \\·hose lands arc thus placed in scrvi-
tuclc. <2 0 "> Ordinarily the owner of the casement has 
the right to go on the scrvicnt tenement to keep the 
clrain in repair without doing unnecessary injur:: to 
the land. The court has stated that: 
As a gcnen1l proposition, "·hocYcr has an eascmrnt in 
or o,·rr :inothcr's !:incl has the right to do all such things 
a~ arc ncccs~ar:-' to preserve the casement; that is, he 
m;l)' keep it in rcriair, and has the right of access lo make 
the neces~ary repairs . ... It would seem, therefore, that 
thr rommon la11· :innexcs to thr ca:"ement of a drain in 
:inothcr"s land the right to go upon such land, and clran 
out, or repair ~uch drain without doing unnccrssary 
i n.iu ry to the b nd. <20•> 
The court has further mentioned that such an 
interpretation is consistent with fundamenta l con-
cepts respecting property rights whereby one O\rn-
ing property is expected to protect those rights him -
scl f \\·hilc others arc expected not to invade 
them. <210 > 
IV. STATUTORY DRAINAGE 
As the preceding discussion has shown , the con-
cept of natural drainage is founded on the relative 
positions of pieces of land. The discuss ion therefore 
was in terms of dominant and scrvicnt lands, re-
gardless of what particular party occupied either 
position. 
Drainage statutes, however, do not deal in term s 
of relative positions of land. Instead they deal with 
the rights and duties of particular parties: high-
\rny authorities, individual landmrncrs, and drain-
age districts. Clarity therefore suggests that statu-
tor~· drainage be discussed in terms of parties. 
Before we deal with specific stat utory provi-
,:ions, a few general comments may be helpful: 
First, rights that arc non-existent at common 
law and that are created by statute must be s trictl:; 
fo l\o,,·ed .<2 11 > Deviations arc often fatal.<2 12 > 
Second, this study docs not purport to include 
a ll statutory provisions related to drainage. Basic 
drainage rights and duties arc presented; technical 
prerequisites, conditions, etc., arc excluded. 
Third, there has been little opportunit~· fo r 
cases to have been litigated and reported under 
either the 1959 Highway Code or the 1955 Drain-
age Code; most cases that have been rcviC\\·cd ,,·ere 
decided under previously existing laws. The specific 
provisions of the codes with which this report deal s, 
ho,,·cver, arc basically identical to the comparable 
provisions of the earlier la ws. Any material differ-
ences "·ill be noted. 
Finally, definition of the term "higll\rny author-
ity" was added in the 1959 Higll\rny Code.< 2 "'> 
Unti l this addition, statutory sections applicable to 
highway authorities had specifica lly li sted each 
autho ri ty . The new code has avoided these li sting~ 
either by using the term "highway authority"< 21 •> 
or by using separate sections, each of which applies 
to one authority. <213 > 
Th e question a rises whether rules and inter-
pretations laid dmrn in cases invo lving hi ghway 
comm issioners can be applied to highway authori-
t ie in genera l. It appears that, in general , the 
legislators intended the basic drainage ~tatute,; to 
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apply equally to all high,rny authorities. <216> The 
general rule seems to be that the one having juris-
diction over a particular higll\rny must be the act-
ing authority. <rn> 
A. HIGHWAY AUTHORITY 
1. Eminent Domain 
The preceding chapter explained the appli-
cability of the rules of natural drainage to Illinois 
higll\rnys. It pointed out that drainage of highways 
ac ros,; adjoining lands is governed by the same 
rules applying to individual adjoining lands except 
\\·here the highway authorities come under the 
em inent domain laws of the state. <218 > The reason 
is that the right to drain other than in the course 
of nature is an easement \\·hich, at common law, 
can be obtained only by dcccl or prescription. By 
statute , highway authorities may obtain this right 
through the use of eminent domain.< 219 > 
a. AcQu1s1no:-,r OF PROPERTY 
Highway Code sections 4-502, 5-802, and 6-802 
each provide substantia lly as follows: 
When the highway authority deems it necessary 
lo build, widen, alter, relocate or straighten any 
ditch, drain , or watercourse in order to drain or 
protect any highway or highway structure it is 
authorized to construct, maintain or operate, it 
may acquire the necessary property, or such inter-
est or right therein as may be required , by gift or 
purch ase or, if the compcn~ation or damages can-
no t be agreed upon, by the exercise of the right of 
eminent domain under the laws of this state.<220 > 
(l ) Constitutionality and Procedure 
In earlier high\Yay acts, <221 > there ,,·ere no state-
ments concerning the use of eminent domain laws. 
Instead , the statute outlined the steps to be taken 
to acquire property and, in doing so, used the term 
"damages." This statutory language was attacked 
as unconstitutional , the assertion being that pro-
Yiding only for damages meant that private land 
could be taken for public use in violation of the 
Constitution of 1870, Article II , section 13. <222 > This 
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objection to the statute was ans\Yered b~- the court's 
broad interpretation of the term "damage,.:." Th e 
award of damages \YaS to include both ,-aluc of the 
Janel taken and injmy caused to the land re-
tainccl.<223> Similar constitutional questions should 
not arise today, since the statute now incorporates 
the eminent domain la\\'S of the state rather than 
specifically stating the steps to be fo\lo,1·ecl. 
Procedurally, the statute seems to require that 
high\\'ay authorities attempt to acquire the clesirecl 
property by gift or purchase before im;tituting 
eminent domain proceedings. Xotc the 11·ording 
under the previously mentioned sections of the 
statute pertaining to the acq uisition of propert:•: 
" ... by gift or purchase or, if the compemation 
or damages cannot be agreed upon, by the exercise 
of the right of eminent dornain."C 22 ·1> An earlier 
statute read: "[U]nlcss the 01rncr of such land , or 
his agent, shall first consent to the cutting of such 
ditch, the commissioners shall apply to an» ju,.;ticc 
of the peace .... "c 220 > This clause was interpreted 
to mean that the statutory method of acquiring the 
Janel must be preceded by an offer of just compen-
sation to the owner and his refusal to accept that 
offcr.c22 a> The present wording ma>" be similarly 
interp reted. 
(2) Determination of Necessity 
The statute provides that eminent domain pro-
ceedings may be exercised when the higl11rn~­
authority "deems it ncccs ary." " ' hcther such ne-
cessity exists is a question to be determined by the 
highway authorities, acting in their official capacity, 
and is beyond the contro l and jmisdiction of the 
courts unless there is fraud or a clear purpose of 
opprcssion.<22n The exercise of discretion w i 11 be 
interfered with only when a private right of a citi -
zen is invaded. C228 > 
(3) Direction of Flow 
The statutory pro,·ision is in no \\·ay limited by 
the natural flo\\· of 11·atcr. The court has express]» 
stated that the purpose of the provision is to en-
able higlrn·ay authorities to convey 1rntcr from the 
highway in a direction in 11·hich it would not run 
in the course of nature. c220 > 
( 4) Limitation: Sewage 
The right of eminent domain may not be used 
for the purpose of carrying off sc1rngc deposited on 
the higlrn·ay by the drains of an incorporated 1· il-
lage. The statute docs not contemplate such 
usage. c230 > 
(5) Limitation: Subsequent 1\cgligenre 
When land is acquired by eminent domain for 
higlmay pmposc~ , certain injuries to lhc land-
0\rncr arc cxpcctccl and included in the eminent 
domain mYard. Ho1Yc1·cr, condemnation b:-· emi-
nent domain is no bar to a suit by the land01rncr 
for subsequent injury groll'ing out of the negligence 
and un,.:killfulne;;s of the public authorities in con-
structing drains in the higll\\'ayY'"l 
b. E:\TRY ox LANDS TO l\IAKr. SrRl'EYs 
In order to make sun·c,1·s and to determine the 
amount and extent of lane\ nccc~~ary to be taken for 
a high1Yay project, the higlmay authority may 
enter the lands or 1rntcrs of another after giving 
notice to that lancloll'ner. The higl11n1y authority 
is responsible for all damages occa:<ioncd therc-
b~-. (2 32 ) 
2 . Contract with Owners or Occupants 
of Adjo ining Lands 
a. CONTRACTS UKDER STATUTORY Pnons10x 
Higlnrny Code section 9-107 provides: 
\Vhcnever the highm1y aulhoritie>' 3re 3\Jout lo by a 
tile along 3ny public highll'ay the higl1\\'ay m1thori tie8 
may rontrnct \\·ith the 011·11C'l's or occupants of adjoining 
lands lo Liy larger tile th3n 1rnulcl be nece~;;ary to drain 
the hip:l111·3,1-, and permit connection there1ri th h,1· such 
contr:icting partic,; to drain their l:incls.<"'> 
Xo cases ha1·c been clisconrcd dealing 11·ith this 
precise situation, although llrn cases mention this 
]1l'OYision. In one case the comt pointed out that 
under the facts of the case the higl11rny autho riti es 
were not taking steps to tile-drain the higll\\'ay and 
therefore the provision did not apply to the ques-
tion involnd. (231 > In the other case the adjoining 
011·ncr had constrnctcd a tile drain in the higl11rny. 
The rourt found that the drain benefited the high-
11·ay, implying that it \\'as part of the higlrn-ay 
drainage system and not mercl» a priYatc drain. 
As a partial justification for allowing the drain to 
remain in the high way, the court cited the above 
statute and held that higl11rn,1· authorities "haYe the 
right to la,1· tile in the road and to make contracts 
with adjoining owners for that purpose."( 2·1"> Thus 
a loose interpretation of the statute aided the rourt 
in arriYing at a desirable decision. 
b. Cox'l'RACTS OcTSIDE STATUTORY Pnonsrox 
(1) Higlrn·ay to Drain onto Land01rner's Property 
It appears to be permissible fo r the higl11rny 
authority to contract 11·ith an adjoining landowner 
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fo r the right to drain onto the adjoining land. If 
the contract contemplates lmdul dispo::; ition of the 
1rnter by the landowner, the highway authority is 
not responsible for subsequent unlawful disposi-
tion. (23G) 
(2) Landowner to Construct Ditch into Higlmay 
The type of drain inYoh·ed in the statutory sec-
tion quoted previously (section 9-107 ) is one that 
is part of the higlmay d ra in age s>·stcrn and is therc-
f ore a part of the higlnrny. <z:<n As such, it i:-; a 
benefit to the highwa>-. A different situation i::; 
encoun tercel 11·hcrc a landowner is given permission 
to ron::;truct a drain in the higl11rny rn lcly fo r his 
01\'n purposes. 
Tim similar cases have dealt with this situation. 
In each ca:;e the highway authorit>-· had gi1·cn the 
lando1rncr permission to construct a ditch in the 
higl11rn>· right-of-11·ay so lcl>· to drain his 01rn prop-
ert>-. Both di tchcs 1Yerc constructed in the high11·a>· 
right-of-way at locations 11·herc the higlmay 
fronted a second landowner's propcrt>-. In othe r 
11·ords, the ditch began on the land of the party 
who h:1cl received permission from the higl11rn>· 
authority and ran, in the highway propcrt>·, along 
the land of another. In each case the quc:;t ion 11·as 
1Yhcthcr these di tchcs must be allo11·cd to rem ain 
in the higlmay right-of-way. 
In denying the right of the land01rner to main-
tain the ditch, the court in the fir:ot case held that 
highway authorities cannot bind the public to fur-
ni:;h drainage for a priYatc individual 's Janek A 
mere li cense or permission giYcn to a pri1·atc incli-
Yiclua l to dig a ditch along the highway, even 
though he acts and expends money upon such per-
mission, cannot operate as a grant of a perpetua l 
right fo r such individual to drain his land through 
th is ditch . The authorities cannot gran t a11·ay the 
use of the right-of-way of the public higl11rny to a 
priYatc pcrson .< 238 > 
Th e second case reached a simil ar conclusion. 
This holding, ho11·cver, 1rns based on the rule that 
higlmay authorities 01Yn only an casement in the 
land of the highway and the fee remains in the 
adjoining owner.<239 > Highway authorities have no 
right to grant abutting landowners the privilege of 
digging a ditch in the highway fronting the prop-
erty of another landowner, in cc it would be im-
posing an additional burden and servi tuclc on such 
land inconsistent '.l·ith the limited rights of the pub-
lic in the highirny.<240 > 
J. Injuring or Obstructing Highways 
a. STATCTorn- PRonsroN 
Ili gl11rny Code sect ion 9-117 reads as follows: 
lf any pN~on in.iures or ob,;t ructs a public higlmay 
by ... plo1Ying or digging :my ditch ... or by turning 
a cu rrent of 11·atcr ~o as lo ~alu rale, 1rn,h, or dam:Jgc 
.. or b>· plm1·ing in or :1Cro,:::; or on the slopes or the 
"ide gutte r:; or ditches, or by placing any material in such 
ditehe;.; ... 1Yit hout the prrn1i,:sion of the higlmay 
:1ut hori t1· ... he slrn ll be fi nrd fu r cYcry ~uch offense 
... :1nd ... fo r e1·ery cb>· he 3J loll'S ~uch obstruction 
lo rern:Ji n after he has been orderrd to rcmoYc it by 
the highway authority h:1 \·i ng juri:.;diclion oYcr such 
higl11ray . ... 
The higlmay authority ... after having giYen 10 
d:1y::;' noti ce ... m:1y ... Jill up any ditch . .. except 
ditches ncec,,a ry to the drain:igc of an adjoining farm 
c•mpt>· ing in to a ditch upon the higlrn·:i>-. ... 
J lm1·e1·t'I', this section sha ll not :1pply to any pcr,on 
... through or :Jlong 11·ho"e !:i nd a public higl11rny may 
p:1,:,:, 1\·ho "h:111 cle,:irc to dr:1in hi:; land , and 1Yho shall 
giYe due notice to the proper high11·a>· authori ty of such 
intC'ntiun, and \1·ho shall lir,:t 'ccurc from such highll'ay 
:tuthuri t.\· 1nittcn pcnni""iun for an>· 11·ork, ditching or 
cxcarnli ng he propo::;C's to do ll'ithin the limits of the 
higlrn·ay.<'''> 
b. T unKIN G A CunREi'IT Ol" \VATER 
"Turning a current of water so as to saturate, 
1rni'h, or damage" is included as an offense under 
~cction 9-117 of the Hi ghway Code. The inclusive-
ness of the phrase is indicated by this statement of 
the cour t : 
\\'alc r may be accustomed lo flow in a limited st ream 
or 01·cr a 1\·ide ,:urface, and may flo1Y continuously or at 
intrn·al~, but 1Yhcrc\'Cr it flo11·;::, it is a current .. .. The 
c1·il 1rhich lhi ::; statute 1rn::; aimed at might be produced 
:t~ dTccti1·ely by turning the diffu~ed drainage of a 1riclc 
;.;urfaee lo one place, as by cli1·crting the contents of a 
n:1rro11· c;l rcam. \Ye arc clearly of opinion that such 
drainage is 1rithin the pun·ie11· of the 1:11\·, and that, as 
a pplicd lo the general subj ect, the language employed 
fairly coYers and includes itY"> 
It 1rnulcl appear that this provision includes the 
yarious t>·pes of unlmdul cliYcrsions of 1rnter from 
a natural 1rntcrcoursc discussed under the section 
of this repo rt dea lin g 11·ith natm al drainage. 
C. ?\OTICE 
The initial fine provided for in the statute is 
imposed for the obstruction itself. If the obstruc-
tion i::; allo1red to continue, an additional fine may 
be rcco1·cred. It is clear that no notice is required 
to rcco\'Cr the ini tial penalty, 11·hcreas notice must 
be ginn before the subsequent fine may be im-
posed. <2 ·• 3 > 
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cl. NECESSITY FOR DITCH 
Excluded from the category of obstructions arc 
ditches necessary for the drainage of an adjoining 
farm emptying into a ditch upon the highway. Th e 
court has held that a ditch which a llows water from 
adjoir.iing lands to flow naturally into a higlma:' 
ditch is "necessary." Conversely, a ditch that di-
verts water from its natural course in order to reach 
the highway is not necessary and is no t protected 
by the statute. c244 > 
e. A DITCH AS AN 0BST HUCT10N 
The circumstances under which a ditch con-
structed in the highway by an adjoining landowner 
without permission constitutes an obstruction arc 
not clear. The confusion centers a round the fact 
that the highway authorities a rc not con:; icl crccl 
absolute owners of the land within the highway. 
The public has but an easement in the higlmay, and 
the fee remains in the adjoining owner, who may 
exercise every right of 01rncrship not inconsistent 
with the easement of the public. c2 • 5 > 
This is the general rule in Illinois. However, 
under the wording of the Illinois Highway Code and 
under the eminent domain laws of the state, it is 
possible for the highway authority to obtain the 
entire fee interest in any land taken rather than 
merely an easement. Note the language of two 
Code sections : "The D epartmen t, in its name, or 
any county may acquire the fee simple title, or 
such lesser interest as may be desired, to any land , 
rights or other property necessary for the con-
struction, maintenance or operation of state high-
way ... "; C246 > " •.• it may acquire the nccc:;sary 
property, or such interest or right therein as may 
be required ... . "C 2• 1 > If the entire fee is taken 
from the adjoining owner, the problems surrounding 
his rights when only an casement is taken will not 
exist. 
An uncertainty exists concerning the rights of 
an adjoining owner to construct a ditch in the high-
way without permission when the fee is not taken. 
An early appellate decision held that "the digging 
of the ditch inside the limits of the highway is o [ 
itself an injury. It is a trespass unless the digging 
is by permission or under some legal right." C2• 8 > Th e 
landowner involved had not secured permission , and 
a fine was therefore imposed . Th e fact th at he was 
the fee owner was not discussed. The appellate 
court apparently did not feel that this \ms suffi cient 
justification for his act; his O\rnership of t he fee 
was not looked upon as "some legal right. " 
On the other hand, the adjoining owner's t itle 
to the fee has been in te rpreted as giYing him the 
ri ght to use the land of the highway in any manner 
he \vishcs, including the construction of a ditch, so 
long as the casement of the highway is not affected . 
The digging of the ditch in itself is not an obstru c-
tion. The ditch becomes an obstruction on ly if it 
renders the highway less sa fe, useful, or conven ient 
fo r the public. This i , a question of fact to be 
determined by a jury. The cour t sta ted it:-; holding 
as foll01vs: 
. The appell ant I owner of the fee I had a right , upon 
tlrn; h1glmay, to do that ncce~"ary for the drai nage of hi:; 
lands, provided he did not in tcrfcre with the use of the 
hig l11ra~-, rendering it Jess safe, useful or con1·cnicnt fo r 
the public. If the ditch dug by appellant \\"fl~ an ob:;t ruc-
tion on this highway then bis acts \\"ere unhmful. The 
finding of the jury \ms that the ditch \\"US an obstruc-
tion, and that finding we arc not authori zed to cli,tmb.<'"'> 
4 . Maintenance and Repair 
The Higlnrny Code imposes upon the respective 
highway authorities the duty to construct, main-
tain, and repair t he highways within the jurisdic-
t ion of each authority. c200 > An addit ional section 
provides the procedural steps for compelling hi gh-
way commissioners to make road repairs. c2 ·' 1 > 
The question is whether t hese sections impose 
upon the highway authority the duty to maintain 
and repai r drainage systems along the highway , 
both \\·hen adjoining owners have connected under 
:;cction 9-107 of the Higlnvay Codec 202 > and when 
they have constructed pri,·atc drains \Yit h pcnnis-
,.; ion upon land obtained under eminent domain pro-
visions. The sections imposing the duty of main te-
nance and repair do not expressly include drainage 
::;y:;tcms, but such sy:;tcms appear to be included in 
the definition of " higlllrnys" in the Higlmay 
Codc.< 2 " 3 > However, it is not likely that drains con -
structed for private purposes in the highway right-
of-way a re included \\·ithin the statutory definition 
of "h iglnrny," and therefore it "·ould seem that the 
responsib ility of t he higlmay authority for mainte-
nance and repair \YOuld not extend to such drains. 
An early appellate case dealt indirectly with the 
maintenance and repair question. The court, in 
discussing the right of lhc highway authorities to 
fill a certain highway ditch, said: 
. It \\"US therefore clearly thei r duty, under the statute 
1rh1 ch gaye them charge of the road ;md required them 
to keep it in repair, ... to fill it [the ditch] up , as the 
needful and only 1rny to a1·crt the danger and put an 
encl to the \\"rang and injury. <'04 > 
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5. Recording of Plats 
·whenever a higlmay is laid out, widened , or 
a ltered in accordance with the Highway Code, the 
rroper highway authority shall cause a plat to be 
made and recorded in the office of the recorder of 
deeds of the county or in the office of the registrar 
of ti tles for the county if appropriatc.<2·10 > 
6. Willow Hedges as a Public Nuisance 
\\'here \rillow hedges, or a line of willo\r trees have 
been planted along the margin of a higl1\rny, so a~ lo 
render ti ling impract icable, the highway authori ty having 
juri~diction of such highway may contract with the 
om1cr for their destruction; a nd they sha ll be destroyed 
before tiling. The planting of such hedge~ or trees here-
after on the margin of highways is declared to be a public 
nuisance.<"·'> 
7. lateral Support and Deposit of Spoil 
lt is unla \rful for any person to cxcaratc or rernon~ 
. the lateral support \rithin a distance of 10 feet plu,; 
one and one-half time~ the depth of any cxcarntiun 
adjacent to the established righ t-of-way of any public 
higll\ray located outside the corporate limi ts of ;i ny 
municipality, except that if any of the excavated mate-
rials be of solid rock, the dep th of such solid rock ~ha ll 
not be considered in compu t ing the limit of cxcarnlion 
from such right-of-way line of such public highway. 
It is unlawful fo r any person to deposit spoi l ... 
in such a manner that the toe of such spoil will be neare r 
than 20 feet to any established righ t-of-\rny of any public 
highway located outside the co rporate limi t~ of any 
municipality. 
Whenever any person violates . . . the fo regoi ng 
1irori ·ions . .. he shall be fined .... 
Where any such violation occurs along any public 
higlmay the proper highway authori ty ... is authori zed 
to take the necessary steps as required by la\\. to enter 
upon the property where such violat ion occurs and back-
fill ... the unlawful excavation or remove .. . the 
unlawful spoil banks . .. Y'·'> 
B. DRAINAGE DISTRICTS 
1. General 
The organization and operation of drainage dis-
tr icts in Illinois are governed by the Drainage Code. 
This code completely revised the two existing drain-
age lmrs, which dated back to 1879 and 1885. 
Although most of the reported cases deal with the 
tlrn earlier laws, the provisions of immediate inter-
est to this report were substantia lly retained in t he 
new code and the implications of the ya rious sec-
tions therefore remain unchanged. 
It is not the purpose of this report to study the 
techn ical aspects of the drainage cli:;trict organiza-
tion and operation, bu t instead to discuss the rein-
tionships and the relative rights and duties that 
exist bct\rccn the drainage districts and the respcc-
tiYc hi gh,rny authorities. For this reason all tech-
nicali ties ham been omitted, and only Drainage 
Code provisions of either definite or possible appli-
cation to highways arc included. (z 3 s> As a starting 
point, hmYe\·er , summ arized 8tatcments are pre-
sented to indi cate, in a general manner, the basic 
prinC'iplcs goYerning drainage districts: 
( 1) They ;ire a11t hori zcd by the General As~ernbl~· 
b11t arc not specifically created by it. Thus, the legisla -
t me tn'a !cs the framework fo r a drainage district and 
gi\·e · it cer tain po\rer~, but lea\'eS i t up to the people of 
t hC' a re:c lo determine the need for such a district. 
(:2) They do nut follow ex i~t ing governmental lines 
(('o unt y, tO\rnship or city) but can be created on the 
ba~is of phy~ical need, i.e., a natural drainage basin or a 
11nific<l ri\·cr net\rnrk. 
(:)) Thei r pmre r;; rela le solely to the specific purpose 
:1t hand ... . 
(.t) The procedure fo r orga ni zi ng and go\'crning the 
di~t rich i~ u~ually the 8a mc, ·ta r ti ng with a petition of 
:1 c-c rtain number of residents of the area to t he county 
j11dge, a general election, amioin tment of commissioners 
or t r11stct'5, etc.<"·" 
(!1) Drainage diotricls arc dependent solely upon 
~1at 11 Le, and these statutes must be fu lfilled to make their 
organi zat ion legal.<''°' 
2. Assessment of Highway as Drainage 
District Member 
a. Assi-:ss~IEXT OF HrcnwAYS 
Th e Illinois Constitution provides that the prop-
erty of the ;;;tate, counties, and other municipal 
('Orporations may be exempted from taxation, bu t 
that such exemption shall be only by general 
l<m. <2n 1> This constitutional provision is not sclf-
cxccuting, and affirmative action by the General 
Assembly is required in order to exempt property 
from taxation.'2°2 > All property will be subject to 
l<1xation unless it fa ll s within the proYision of a 
f'tatutc exempting it from such taxation. Affirm a-
ti,·c action by the General Assembly to exempt the 
state goYernmcnt from taxation has taken place 
under the express pro visions of the Revenue Act. 
This act states that all property of every kind be-
longing to the State of Illinois is exempt from tax-
ation . (203 > 
The Illinois Constitution further provides that 
the State of Illinois :;hall nenr be made defendant 
in any court of la\\. or equi ty.( 20•> This provision 
mean,; that the co ll ection of assessments or taxes 
aga inst state property i::; not enforceable by law. 
Th e courts han relied upon the above-named 
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prov1s10ns in holding t hat state property i;; not 
subj ect to specia l assessment or taxation b~· cities 
and villages for making local improYemcnts. <2 u·» 
The Drainage Code contain s a sec tion which 
specifically provides that high,rnys may be in-
cluded in the assessments of a drainage di strict. 
Drainage Code section 5-2 reads: 
Gpon the organization of the dist ri ct, t he commi~-
3ioncrs sha ll proceed to make out thci r assc,.;,.;mcn t roll 
of benefits, damages and compen~at ion, a ncl t h e~· sha ll 
include therein all lands, lot , railroads, public higlma_,·~, 
~t reets and a lleys a nd other property \rithin the di,lrict 
which, in their opinion, will be bcnefi lecl, taken or da m-
nged by the proposed work .... ""> 
Court cases furni sh examples of the application 
of this provision yun Jn a case where a tO\rn con-
tended that it could not be assessed for its high-
ways, the court answered: 
If the highways of a town a re benefited by the irn-
provcmen t they fa ll within t he cla~~ of properly that 
mny be assessed therefor, such asse,.;sments, hm,·c,·e r, 
being enforceable against the tmrn a nd not again'l the 
specific property benefited .<",.> 
These citations and comments appear to be con-
fined to the lesse r political subdivisions, such as 
counties and townships. It has been sta ted by the 
court that cities , villages, and counties arc mere 
agencies of the state through which local govern-
ment is conveniently administered, and that the 
general assembly may authorize property held by 
one of its agencies to be burdened \Yi th a charge 
for the benefit of another of its agencies to t he 
extent of benefits received. <2Gn> 
It therefore appears that the state is exem pt 
from any form of taxation or assessment. However , 
it docs appear that the lesser political subcliYi sions 
a rc subject to t axation and assessment and sect ion 
5-2 of the Drainage Code therefore applies to them . 
b. NEED TO SHOW BEKEFIT 
A limitation placed upon the right of a drain-
age district to assess lands is t hat benefit to those 
lands must be shown and the assessment must not 
exceed the benefit. These requirements arc stated 
in Drainage Code sections 3-23 and 5-1. Sect ion 
3-23 reads: 
If, at t he conclusion of the hearing, the cour t ap-
proYcs the plans for the proposed \rnrk or any modifi-
cation thereof and finds that t he benefits to the land in 
the proposed di ::;t rict from such \YOrk \rill exceed the 
co:;t lo that land, then the court sha ll order the organ iza-
tion of the district ... .<''0 > 
Section 5-1 reads: 
::\ o Janel or ot her properly shall be asses,;ed fo r bene-
fil ~ more than its .iu't proportion of t he entire asi'c,,mcn t 
or in exec'" of the benefits !hereto .<"" 
Court decisions ha\·c applied this principle to 
high\\"ay assessment situations as readily as to any 
other. The limitation has been stated as fol lows, 
the first sta tcrnent made in a hi glmay case: 
The onl~· limi tation llpon the proprrt.'· that lllay he 
;l"'r"scd is t hat it Jllll ,.;( he proper!,. hcnefi ted hy the 
i111pro,·emcnt. <"2 > 
In order to be a""c""cd fo r a d rain age pro.ice!, la ntb 
mll't be t hrreby rendr rrd 111orc prodlle! i ,·e, morr acccs, i-
hle, or their market Y:tluc c;ubsta ntialh· incrm,.;rd a nd 
I hei r aclu;i l or in t rirn;i c y;iJue enha nced.'""' 
The question liti gated is \\"hat con:otitutcs bene-
fit. Th e rule in Illin ois is that if a party has ade-
quate drainage under natural drainage rul es, he is 
not benefited by the drainage di strict and his land ::; 
eannot be assessed by the dist rict. 
l3ecallSC land O\rncrs ;i re joined toget her in a drainaµ:c 
dislritt affords no rm:'on \\· by a ll lnnd mrncr,.; !llu't con-
! ril rnte to c\·ery irnproYcmrnt 11·hich m;iy a'"i"t in the 
drainage of the district. The relatiYc location or the 
lands a nd the benefit::; to ;1cc ruc therefrom mu::;t be con-
c;i derecl. It is not enough that the la nd ::; arc in the rn111p 
\1·a ler,hcd. <2" > 
The O\\·ner of the dominant e~tate may rightfully 
collect !he f' urfo cc \YatC'r,; upo n hi ::; land and by mea ns or 
di!che' condu ct them into natura l ,,·ater-cour,.;c::; \rhich 
c111pt.'· in to the ditches of the district, \1·ithout ;.;llhjccli nµ: 
h i::; land lo be a nnexed to the dist ri ct.<"'> 
3. Use of Highways by Drainage District 
D rainage Code sect ion 4-14 reads in part: 
The commi:;~ioners arc cmpo,1·crcd to ... u~e an)· 
p r t of nn~· public higlmay for the purpo;.;e of \rnrk to 
he clone, pro,·idcd such u'e \1·ill not pennanently dc:;lroy 
or material!~· impair ~uch public higlm2y for public 
u....;c . ... (27G) 
Th e extent to which the highway may be u:;ed 
is not clear from the statute. From t he reported 
cases i t appears that t he statute pcrmih cutt ing 
across a high\rny with a drainage di:otrict dit ch. ~\ 
full discussion of the implications of such cull ing 
,,·ill be fo und in the ~cction conrin g bridge::; and 
cuh·crts. 
The quest ion is wh ether the right to use a publi e 
highway giYC::> to a drainage di stri ct (1) the right 
to drain into higlmay ditch es and (2) the ri ght to 
construct a drain a long the hi glrm:ty in the riglt t -
of-way. There arc no cases interpreting the ~tatu­
to ry language that anS\\·ers lhis question. As to the 
consl rn dion of a ditch ,,·ithin the higlrn·ay right-
of- \,·ay, t he problem di scussed in the cases i:; not 
\rhcther the drainage di strict is within its rights in 
IV. STATUTORY DRAINAGE 39 
regard to the higlnrny authority, but instead 
11·helher the district has obtained the consent of the 
fee O\\·ner. 
While it is ncccs:;ary to secure the consent of the 
cornmis;:ioncrs of highways to lay \\'ithin the higlmay a 
drain for drainage which is not primarily or cxclu:;i\·ely 
for the benefit of the highway but which is for the W'C 
of the adjoining lands, the conrn1issioncr,; of higlma:>~ 
do not possess the sole po\1·cr and authority to grant :t 
right-of-1rn~· for such improYcmcnt. Section 13 of article 
:? of the Constitution proYidcs that prirnte propcrt:-· 
,h:1ll not be taken or damaged for public use 1rithout ju.-<t 
c·ompcn:-ation .... The laying of this tile in the public 
higlmay \1·as an additional bmdcn and :,;crYitudc upon 
the f cc.<''" 
4. Eminent Domain 
The Drainage Code states that : 
\Ylwncrer the commissioners ;ire unable to agree 1rith 
any lando1rncr ... on the ;imount of compcn:-ation to be 
p;iid ... then the commis:,;ioners may . . acquire ;iny 
o'UCh land~, casements, rights-of-wa:--, propertic;; and in-
(('rc,t.-', \\'hcther priratcly 01rned, publicly mrned or held 
for the u:-e of the public, by the exercise of the right of 
cminrnt domain.<'"> 
Xo cases have been found involving the use of 
this right against a highway authority. The statu-
tory language, however, uses the phra:<c "held for 
the use of the public,'' \\·hich is the characteristic 
language of the courts in defining the manner in 
\1·hich public highways arc held by higlmay author-
ities.<"'"> Therefore, the question is \\·hcthcr a 
drainage district may u se the right of eminent do-
main against a higlnrny authority, whether or not 
the fee i::; held by the higlmay authority. 
5. Annexation of Lands to Drainage Di stricts 
Lands lying outside a drainage district may be 
annexed to the district in any one of three 1rny:,;: 
(1) connection to the drains of a drainage di::;trict, 
(2) petition by commissioners, and (3) petition by 
lanclo\rners. The th ird method of annexation is not 
often litigated because it inYolns the express des ire 
of the owners of land outside the drainage district. 
The fir:;t and second methods, ho\reYer, ha\·e been 
the :;ubject of controversy. 
Although no cases on annexat ion ban inrnlved 
a higlnrny authority as a party, there appears to 
be no reason why it cou ld not be found in such a 
position. The importance of the annexation pro-
Yi::;ions is that once annexation is found to exist, 
'ueh Janel may be assessed. 
Regarding the first method, Drainage Code sec-
tion 8-2 reads: 
Any mrner of land 1rhirh lies out:;idc of a di:;trict, 
~uhdi"trirt or minor subdistrict but \rithin the rnmc 
natural drain:1gc area, or i1woh-ccl in the same system 
of drain;igc as the lands 11·ithin the di:;trict ... may 
connect hi:,; land to any open ditch of the district ... 
or, 11"ith the prior consent of the commis;:ioncrs, to any 
co\·cred drain of the di :::t ri ct. . .. Any connrction so 
m:1dc ~ hall be 'ub,iect to the conditions of Section 1:2-1. 
\Yhen :rny such connection i:; rn;ide, the landmrncr in-
1·oh·cd "h;ill be deemrd to haYC ron,.,rnted to the annexa-
tion of "uch land to the cli~trict. . .. <''0 > 
Regarding the f'econd method , Drainage Code 
:-iC'Ction 8-3 reads: 
\\'hen any land lying outside of a district has been 
<·onnected to a district drain or ha s been or will be 
benefited or protected by a1n- di st ri ct 1rnrk done or 
orderPd to be clone, the commi,;i'ioncr~ may petition the 
comt to ~111ncx such land to the district. .. . '"1' 
n:, \my of summary, seclion 8-2 states that con-
nection to a drainage district ditch b:< an outsider 
is deemed to be consent for annexation. Section 8-3 
states that \Yhen connection or benefit can be shmrn 
by the drainage cli;;trict, the drainage comm is;:ion -
er:-; may petition the court for annexation. 
\\'hen either connection or benefit is slimn1, the 
courl:s do not hesitate to annex the lands to the 
drainage district: 
[I [ t has been held that 11·hilc thr mrncr of tlH' 
domin;int heritage has the right to collect the water~ 
n;iturally flm1·i ng from his lamb 01·rr thr ;:e n ·irnt heritage 
into ditches and drains and tlrns to di,clrnrgc them, yet 
11·hcn he connects his ditehc,; 11 ith the ditches dug h.1· the 
di,trict the statute takrs effect, ;ind he nrn~t be held to 
ha1·c Yoluntarily applird to harn hi ::; bnds included 
11·ithin the district. The mere fact that these relator~ 
h:td the legal right to h;iye the \rnter::; from their lands 
flow off onr the lands below them lying ll'ithin the 
drai nage district gave them no right to connect thei r 
drains \1·ith the artificial drains of the district without 
,;ubjccling theml'elns to the conditions imposed by the 
l'tatuteY"> 
On the other hand, \Yherc the drainage district 
has not benefited the land and \Yhcre no connection 
ha:; been made, the courts just as readily refuse to 
annex the lands: 
The c1·idence shml'o that lhc lands included in the 
drainage district as originally formed, so far as drain;igc 
io concerned, arc, and ahrny::; haYe been, sen ·ient to the 
lamb of the rclators, and that the relator,; ha\·c done 
nothing further than to collect the su rf;icc \Yaters upon 
their rcspcctiYe tracts of land :rnd by means of tile clrnim; 
and open ditches conduct them, in the natural course of 
drain:1gc, into natural \rntcr-cour"c · 11·hich either directly 
or indirect ly haYe as their outlet the ditches of the 
district ... . 
In order to cstablil'h that a 1.ract of land lying out-
side a drainage district has been connedcd by the owner 
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\Yith the ditches of t he di strict it is not suffi cient to 
merely show that the waters from that tract ultimately 
pass into and through the district ditches, but it rnw't 
further appear that an artificial ditch has been con-
structed leading from that land directly into the dist ri ct 
ditch or into some ditch which has been theretofore 
artificially connected with the drainage ditch. Such is, in 
effect , the substance of our previous decisions upon this 
question. The proof fails to show that any of the rclato rs' 
lands have been so connected, and the authori ty of the 
drainage commissioners to annex the lands in controYcr,;y 
to the district was therefore not r~ t a bli,hed. <"" 
6. Miscellaneous Provisions 
a. RIGHTS OF LAKDO\\"NERS vVlTlllN A Drs THlC'r 
Two sections of the Drainage Code deal with the 
rights of landowners within the district, i.e ., di strict 
members. Section 12-1 grants the right to use dis-
trict drains : 
A landO\\·ncr \Yithin any drainage dist ri ct has the 
right to use the ditches a nd drains of the dist rict as out-
lets for any drains, either open or covered, which he may 
desire to construct for the more complete drainagr of his 
own land ... y••> 
Section 12-2<2 85 ) i the result of a 1943 case 
which held that landowners "·ithin a drainage dis-
trict relinquished some of their common-law rights. 
The court in that case said: 
All of the landowners who \\UC included in the di~­
trict, and \Yho accepted tlwsc benefits, relinquished to 
that extent any common-law right of dominant Dowagc 
OYer that of the land lying below them by connecting 
\\·ith the ditches of the distri ct. While it is true the 
principle might h~wc a pplication as to m1tcr normally 
flowing OYer the surface of a higher tract to a l01rcr 
tract, and not attached Lo the dra ins of the distri ct, yet 
when the upper and lower land01n1crs unite in forming 
a district for obtaining the benefits to be deriYcd from 
the remoYal of wa ter by means of drains or lcYccs the 
principle has no application, for the simple reason the 
parties have agreed to adopt the drainage system pro-
\·idcd by statute in lieu of the rights at comm011 
law .... <"'> 
To change this result, sec tion 12-2 provides : 
Land included within a district :;hall continue to haYc 
the same rights of drainage, both common law and 
statutory, as land not within an organized drainage dis-
trict, except insofar as the drainage system of the district 
may vary from or be inconsistent with natural drainage. 
The construction of a covered drain by a drainage dis-
trict in the course of natural dra inage or along the course 
of an open ditch shall not in itself be considered to be an 
abandonment of the natural drain or the 011cn di tch .<'"' 
b. LANDOWNERS' UsE OF THE RrcHT-OF-vVAY 
Drainage Code section 12-3 reads: 
The O\rncr of any land o\·er, through or aero~:; \rhich 
a di:;trict has acquired a right-of-way ... ma y U:'C th r 
land occupied by such right-of-\rny in any manner not 
in consistent \Yith the pa ramount casement of the dis-
trict. Any use of the right-of-\1·ay \\·hich \\·ill interfere 
with the operation of the drain or will increase the cost 
to the dist rict of performing any of its \\"Ork thereon is 
deemed to be inconsistent \rith the dist rict 's ca~e­
ment. .. .<'88 > 
C. PENALTIES 
Additional Drainage C'odc ~cc tions provide pen-
a lties : (1) for injuring a drain , drainage structure, 
Jene, or pumping plant (section 12-7) ,< 289 l (2) for 
preventing entry by commissioners upon landi,; or 
rights-of-way (sect ion ] 2-8), <200 l and (3) for prc-
vcn ting construction or repair of private drains 
(~ection 12-9) Y"'l 
C. INDIVIDUAL LANDOWNER 
The subjects di scussed under this heading arc 
substantially the same as those covered under 
"Highway Authority." The present sec tion views 
the subjects from the standpoint of the individual 
landO\rner, whereas the prior section viC\\·cc! them 
from the standpoint of th e highway authority. Th e 
previous section contains fl full discussion of the 
statutory provisions. 
1. Contract with Highway Authority 
An adjoining landowner may contract with the 
highway authority whereby the authority will lay 
a larger drain tile than is neccsrnry to drain the 
higlnrny and the landO\\·ncr \\·ill be allowed to con-
nect thcre1rith. <202 l The landowner will be required 
to pay such sum as the enlargement of the tile cl rain 
will cost in order to carry off the additional \rntcr 
that might come from his land.< 2"'ll Contracts bc-
fo·ccn the highway authority and adjoining land-
owner, other than those contemplated by this statu-
tory provision, were discussed earlier and arc not 
included here. 
2. Drain into Highway with Permission 
A lanclO\Yner through or along \\·hose land a pub-
lic highway passes and who desires to drain into the 
highway may so drain if he fir:;t gives due notice to 
the proper highway authority and receives from 
that authority written permission for any work, 
ditching, or excarnting he proposes to do within 
the limits of the highway. <2 <J.1) 
3. Injuring or Obstructing Highway 
Higlmay Code section 9-ll 7<295 l provides that 
a penalty be imposed on any person who injures or 
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obstructs a highway. However, the consequences 
of an adjoining landowner constructing a ditch in 
the highway without permission arc not clear . The 
act of construction a lone may be considered an ob-
st ruction and s ubj ect the landowner to a penalty 
under the Highway Codc.cmi Or the ditch may be 
considered an obstruction on ly if it render:; the 
highway less safe, useful, and convenient to the 
public. <29 n 
Xcvcrtheless section 9-117 of the code abo per-
mits an adjoining landowner to commit certain act:; 
" ·ithout s ubjecting himself to the penalty for ob-
:-:truction. The landowner may: 
(1) Drain into a ditch located across or a long 
the highway following the course of natural drain-
age. c29si 
(2) Drain into a highway pass ing through or 
:dong hi s land if permission has been secured. <2 "") 
4. Cutting or Damaging State Highways 
:\o per~on shall \Yillfully cut, cxcaYatc or othcnri,;e 
damage that portion of any highway under the jurisdic-
tion :rnd control of the Department, including the hard-
:-:urfaced slab, shoulders and drainage ditches, either 
11·ithin or without the corporate limits of a municipality 
11·ithout a permi t to do so from the Department. The 
Department shall issue its permit when such cutting, 
exearnt ing or damaging is reasonably necessary, but it 
i" the duly of the person securing a permit to make such 
repairs to the highway as 1rill restore it to substantially 
the same condition as it \YaS originally .... To in~urc 
the proper repair, the Department may, before issuing its 
pNmit, req uire the person applying for a permit, to 
enter into a bond payable to the People of the State of 
lllinoi:; in a sum commensurate, in the opinion of the 
Dcp::irlmcnt, 1rith t he injury to be clone to the higlmay, 
l'onditioned for its proper restoration within such time 
as thr Department may prescribe ... .<'00> 
5. Lateral Support and Deposit of Spoil 
A landowner may not remove the lateral sup-
port w ithin certain specified distances of the high-
1rny . ::\either may he place the spo il of any 
excavation w ithin a specified distance of the right-
of-1rny of the highway .<3° 1 l 
D. EXTENSION OF COVERED DRAlN 
THROUGH LAND OF OTHERS 
1. Statutory Provisions 
a. ExTE:'.'ISI0:'.'1 OF COVERED DnAINS T1-rnouGH LAND 
OF O·rHERS 
\\' hen it is necessary for the owner of land 1rhich 
may be drained by a covered drain to extend such drain 
through the land of others in the general course of 
natural drainage in order to obtain a proper outlet and 
the owner of, or other party interested in, the land 
through which such extension is nece~sa ry refuses to con-
cent to t he extension ... , the person desiring to con-
struct t he drain may file suit in the county court in the 
county in which such land lies against t he mrner ... 
and summons shall issue ... and proceedings shall be 
had thereon as in othrr ciYil :cctions in county courts.'""' 
b. BOND 
At the time of commencing thr action, the plaintiff 
~ hall file a bond in the pell:ll ,;1 1111 of no t Je,,; than $100 
.. . conditioned u11on the payment of :ill eo,;ts accruing 
in the :1elion and .. all d:un:q.(c's 1rhi ch may Le 
:rn«trded to the defendant. "'"'" 
c. PLNr AKD PnonLE 
At the time of commencing the act ion, the plaintiff 
shall abo file a map or plat sho11·ing the land proposed 
to be dr:1ined, the land across 1rhich the drain i,; proposed 
lo be con:;tructed nnd the starling point, route and out-
let of the propo$cd drnin and a profile showing the 
elc1·ation of the flow line of the proposed drain and 
the elerntion of the su rface of the ground through 
11·hich the dr:1in i:; proposed to lie constructed.'""> 
d. TRIAL, FINDI:\'G OF VEHDICT, AXD JUDG.\IENT 
U, on the trial of the cnse, it i:; found that t he pro-
posed drain will be of ample capacity, will not materially 
dam:1ge the land of t he defendant and 1Yill empty into 
(a) a nat ural 1rntcrcour,;e, (b) an a r tificial drain along a 
public higlrn·ay, 1rith the consent of the high1rny author-
itie~, or (c) any other outlet which the plaintiff has t he 
right lo use, then the finding or Yerdict shall be for t he 
plaintiff; ::ind the defendants shall be allmrcd such actual 
d:unage:; only a,; 1rill be sustained by entering upon the 
land and constructing t he drain and thereafter keeping 
the same in repair. If it is no t so found, then the finding 
or YCrdict of the jury shall be for thr defrndant. . <'"''' 
C. COXSTRUCTION AND l\!AINTENAi\C8 
The plaintiff, after 11aying ... the damages ... , 
1n:1y t hereupon enter the premises of the defendant and 
l'onstruct the drain, and he or his succe,;sors in title may 
therea fter at all times enter upon suc h land for the pur-
pose of repairing and maintaining the drain .... The 
plaintiff ... shall keep it in good repair. If, in repair-
ing the drain, the plain tiff ... cause! s] ::iny damage 
. he . .. shall be liable for the actual damage caused. 
I f, in constructing or repairing the drain, the plaintiff 
... sha ll wilfully cause any unneccs~ary damage ... 
he shall become liable for ... 3 timr:; the amount of t he 
unnecessary damage clone ... .'"''"' 
f. ABANDONMEK'r OF PnoCEEDINGS 
If, after obtaining suc h a judgment, the plaintiff 
elects ... to abandon t he proceedings, the court shall note 
such Yoluntary abandonment upon the docket. If the 
plaintiff fails to construct the drain within 2 years after 
obtaining rnch a judgment, the court, on motion of the 
defendan t ... shall note the failure lo construct and 
rr~ult ing abandonment. ... If the plaintiff abandons 
the proceeding~, either Yoluntarily or by failure to con-
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struct the drain as set forth above, he shall not be per-
mitted to commence another action against the defendant 
for the same purpose until after the expiration of 5 
years from the rendition of the judgment. <"''> 
2. Constitutionality 
The leading case litigating the extension-of-
covered-drain provision has resolved some uncer-
tainties resulting from the general language of the 
statute, but has left other questions in doubt. 
The constitutionality of the statute was chal-
lenged on the ground that it permitted the taking 
of the private property of one landowner for the 
private use of another. The court summarily 
answered the challenge: 
It is sufficient to say, that said statute is clearly 
within the legislative power conferred upon the General 
As embly by section 31 of article 5 of our present State 
Constitution. That section provides that: "The General 
Assembly may pass laws permitting the owners of lands 
to construct drains, ditches and levees for agricul tural 
sanitary and mining purposes, across the lands of 
others."<308> 
A second constitutional question was raised be-
cause of the statute's use of the term "damages" 
instead of the customary "just compensation" when 
a taking of land is involved. In the words of the 
statute, the defendant is to be allowed "such actual 
damages only as will be sustained by entering upon 
the land and constructing the drain and thereafter 
keeping the same in repair." If strictly construed, 
this award of damages would not be "just compen-
ation" as the term is usually interpreted in the 
taking of private property. Therefore, to avoid 
declaring the statute unconstitutional, the court 
held: 
This language clearly embraces all damages which 
will be sustained by .. . the entry upon the land and 
the construction of the ditch, and the word "only" can-
not be held to have the effect of restricting it to anything 
less than all the damages thus occasioned. The entry 
upon the land and the construction of the ditch ... 
constitute, in law, a taking and appropriation of a per-
petual easement in the defendant's land, and all dam-
ages' both direct and consequential which necessarily 
result from such taking and appropriation, are actual 
damages occasioned by the construction of the drain . ... 
We think, therefore, that ubstantially the same rules for 
the ascertainment of damages which prevail in proceed-
ings for the condemnation of private property for public 
use should be adopted in cases arising under this 
statute. <309> 
3. Bond and Plat 
The plaintiff is required to file both a penal 
bond <310 > and a plat<311 > of the land to be drained 
and the land across which the drain is to be con-
structed. In the leading case, the transcript of the 
case from the justice of the peace contained a re-
cital that the bond had been properly submitted. 
This recital, in the absence of any evidence tending 
to impeach it, was held to be a satisfactory com-
pliance with the statute. In addition, a crude and 
imperfect sketch of the land to be drained had been 
submitted to fulfill the plat requirement. The court 
held that this imperfect sketch was a sufficient 
attempt at compliance with the statute. <312 > 
4 . Appeal 
Under an earlier statute, <313 > a clause was in-
cluded which stated that the "judgment shall be 
final and conclusive .... " Therefore, when the de-
fendant took an appeal to the Supreme Court, the 
plaintiff contended that such appeal was contrary 
to the statute. The court decided that "final and 
conclusive" did not mean that judgment of the 
justice of peace (where this type of action origi-
nated at that time) should necessarily be final, but 
that the final judgment, which might be the judg-
ment on appeal, should be conclusive. The intent 
of the clause, reasoned the court, was to restrain 
repeated attempts by one party to litigate his right 
to extend a drain through the land of another. 
The right to appeal was further justified by the 
clause ". . . proceeding shall be had thereon as in 
other civil causes .... "< 314 > The court reasoned 
that this clause clearly allowed appeal from judg-
ments of the justice of the peace in cases arising 
under this statute just as in any other civil case. 
The present statute retains this latter clause and 
eliminates the former . The question appears settled. 
5 . Applicability 
Among the unan wered questions is to whom 
the statute applies, both as plaintiff and as de-
fendant. Clearly an individual may occupy the 
position of plaintiff. But is is not clear whether the 
statute is restricted to the use of individuals. The 
term "person" used in section 2-2, <315 > if narrowly 
interpreted, may exclude such quasi-corporations 
as the highway authority. 
Furthermore, would the highway authority be 
permitted to use this provision in view of the fact 
that the Highway Code makes available to such a 
body the right of eminent domain? 
The statute probably contemplates that the 
position of defendant will be occupied by an indi-
vidual landowner. Nevertheless, could the highway 
----------- - ---
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authority ever be found in that position? It seems 
unlikely that a landowner would seek permission 
to construct a covered ditch beneath a highway, 
since one of the enumerated outlet for such a ditch 
is "an artificial drain along a public highway, 
with the consent of the highway authori ty."< 31si 
The wording of the statute does not clearly state 
the circumstances under which it may be used. 
First, its provisions are limited to situations where 
"it is nece sary" to extend the drain. What consti-
tutes a necessity is not defined. Second, the drain 
must be "in the general course of natural drainage." 
Just what this clause may require is likewise left 
undefined. 
E. DRAINS AND LEVEES FOR MUTUAL BENEFIT 
1. Purpose 
ections 2-8 through 2-11 <317 l of the Illinois 
Drainage Code deal with the subject of drains and 
levees for the benefit of the members of a mutual 
drainage system. 
The purpose of the act has been repeatedly 
stated by the courts: 
The statute referred to does not restrict or abridge 
the rights of drainage as they existed at common law. Its 
sole purpose and effect is to enlarge those rights .... <31•> 
That act was intended to enlarge the rights of drain-
age as between adjoining land holders and to protect 
drains continuous in their character and purpose for the 
mutual benefit of the lands affected whenever they had 
been constructed by license or consent, though without 
written authority.<"9> 
These broad statements must be limited in at 
least one respect: When a mutual drainage system 
exi ts, a landowner may be restricted in the full use 
of his common-law rights. In a 1907 appellate case, 
a landowner who was a member of a mutual drain-
age sy tern attempted to use the common-law right 
of the dominant owner to artificially collect the 
urface water on his own land and discharge it on 
the ervient owner at the point of natural entry. In 
artificially collecting the water, the landowner cut 
across several tiles of the mutual system, preventing 
water from flowing normally through the tiles. In 
holding that this normally permissible improvement 
on one's own land was not permissible under these 
circumstances, the court said: 
[H]e has no right in doing so to disturb in any way 
the flow of waters which would pass off his premises 
throuo-h an outlet provided by a mutual system of drain-
age.<''0> 
2. Parties 
While the statute speaks in general terms of 
"owners of lands," court decisions have determined 
which landowners may become parties to a mutual 
drainage system. Clearly an individual landowner 
is included within the statute. Just as clearly, a 
drainage district is excluded : 
[Tlhe act was not designed and did not have any 
operation upon a drainage district or the ditches or 
drains therein . . .. The act of 1889 relates only to pri-
vate and individual rights in ditches or drains constructed 
by mutual license, consent or agreement, and has no 
reference to the ditches or drains of an organized drain-
age district.<'"> 
The act has been applied to highway authorities 
on the assumption that they may become members 
of a mutual drainage system. Once a member, how-
ever, it is not clear whether the highway authority 
will be bound in the same manner as an individual. 
One case indicates that the highway is similarly 
bound : 
[T]he highway commissioners of the town of Oak-
wood have consented to the laying of this drain in the 
highway, and ... they are bound thereby. Appellee is, 
therefore, protected in his right to drain the land through 
this small drain as it is now re-located in the highway. 
... Neither the public, through the highway commis-
sioners, nor any private individual can interfere with 
this right.<"'> 
Another case, however, seems to indicate that 
the highway authority, although a member of a 
mutual drainage system, may make subsequent 
changes within the system which an individual 
member would be prohibited from attempting. 
After finding that a mutual drainage system existed, 
the court commented: 
Even if public necessity and the security of the high-
way might authorize the highway commissioners to make 
changes, yet that could not be done ti ll the necessity 
arose.<"'> 
Another question arises concerning the appli-
cability of the statute to the highway. The cases in 
which a highway has been found to be a member 
of a mutual drainage system have usually involved 
situations where the system carried water away 
from the highway. <324 > There is at least one case, 
however, where the reverse was true.<320 > The high-
way authority had granted permission to an adjoin-
ing landowner to connect with and discharge into 
the highway drain under the predecessor to High-
way Code section 9-107.<326 i The court found that 
the element of mutual benefit existed and that a 
mutual drainage system had been established. The 
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question raised is this: Whenever Highway Code 
section 9-107 is u ed by the highway authority to 
grant permission to an adjoining landowner to con-
nect with the highway drain and where such con-
nection benefits the highway, does a mutual system 
exist? 
A third point concerning membership of a high -
way authority in a mutual drainage system involves 
the fact that a record is usually required as evi-
dence of any official act of the highway author-
ity.<327l The subject of mutual drains, however, is 
an exception to this requirement. Where a party 
contested the fact that there was no mention of a 
mutual drainage system in the record of the acts 
of the highway authority, the court held: 
It is true, the commissioners act by virtue of their 
corporate authority, and their acts, in most instances, 
can be proved only by the record, but the act here under 
con ideration was not required to be made a matter of 
record to render it valid.<"•> 
3. Statute of Frauds 
The Statute of Frauds<329 > is intended to prevent 
fraud and perjury by requiring certain transactions 
to be in writing. <330 > Transactions involving inter-
ests in land are among those falling within the 
Statute. Therefore, excluding the natural easement 
that exists under the rule of natural drainage, the 
right to drain through the land of another is an 
easement that can be obtained only by deed, con-
veyance in writing, or prescription. Drains con-
structed under the mutual drainage statute, how-
ever, are an exception to the Statute of Frauds and 
are not required to be evidenced by an agreement in 
writing. <331> 
4. Revocation of License 
The original mutual drain statute of 1889 con-
tained a provision allowing agreements for mutual 
drains then in existence to be revoked within one 
year. The purpose of this provision was to allow 
landowners who had made agreements prior to 
enactment of the statute to escape its effect. Liti-
gation arose concerning whether the revocation had 
been made, whether it had been made within the 
one-year period, etc. <332 > These questions, of course, 
no longer arise. Under the present statute, there 
must be an agreement of all parties before the 
mutual license may be revoked. <333 > 
S. Drains Included 
Drainage Code section 2-8< 33•> defines the cir-
cumstances under which a drainage system is con-
sidered to be for the mutual benefit of adjoining 
lands. The section as set out here has been sep-
arated and numbered for easier reading. 
(1) When a ditch, covered drain or levee is, or has 
been, constructed by mutual license, consent or 
agreement, either separately or jointly, by the 
owners of adjoining lands so as to make a con-
tinuous line across the lands of such owners, or 
(2) When the owner of adjoining land is permitted 
to connect a ditch, covered drain or levee with 
another already so constructed, or 
(3) When the owner of lower land connects a ditch 
or covered drain to a ditch or covered drain 
constructed by the owner or owners of upper 
lands, or 
( 4) When the owner of land protected by a levee 
has contributed to the cost of the construction, 
enlargement or reconstruction of a levee upon 
other land, such ditch, covered drain or levee 
shall be deemed to be a drain or levee for the 
mutual benefit of all lands connected to, or 
protected by, it. 
Three points are clear under the first method 
enumerated by the statute: 
(1) The drain must be constructed by mutual 
license, consent, or agreement.<"'> 
(2) The drain may be constructed either separately 
or jointly. Each landowner need not take part 
in the actual construction. <03•> 
(3) The construction must result in a continuous line 
across the lands of member landowners. <337> 
The following statement by the court illustrates 
the second method, which permits one landowner to 
connect a drain with the drain of his neighbor, with 
the permission of the latter: 
[W]e are inclined to hold that the construction of 
independent ditches by adjoining owners of lands, and 
then connecting them together so as to form a continuous 
system of drainage across the lands of the several owners 
. .. would bring the case within the statute. <m> 
The third method is exemplified by the situation 
in which an upper landowner had constructed a tile 
in the course of natural drainage, emptying onto 
the lower owner at the point of natural entry. The 
lower owner connected a tile on his land at this 
point, and a mutual system was established. <339 > 
No cases were discovered dealing with the 
fourth method mentioned by the statute. 
6. Parol License and Acquiescence 
Drainage Code section 2-8 provides: 
The mutual license, consent or agreement required 
in this section need not be in writing, but may be estab-
lished by parole [sic] or inferred from the acquiescence 
of the parties.<"•> 
It is clear that no writing is necessary in order 
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to establish a mutual system of drainage. Both 
parol agreements and agreements inferred from 
acquiescence are equally effective. Below are state-
ments made in this regard by the court: 
[I]ts existence as a mutual ditch was recognized by 
the request of Mrs. King's husband, in 1910, to repair it, 
and the action of the commissioners in doing so ... . If 
the act of 1889 is applicable to this case, - and we think 
it is, - it is clear appellants had no right to destroy or 
obstruct the ditch. <341) 
[T]he license, consent, or agreement with the parties 
need not be in writing, but shall be as valid and binding 
in parol as in writing. <34» 
[I]t appears that he was present while the work was 
going on, and we are constrained to hold that there was 
such acquiescence on his part as to bring him within the 
provisions of the act of 1889.<'"> 
If it be conceded that the evidence does not show an 
actual agreement between the appellant and the city to 
construct a system of drainage for their mutual benefit, 
the fact that the system has been in existence for nine-
teen years without objection and with mutual benefit is 
sufficient to establish a mutual drainage system by im-
plied agreement. <34•> 
[E]ven if it did not show an actual agreement be-
tween the parties, the fact that the main system has been 
in existence for said period without objection and with 
mutual benefit is sufficient to establish a mutual drainage 
system by implied agreement, within the meaning of the 
Drainage Act of 1889.<'"> 
7. Original Tract Divided 
Drainage Code section 2-8 further provides: 
When a ditch, covered drain or levee is privately 
constructed through or on a tract of land and the owner-
ship of such tract is thereafter divided, such ditch, cov-
ered drain or levee shall thereupon be deemed a drain 
or levee for the mutual benefit of all the portions of the 
original tract connected to, or protected by, such ditch, 
covered drain or levee. <"0> 
A 1900 appellate case dealt with this situation, 
although at the time a like provision was not in-
cluded in the statute. <3 47 l A drainage system had 
been established by a landowner who had since died. 
His land had been divided between two parties, 
one of whom sought to obstruct the drainage sys-
tem. The trial court found that a mutual drainage 
system under the 1889 act existed. The appellate 
court did not rule on the issue, finding another basis 
upon which to decide the case. That a mutual 
drainage system exists and cannot be disturbed now 
appears settled by the statute previously quoted. 
8. Connection by Third Party 
Drainage Code section 2-9 reads as follows: 
It is unlawful for any person to connect a ditch, cov-
ered drain or levee with any drain or levee deemed to 
be for the mutual benefit of the lands connected or pro-
tected without the consent of all parties interested in 
such drain or levee. When an unlawful connection fa 
made, any interested person may recover damages and, 
if an unlawful connection is made to a covered drain, 
may compel disconnection.<"•> 
Basically the section answers two questions : 
First, when may a third party connect, and, second, 
what is the remedy for unlawful connection? 
As to when a third party may connect, the 
courts strictly follow the statutory requirement that 
consent of all interested parties must first be ob-
tained. <349 l Two qualifications, however, must be 
noted : 
The first is illustrated by an 1897 appellate case 
that involved a mutual drain constructed in a 
natural watercourse. One party to the drain allowed 
connection by several third parties. When the sec-
ond party contested, the court ruled that the con-
nection was not unlawful, since the third parties 
were dominant owners whose surface water would 
flow through the natural watercourse in a state of 
nature, and since the mutual drain act did not re-
strict or abridge natural drainage rules. <35 oJ 
The second qualification is that the clause pro-
hibiting connection has been interpreted as a pro-
tection for parties to a mutual drain who have made 
no contrary agreement. Therefore, where the parties 
agree among themselves that all or certain members 
may allow connection by third parties of their own 
choosing, such agreement will be upheld. <35 iJ 
Just as establishment of the system in the first 
instance may be implied by acquiescence, the con-
sent required for connection may likewise be 
implied: 
We think that some of the surrounding facts and cir-
cumstances tend slightly to show that the appellant 
knew, at the time Ascherman's drain was built, that 
Drumond's drain [the third party] was to be connected 
with it .... We do not think the court erred in refusing 
to take the case from the jury on the ground that there 
was no proof of consent by appellant. <352> 
Acquiescence, however, is not implied where the 
facts indicate quite the opposite: 
There is no merit in the contention that defendants 
in error are to be held to an implied consent to the con-
nection enjoined because of the fact that they waited a 
year, or almost a year, after the connection was made to 
bring their suit. They notified plaintiffs in error very 
shortly after the connection was made to disconnect and 
close up the tile drain and within less than a year there-
after began this suit. <353> 
The evidence fails to show that appellee, by word or 
action, consented to or acquiesced in the action of appel-
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!ant. Upon the contrary, when he saw him laying the 
tile and making the connection, he told him he was doing 
an unlawful thing, and that if he ever suffered in conse-
quence thereof he should hold him responsible. <3"> 
The second question is how to remedy unlawful 
connection. The statute specifically allows damages 
for all unlawful connections and injunctive relief 
for unlawful connection to a covered drain. Since 
compelled disconnection i expressly mentioned, the 
courts do not hesitate to use this mandatory 
remedy, <355 > regardless of the fact that it may cause 
more damage to the party allowing connection and 
to the third party than would be suffered by the 
party bringing the action if the relief were 
denied. <356 > 
9. Duration 
Drainage Code section 2-10 reads: 
Drains and levees deemed to be for the mutual bene-
fit of the lands connected or protected shall constitute a 
perpetual easement on such lands and shall not be filled, 
ob tructed, breached or impaired in any \my without the 
con ent of the owners of all such lands. <35 '> 
An original mutual benefit act in 1889 did not 
state that the mutual system constitutes a perpetual 
easement, although it did prohibit filling , obstruct-
ing, breaching, or impairing the system. Even with -
out the express statement that perpetual casement 
results from such a sy tern, the courts reached this 
conclusion: 
[A]s this statute is intended to enlarge those rights of 
drainage, it would seem that it was the intention of the 
legislature that in cases where the owners of such land 
have constructed a ditch through their several tracts to 
carry off the water, the right to maintain the same and 
to have the water flow through it unobstructed should be 
a permanent one and pass with the land as an incident of 
ownership. <35•> 
Under the Drainage Act of 1 89 drains constructed 
by mutual consent and agreement over adjoining lands 
and operating and remaining undisturbed for a period of 
time limited in the act are converted into perpetual 
easements. <35•> 
W c are of the opinion that by force of the statute 
the license has been converted into a perpetual easement. 
The effect of the statute is to make such a ditch so con-
structed an encumbrance, so to speak, upon all the lands 
through which it passes. The right to it and its mainte-
nance is an interest in the land itself, and passes with the 
land by conveyance, devise or descent, for the statute 
declares that it shall be held to be for the benefit of all 
the lands, and the obstruction to the flow of water is pro-
hibited, and it is in effect made perpetuat.<300> 
Under these sections the owners of land who have 
established and constructed a system of drainage for their 
mutual benefit po sess a right to have such system of 
drainage maintained as established. <3••> 
--------------- -- - -- -
Once established, the principle that mutua l 
drains are perpetual in duration has seen repeated 
application. <362 > Even when a party incurs damages 
because of the system as it exists, he has no justi-
fication for interfering with the easement. <363 > 
10. Repair and Maintenance 
Drainage Code section 2-11 provides: 
The owner of any land connected to or protected by 
such a mutual drain or levee may, at his own expense, go 
upon the lands upon which the drain or levee is situated 
and repair the drain or levee, and he shall not be liable 
for damage to lands or crops unless he is negligent in 
performing the work.<'64 > 
This section plainly grants to any member of 
a mutual system the right to go onto the land of 
another member to repair and maintain the mutual 
drain. This conclusion was reached by the court 
even before the statute so provided. Where a land-
owner was being charged with trespassing for hav-
ing entered the land of another to clean a drain, the 
court said: 
As a general proposition, whoever has an easement 
in or over another's land has the right to do all such 
things as are necessary to preserve the easement, - that 
is, he may keep it in repair, and has the right of access 
to make the necessary repairs . . .. It would seem, there-
fore, that the common law annexes to the easement of a 
drain in another 's land the right to go upon such land 
and clean out or repair such drain without doing unneces-
sary injury to the land. Nor can we conclude that the 
statute has taken away this right. <3•» 
It must be noted, however, that section 2-11 of 
the Drainage Code grants a right but imposes no 
duty. Therefore, the question is whose is the burden 
of maintenance and repair. The courts have indi-
cated that the most justifiable distribution of the 
burden of repair and maintenance is on the basis 
of benefit received : 
It is not necessarily an equitable division of the bur-
den of maintaining such a ditch once it has been con-
structed and keeping the same free from obstructions, to 
impose upon the several mrners the obligation of main-
taining and keeping in repair that portion of the ditch 
extending through their premises. If one be the owner 
of the servient estate, the ditch may be constructed par-
tially for the benefit of his lands and partially for the 
benefit of the dominant estate, or it may be constructed 
solely for the benefit of the dominant estate. The distri-
bution of the burden of maintaining the ditch must neces-
sarily be governed by the facts in each particular case.<"•> 
[A] lthough the Act of 1889 imposes no duty of 
maintenance and repair upon the members of a mutual 
drainage ditch, the court will apportion such duties in 
accordance with the benefits conferred by the drain, and 
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will enjoin any overt acts designed to change the water-
course.<"''> 
The Drainage Code contains the following pro-
vision: 
Where 2 or more par ties owning adjoining or con-
t iguous lands, or their predecessors in t itle, have, by 
Yoluntary action, constructed a combined system of 
drains, a combined system of levees or a combined sys-
tem of drains and levees which form a continuous line or 
a continuous line and branches, the lands connected by 
such system shall be liable for their just proportion of 
the cost of such repairs and improvements as may be 
needed therefore, t he amount to be determined, as nearly 
as may be, on the same principles as if these lands were 
in an organized drainage district. Whenever such repairs 
and improvements cannot be made by voluntary agree-
ment, any one or more par ties owning land upon which 
any such work has been constructed may petition the 
court fo r t he formation of a drainage district to include 
the lands connected by such system. <30•> 
V. BRIDGES AND CULVERTS 
Since no decisions have been reported under the 
revised Drainage Code, the critique in this section 
will be based on interpretation by the courts of 
the mandates of prior statutes compared with the 
present-day code. 
Prior to enactment of the code, there were dif-
ferences of opinion concerning duties and responsi-
bilities relating to building and maintaining bridges 
over natural and artificial watercourses. Therefore 
it should be advantageous to follow the judicial 
thinking leading up to our present drainage code. 
A. CONSTRUCTION 
1. Provisions Prior to Enactment of Drainage Code 
A section in the Farm Drainage Act of 1885<369 > 
provided: 
The [drainage] commissioners shall have the power 
and are required to make all necessary bridges and cul-
verts along or across any public highway or railroad 
which may be deemed necessary for the use or protection 
of the work, and the cost of the same shall be paid out of 
the road and bridge tax, or by the railroad company as 
the case may be. . . . 
The apparent meaning was that the highway 
authority would be required to pay for such con-
struction. This language was held to be in con-
travention of the Illinois Constitution in a case 
decided by the Supreme Court of Illinois in 
1907. <370> The parallel of that section in the Levee 
Act of 1885 <371 > reads: 
And, provided further, that the sum assessed against 
either of said corporations [town, railroad, etc.] shall not 
include the expense of constructing, erecting, or repairing 
any bridge, embankment or grade, culvert or other work 
of the roads of such corporations, crossing any ditch or 
drain, constructed on the line of any natural depression, 
channel or watercourse; but the corporate authorities of 
such road or railroad are hereby required, at their own 
expense, to construct such bridge, culvert, or other work, 
or to replace any bridge or culvert temporarily removed 
by the commissioners in doing the work of such district. 
This act gave rise to even more litigation .<312 > 
Section 55 of the Levee Act was put in issue in 
the case of Heffner v. Cass & Morgan Counties.<313 > 
The court granted the demand of the plaintiff drain-
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age comm1ss10ners that the highway authorities 
replace a bridge removed by the drainage commis-
sioners in the course of enlarging a natural stream. 
The counties' defense, based on sections 9 and 10 of 
Article IX of the State Constitution, was that the 
legislature could not allow the drainage commis-
sioners, at their discretion, to impose a debt on 
residents of the county not benefited by the drain-
age work. The court said: 
These drainage commissioners did not, in removing 
the bridge, levy any tax on the county or upon its in-
habitants. Nor did they thereby create any debt against 
the county, but merely removed a public bridge from a 
public highway by authority of a public law .... 
In 1906, however, Commissioners of Union 
Drainage, Dist. v. Commissioners of Highways,< 374 > 
an appeal decided on issues of procedure not per-
tinent here, set the stage for a reversal of the 
Heffner case. The lower court had granted the 
plaintiff drainage commissioners a judgment for 
the cost of a bridge crossing an artificial ditch pur-
suant to the provisions of section 401/2 of the Farm 
Drainage Act. The Supreme Court implied that 
such a result was unjust and perhaps contrary to 
the constitution and said: 
LT]he ditch was for the sole and exclusive benefit of 
a drainage district constituting not more than three-
eighths of the territory of the two towns, which is pre-
sumed by law to have been all the lands benefited by the 
ditch. 
The next year, 1907, the decision in Morgan v. 
Schusselle< 375 > was a direct holding that section 401/:! 
was unconstitutional in that it enabled the authori-
ties of one local government to impose a debt on 
the residents of another municipal corporation with-
out the latter's consent. The court upheld the 
protest of the highway commissioners that they 
should not have to pay for a bridge torn down and 
rebuilt by the drainage commissioners and declared 
that the drainage district should absorb the full 
cost of all artificial ditches, including bridges cross-
ing them. 
Several other casesc 316 > involving drainage dis-
tricts organized under the Farm Drainage Act were 
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decided in the same manner as the Schusselle case. 
In Commissioners of Highways v. Commissioners of 
Lake Fork Special Drainage Dist., <377 > the court 
extended the holding of the Schusselle case and com-
pelled the drainage commissioners to rebuild a 
bridge over a ditch dug in the line of a natural 
watercourse. 
In 1911, in People ex rel. Parmenter v. Fenton 
& Thompson R.R.,< 318> the Heffner case was modi-
fied to the extent that the commissioners of a dis-
trict, under the Levee Act, were ordered to replace 
a bridge over a wholly artificial ditch . The court 
aid: 
It does not require any provision of the statute to 
compel the restoration of a highway, and it is not even 
within the power of the General Assembly to authorize 
the levy of a road and bridge tax on the taxpayers of the 
town for the benefit of a drainage district where the ditch 
is an artificial one. (Italics added.) 
In Duncan v. Fitch< arn> the same result followed 
in an appellate court. All that remained to be done 
by the courts regarding the liability of a drainage 
district organized under the Levee Act was to re-
move the distinction between the construction of 
bridges over drains in the line of a natural water-
course and those crossing artificial ditches. 
The issue was finally settled in People ex rel. 
Burow v . Block. <380 > The drainage commissioners 
had cut through a highway while in the process of 
deepening and widening a drain that followed the 
course of a natural stream. The Supreme Court 
said: 
These sections [nine and ten of Article IX of the 
tate Constitution] prohibit the legislature from com-
pelling a town to incure a debt without its consent and 
from granting the right of corporate taxation to any 
other than the corporate authorities who are the munici-
pal officers directly elected by the people to be taxed or 
appointed in some mode to which the people to be taxed 
have given their assent. 
Furthermore, the court invalidated the rationale 
of the Heffner case by saying: 
While the destruction of the road is not the levying 
of a tax, the law which attempts to authorize it imposes 
an obligation on the town against its will, which the 
constitution prohibits .... 
The request of the highway authority for a writ 
of mandamus was granted, and the drainage com-
missioners were required to replace the bridge. The 
court reaffirmed its ruling the next year in a short 
decision <381 > based solely on the Block case. The 
Block case has been followed in every action <382 > 
raising the question upon whom the responsibility 
rests for restoration of bridges destroyed or removed 
in the line of drainage work. As late as 1949, in a 
case involving the question of the duty of mainte-
nance of bridges over canals constructed pursuant 
to the provisions of the Sanitary District Act, <383 > 
the Supreme Court, by way of dicta, said: <384 > 
It is thus apparent that, with respect to the duty of 
restoring a highway over a drainage ditch, it is immate-
rial whether the obstruction results from the improve-
ment of a natural watercourse or the cutting of an arti-
ficial ditch, or whether the bridge needed to restore the 
highway replaces an existing bridge or involves the con-
struction of an original bridge. 
There are three analogous cases, <385 > none of 
which involved a constitutional question, which 
point up the fact that the primary responsibility for 
all costs incident to drainage work falls on the 
district doing the work regardless of the fact that 
such work may be done in territory under the con-
trol of another governmental unit. In each of these 
cases a drainage district was making improvements 
in an adjacent drainage district for the benefit of its 
own lands and in so doing removed bridges in the 
adjacent district. The results were uniform, the 
courts holding that the cost of replacing the bridges 
should be borne by the landowners directly benefit-
ing from the drainage improvements. 
2. Provisions Contained in Drainage Code 
Section 12-4 of the 1955 Drainage Code< 386 > 
points out the requirements pertinent to the con-
struction and rebuilding of bridges across artificial 
and natural watercourses. This section provides: 
Whenever a district drain crosses a public highway 
or a railroad other than in the course of natural drain-
age, the district is liable to the highway authority or the 
railroad for the cost of constructing any bridge or culvert 
made necessary by such crossing and shall thereafter be 
liable to the highway authority or railroad for the cost of 
repairing and maintaining such a bridge or culvert. 
Whenever a natural drain or a ditch constructed in 
the course of natural drainage crosses a public highway 
or a railroad, the highway authority or the railroad shall 
construct and thereafter keep in repair and maintain a 
bridge or culvert of sufficient length, depth, height above 
the bed of the drain or ditch, and capacity to subserve 
the needs of the public with respect to the drainage 
of the lands within the natural watershed of such drain 
or ditch, not only as such needs exist at the time of con-
struction, but for all future time .... 
If a district, by deepening, widening or straighten-
ing a natural drain or by changing the established grade, 
width or alignment of a ditch, removes or threatens to 
remove the support from under any abutment, pier, 
wingwall or other supporting member of a highway or 
railroad bridge the district is liable to the highway 
50 Cir. 76. ILLINOIS HIGHWAY AN D AGRICU LTURAL DRAI NAGE LAWS 
authority or the railroad for the cost of protecting or 
underpinning such abutment, pier, wing1rnll or other 
supporting member. ... 
The law as stated in the code pertaining to 
highways crossing drains constructed in the course 
of natural drainage appears to follow rules similar 
to those set forth in the original Farm Drainage 
Act and Levee Act, even though those acts were 
declared unconstitutional when they attempted to 
impose a duty upon the highway authority to build 
bridges across natural drains or ditches constructed 
in natural drains. Nevertheless, the code specif-
ically states that the highway authority has the 
responsibility for constructing bridges whenever a 
natural drain or a ditch constructed in the course of 
natural drainage crosses a public highway. 
At this time it is hard to tell whether the last 
paragraph of section 12-4 abrogates the statutory 
duty of the highway authority to restore a bridge 
over a natural drain when it has been destroyed or 
removed by the drainage district in the course of 
its work. In the light of the language of the second 
paragraph extending that duty "for all future 
time,'' it can be argued that the highway authority 
must foresee the drainage needs of the particular 
area for eternity and construct its bridge to accom-
modate those needs. On the other hand, perhaps 
this paragraph is intended to eliminate the constitu-
tional objections found in the earlier cases by plac-
ing the responsibility of restoring a bridge on the 
district when it has made such construction neces-
sary. 
As to bridges crossing artificial ditches , the code 
points out that the drainage district is responsible 
when it has a drain crossing a public highway at a 
location other than in the natural course of 
drainage. 
B. MAINTENANCE 
1. Provisions Prior to Enactment of Dra ina ge Code 
With respect to maintenance of public bridges 
and culverts, the general rule propounded by the 
courts is that the duty falls upon the highway 
authority to maintain such bridges and culverts if 
the damage to them has arisen by virtue of public 
use. <381 > Implicit in the cases cited, and emphasized 
by way of dicta in one of them, <388 > is the rule that 
if the damage is caused by the work of the drainage 
commissioners, they will be responsible for the 
necessary repairs. 
A brief examination of the cases will serve to 
illustrate the rationale of the courts in determining 
the responsibility of bridge maintenance. Two cases 
before the courts in 1919<389 l and one in 1924<39ol 
involve demands by highway districts that bridges 
over natural drains be repaired by the respective 
drainage districts. Each time the courts refused 
the demands and required the highway commis-
sioners to do the work. In People v. Peeler, <391 l the 
Supreme Court said that there was no continuing 
duty on the drainage district to repair a bridge it 
had built when the damage thereto was caused by 
continued public use , nor could the drainage com-
missioners levy a tax to provide for such repairs. 
A case in 1928<392 l and one in 1949<393 l arose out 
of requests by highway authorities for the repair 
of bridges over artificial ditches. In both of these 
cases the courts sustained the view that even with 
respect to bridges over artificial channels there was 
no duty on the drainage districts to perform main-
tenance. In People ex rel. Kurtz v. M eyer,< 394 l the 
court said: 
A bridge which has been built over a natural or an 
artificial channel to restore a public highll"ay, and the 
highway is thereby restored, becomes a part of such pub-
lic highway, and under the statute would necessarily pa~s 
under the control of the highway commissioner .... 
[Emphasis added.] 
[I] t is true that the ditches referred to in the Peeler 
case, over which bridges were to be built or rebuilt , \\"ere 
located over natural depressions or watercourses, and 
that in this case the ditch in question is entirely artificial. 
... [Iln either case the bridge ... becomes a part of 
the public road and passes under the control of the com-
missioner of highways. 
The appellate court reversed the decision of 
the trial court and refused to compel the drainage 
commissioners to repair a portion of a public road 
damaged by normal public use. 
In City of Chicago v. Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, 
decided in 1949, <393 l the Supreme Court was faced 
with the problem of construing a statute passed in 
1915 which imposed the duty of maintenance of 
bridges, built by the district over its canals, upon 
the city. The trial court had ruled that the city 
must maintain only those bridges constructed after 
the passage of the law and that the sanitary district 
was responsible for maintaining those built before 
1915. The high court held that the city was obli-
gated to maintain all six of the structures involved, 
thereby rejecting the appellant city's argument that 
the digging of the canals created a maintenance 
problem outside the scope of its responsibility. 
In the Peeler case, <39Gl the constitutionality of 
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the mandate rcqumng the highway authority to 
maintain bridges over artificial ditches was put in 
issue. The court resolved the issue in favor of the 
drainage district by saying that the drainage com-
missioners were precluded from levying taxes for 
the purpose of fulfilling an obligation of the high-
way districts. 
2. Provisions Contained in Drainage Code 
The new Drainage Code states that the drainage 
commissioners are responsible for the cost of main-
taining bridges over artificial ditches. 
Whenever a district drain crosses a public highway 
or a rai lroad other than in the course of natural drain-
age, the di trict is liable to the highway authority or the 
railroad for the cost of constructing any bridge or culvert 
made necessary by such crossing and shall thereafter be 
liable to the highway authority or railroad for the cost of 
repairing and maintaining such a bridge or culvert. <307> 
The act is apparently prospective in nature, <3 9 3 > 
making it fair to assume that bridges built across 
artificial ditches prior to January 1, 1956, would 
be maintained pursuant to the rule as it was de-
veloped through litigation up to that time. 
As to the maintenance and repair of bridges and 
culverts crossing natural watercourses, the new 
statute points out that the obligation will remain 
on the highway authority. 
C. LIABILITIES 
Two questions left by the legislature to be 
answered by the common law arc: (1) upon whom 
does liability rest fo r personal injuries or property 
damage incurred by third parties due to faulty 
construction; and (2) what liabilities exist between 
the drainage districts and highway districts for 
damages accruing to one because of acts of the 
other? 
In a 1941 case, <399 > the Sanitary District of 
Chicago was a co-defendant with the City of Chi-
cago and was held jointly liable to a third party 
for injuries the latter suffered when his automobi le 
struck a bridge abutment. The street approaching 
each end of the bridge had been widened to 70 feet, 
while the bridge remained 23 feet wide. The bridge 
had been built by the Sanitary District, which had 
also placed safety reflectors on the abutments and 
"narrow bridge" signs on either approach; the city 
had maintained the structure otherwise. 
The court stated that: 
The evidence indicates that the sanitary district not 
only constructed and maintained [sic] the structure 
\\'hich constituted a dangerous obstruction to the public 
highway, but that it also assumed the duty of keeping 
that part of the public highway safe. Under these cir-
cumstances the sanitary di f' trict ... made itself liable .. .. 
and further: 
[A I third person or corporation using the public 
higlmay for any purpose, although exercising no jurisdic-
tion o,·er it, may nevertheless be held liable for his or its 
negligence, if any, which render the highway un-
safe ... .<'00> 
In Campbell v. City of 1\farseilles,<• 01 > the court 
held the city liable for injuries to a young boy who 
fell through a guard railing while playing on a 
bridge maintained in a fau lty manner by the city. 
As indicated by these cases, common-law principles 
of fau lt will normally serve to determine liability 
of the respective municipal corporations for injuries 
suffered by third parties because of the way in 
which a bridge is constructed or maintained. <• 02 > 
It has been pointed out that a drainage district 
ordinari ly is not liable for damages occasioned by 
the negligence of an independent contractor in exe-
cuting a contract for work to be done for the dis-
trict, but that an exception to this rule occurs when 
the damage is clue to the defective plans pursuant 
to which the work is done. <• 0 3 > People ex rel. Hep-
burn v. Maddox<• 0 •> illustrates the rule and this 
exception. There, in widening a stream, the con-
tractors were following plans approved by a court; 
the court had been told by the commissioners at the 
hearing prior to such approval that no damage 
would be clone to any bridge. The contractors were 
forced by heavy rains to halt their work 200 feet 
upstream from the bridge. In the course of a flood 
that followed , the bridge was washed away because 
of the cutting of the bank of the river. Even though 
the work had not progressed as far as the bridge, 
the defendant drainage district was held liable 
to the highway authority on the ground that the 
commissioners should have known that damage 
would occur if the plans were carried out. 
There is dicta to the effect that a drainage dis-
trict will not be held liable for faulty discretionary 
acts of its commissioners. The court, though not 
concerned with the construction or maintenance of 
bridges, held that even though the discretionary 
acts were not faulty or negligent but the ministerial 
duties performed by the commissioners pursuant to 
them were, the drainage district would be liable to 
third parties for damages arising from these 
acts. <• 05 > 
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D. PRIVATE BRIDGES AND CULVERTS 
Heretofore the discussion has been confined to 
liabilities arising out of the construction and main-
tenance of public bridges. However, whenever an 
open drain "crosses any privately owned enclosed 
tract or parcel of land in such a manner that a por-
tion thereof is landlocked and has no access from 
any public highway other than by a bridge or 
passageway over the ditch,'' « 06 > the primary re-
sponsibility rests with the drainage district. That 
duty was imposed by the Farm Drainage Act of 
1885 and has not been removed by subsequent legis-
lation or judicial decision, although the manner in 
which the responsibilty is carried out now varies. 
Depending upon when the ditch was constructed, 
when the district was organized, and whether the 
ditch is part of a natural drain, the responsibility 
may be either to construct the bridge or to com-
pensate the landowner for the cost of construc-
tion. <401 > 
The only landowners' right that has been dele-
-- -- --- - ----- -
gated to the highway authorities for protection is 
the right of access to land from a highway over a 
ditch constructed by those authorities alongside the 
road. Section 9-105 of the Highway Code provides 
in part: <408 > 
In constructing a public highway, if a ditch is made 
at the junction of highways, or at the entrance of gates or 
other openings of adjoining premises, the highway 
authorities shall construct good and sufficient culverts or 
other convenient crossing .... 
Only one case has been decided on this point: 
Taylor v. Reed, <409 > wherein the court found no 
difficulty in interpreting or enforcing the dictate of 
the statute and ordered the highway commissioners 
to construct culverts at places where the highway 
drains had deprived the plaintiff of his usual access. 
It should be noted, however, that a court will prob-
ably require a drainage district to build the neces-
sary passage if it has built the drains along the 
highway; that was the holding in Morgan v. 
Schusselle. <410 > 
VI. SEWAGE AND POLLUTION 
A . EQUITABLE JURISDICTION 
IN POLLUTION CASES 
Wherever there is drainage, natural or artificial, 
or water collected for any purpose, problems of con-
tamination and pollution may arise. Such problems 
are normally resolved by way of an injunction, 
issued by a court of equity, which puts the per-
petrator of the nuisance in danger of contempt of 
court proceedings if the condition continues to 
exist. Requests for this type of remedy may be 
made by any harmed party, either a private indi-
vidual or a public official, but the granting of the 
requests is subject to different considerations, de-
pending upon who instigates the proceedings. 
1. Suits by Private Parties 
In a suit by a private person, damage or an 
imminent threat of damage must be shown, and the 
damage must be of a type that threatens the health 
of the individual or his family and will necessarily 
result in the impairment of his enjoyment of his 
property.< 411 > For example, in Wahle v. Rein-
bach, <412 > an early Illinois case, the plaintiff sued 
to re train his neighbor from erecting a privy in 
the vicinity of the farmer's well. In holding that 
an injunction should be issued, the court said: 
[W]here the injury resulting from the nuisance is, in 
its nature, irreparable, as when loss of health, loss of 
trade, destruction of the means of subsistence, or per-
manent ruin to property will ensue from the wrongful 
act or erection, courts of equity will interfere by in-
junction, in furtherance of justice and the violated rights 
of property. 
Also, where an injury is of such constant and 
frequent occurrence that no fair or reasonable re-
dress can be had for it in a court of law, it can be 
enjoined. On the other hand, a court of equity will 
not take cognizance of mere annoyances, <413 l nor 
will it intervene where the presence of harm or the 
threat of harm is doubtful. <41•> The Illinois Supreme 
Court made the last point clear when it said: 
To entitle one to injunctive relief he must establish, 
as against the defendant, an actual and substantial injury 
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and not merely a technical inconsequential wrong entit-
ling him to nominal damages, only.<''" 
If the above requirements are present, it is rea-
sonable to assume that a private person may sue 
to enjoin a nuisance created by a governmental 
authority. It has been held in Illinois that a town 
would be restrained from discharging sewage onto 
a farmer's land, <416 > and that damages would lie for 
a nuisance created by an overflow onto a plaintiff's 
land when a city altered the drainage of a 
street. <417 > Thus, if a highway authority allowed 
a drain to become clogged and thereby caused an 
offensive condition, such as a stagnant pool that 
emitted foul odors and those odors hampered a 
landowner in the use of his property, the authority 
could probably be ordered to abate the condition 
at the suit of the landowner. 
2. Suits by Municipal Authorities 
An action to enjoin a nuisance may be brought 
by a public official when the damage or threat of 
damage is to the public welfare. Such an action is 
instituted for the general benefit of a community, 
and no impairment of private property rights need 
be involved. <•18> In Kenilworth Sanitarium v. Vil-
lage of Kenilworth, <419 > the plaintiff village sought 
an injunction to prevent the sanitarium from 
emptying its sewage into a drainage ditch that 
flowed into the municipal water supply. The threat 
of disease forced the court to so order. The court 
stated that a watercourse used solely to drain away 
surface waters cannot be changed into a sewer 
without the consent of all the servient owners. 
Even if the servient owners should consent, equita-
ble jurisdiction would be granted if there was an 
ensuing threat to the public health . 
The language of the court in Stead v. Fort-
ner<420l states the Jaw of public nmsance quite 
explicitly: 
The public authorities have a right to institute the 
suit "·here the general public welfare demands it . . .. 
The maintenance of the public health, morals, safety and 
welfare is on a plane above mere pecuniary damage ... 
and to say that a court of equity may not enjoin a public 
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nuisance because property rights are not involved, \\'Ould 
be to say that the State is unable to enforce the law or 
protect its citi zens from public wrongs. 
That case arose out of the operation of several 
unlicensed taverns in the town of Shelbyville. The 
existence of an unlicensed dram shop was defined 
in a statute in effect at that timc<• 21 l as a public 
nuisance. Such a definition removes the burden of 
proving harm to the plaintiff. All that need be 
shown in order to obtain an injunction when a con-
dition is statutorily set out as a public nuisance is 
that the alleged offense comes within the terms of 
the statute. Consequently, certain acts of pollution 
have been declared public nuisances under section 
466 of the Criminal Code, <• 22 l which reads in part: 
It is a public nuisance: ... to throw or deposit any 
offal or other offensive matter, or the carcass of any dead 
animal, in any watercourse, lake, pond, spring, well or 
common sewer, street or public highway. 
In addition to imposing criminal liability, the 
language would probably make a person amenable 
to equitable restra int for intentional acts, such as 
draining waterclosets into a public storm sewer or 
piping barnyard wastes directly into a highway 
drain. The main problem will be to show that the 
acts committed are of a nature that the legislature 
defined; once that is accomplished, an injunction 
hould issue. 
Magnitude is the key in a request for equitable 
intervention. Unless section 466 of the Criminal 
Code can be brought to bear on the situation, the 
pollution must be of sufficient magnitude to harm or 
offer a threat of harm to the enjoyment of property 
by a private individual. In the case of a public 
suit, it must be serious enough to threaten the gen-
eral public welfare. 
B. CRIMINAL JURISDICTION IN POLLUTION CASES 
Two sanctions are available to help public 
authorities prevent contamination of waterways, 
lakes, and sewers. One is section 466 of the Criminal 
Code; the other is section 9-123 of the Highway 
Code. <423 > The primary purpose of these statutes is 
to act as deterrents, and it is apparent that most 
acts that cause any type of waste matter to be 
placed or discharged into highways or highway 
drains can be indicted under the provisions of one 
or the other of them. 
1. Section 466 of the Criminal Code 
The same requirements of proof will be neces-
sary in a court of law to obtain a conviction under 
this enactment as are necessary to cause a court of 
equity to issue an injunction: the acts complained 
of must be as defined by the legislature. Once that 
is shown, a fine not exceeding $100 may be levied 
for the first offense, and the same fine plus confine-
ment not exceeding three months in the county ja il 
may be imposed for subsequent offenses. <• 24 l 
2. Section 9-123 of the Highway Code 
The other sanction deals specifically with the 
pollution of street and highway drains. It reads as 
follows: 
No person, firm, corporation, or institution, public 
or private, shall discharge or empty any type of sewage, 
including the effluent from septic tanks or other sewage 
treatment devices, or any other domestic, commercial or 
indu trial \\'aste, or any putrescible liquids, or cause the 
same to be discharged or emptied in any manner into 
open ditches along any public street or highway, or into 
any drain or drainage structure installed solely for street 
or highway clrainarre purposes. 
Any person, firm, corporation, or institution, public 
or printte, in violation of this Section, shall be fined not 
less than $200 nor more than $500 for each such offense 
and in a deli ti on shall be fined $25 per clay for each clay 
such violation exists. 
The highway authori ty having jurisdiction over the 
public street or highway affected by such violation shall 
enter a complaint in the proper court against any Yi-
olator of this Section. Upon the failure of any such high-
\rny authori ty to so act, any other person, may in the 
name of poli tical division or municipality, enter such 
complaint.<""> 
This section has been in existence since 1913, 
and no case arising out of its provisions has yet 
been appealed. Thus even the simplest questions 
regarding the statute are difficult to answer. 
The Attorney General of Illinois rendered an 
opinion in 1954< 426 > that lends some certainty to 
the meaning of some of the language in section 
9-123. The pertinent portions follow: 
It will be noted that the prohibitions relate to 
(l) "any type of sewage," (2) "any other domestic, com-
mercial or industrial waste," or (3) "any putrescible 
liquids." 
The word "se\\'age" is defined in Black's Law Diction-
ary , 4th Edition, as follows : "Refuse and foul matter, 
solid or liquid, carried off by a sewer." It would thus 
seem clear that the term "sewage" includes the water 
carried human or animal \Yaste matter from residences, 
buildings or other places. 
The term ''\rnste" is defined in W ebster's N ew Inter-
national Dictionary , as "refuse from places of human or 
animal habitation." 
The word "putrescible" is defined in W ebster's N ew 
International Dictionary, as "capable of putrefaction; 
liable to become putrid." The term "putrid" is further 
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defined as "decomposed, especially in an advanced stage 
of decomposition; rotten." ... 
It would seem to be the general purpose of this en-
actment to prohibit the discharge into the open ditches 
along any public street or highway, or into any drain or 
drainage structure for street or highway drainage pur-
poses, of such substances as will be likely to create a 
nuisance or which will be detrimental or injurious to the 
public health, safety or welfare. In other words, the 
prohibitions relate to certain substances \rhich are physi-
cally offensive to the senses. 
In construing this statute in acco rdance with its gen-
eral purpose and object, it would seem that water con-
taining soap or detergents used in connection with shower 
baths or washing clothes would be "domestic waste" 
within the meaning and intent of the statute .... 
Although seepage water [in this particular case water 
seeping out of a basement] may po sibly be considered 
to be a form of domestic waste, and thus within the letter 
of the statute, yet it is clear that if it is nothing more 
than water containing no deleterious substance, it would 
not be phy ically offensive to the senses. Although thus 
po ibly coming within the letter of the Act, it does no t 
come within the general purpose and object of the 
Act . ... 
In re pect to your third question relating to ordinary 
urface water, [carried off of a house by drainspouts] it 
is my opinion that same does not come within the inten-
tion of the statute ... . 
The Attorney General pointed out that any 
waste matter, human, animal, or manufactured, 
that is physically offensive to the senses is included 
within the prohibition of the statute. But does that 
mean that a farmer who has manured or otherwise 
fe rtilized his fi elds must suffer a criminal penalty 
if some of the offensive material finds its way, in 
the course of natural run-off, into a highway ditch? 
And is the farmer whose barnyard borders on a 
road liable for the escape of waste matter into a 
highway drain? 
A literal interpretation of the statute coupled 
with the Attorney General's opinion would lead to 
the conclusion that those landowners would be 
criminally liable for any discharge, no matter how 
small or from what source. Final interpretation of 
the statute rests in the Supreme Court of the state; 
and until an appropriate case is appealed to that 
bench, exactly what offenses constitute violations 
remains a question to be answered. 
VII. LEGAL REMEDIES 
The body of sub tantivc law governing drainage 
in Illinois has been thoroughly reviewed in preced-
ing sections of this study. If one of those rules is 
violated, the question arises as to the proper legal 
action to remedy the injury. It is the purpose of 
this section to discuss the remedies applicable to 
drainage violations. However, this brief analysis of 
legal remedies will touch only the surface and indi-
cate only a few of the problems that are involved. 
The two primary remedies are damages and 
injunction. These two modes of redress apply to 
both natural and statutory drainage violations. In 
at least one statutory ection, damages and injunc-
tive relief are expressly provided for; <427 > in other 
situations, these remedies are applied without ex-
press provision. <428 > In addition, certain statutory 
sections expressly provide for collection of a fine 
as the penalty for the specific violation <429 > or give 
the highway authority the right to fill certain 
ditches. <430 > 
A. DAMAGES 
The term "damages" has been defined as a 
compensation, recompense, or satisfaction in money 
for a loss or injury sustained. <• 31 > Subject to certain 
limitations to be discussed subsequently, damages 
are recoverable by parties who have been injured 
because of violation of a rule of natural drainage. 
For example, damages have been recovered when 
the violations involved diversion, <432 > obstruc-
tion, <• 33> and overflow. <434 > 
Although the right to damages may be clear, 
problems are often encountered in measuring the 
extent of the damages. The general rules are well 
defined; it is their application that proves difficult . 
"General" or "nominal" damages are those implied 
or presumed by the law to have been sustained 
because of the legal wrong committed by the de-
fendant. These are recoverable for any technical 
injury and therefore do not present a measurement 
problem. The court ha stated that "every violation 
of a right imports some damage, and if none other 
be proved, the law allow nominal damages."< 43 "> 
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Thus the plaintiff may recover a nomin al sum 
(often $1.00) for any technical invasion of a right, 
regardless of actual injury sustained. 
"Special " or "substantial" damages, on the other 
hand , are those actually suffered. <4 3 s> They are the 
ones that create measurement problems. D amages 
in this category are classified according to the type 
of injury sustained; the two classes are temporary 
and permanent, their names indicating their nature. 
Permanent damages are those of a lasting or 
enduring nature. In an action for permanent dam-
ages, the plaintiff may recover not only present but 
future damages. Because both present and future 
damages are recoverable, such recovery bars all 
future actions by that plaintiff or any other person 
holding the property through him.<437l Permanent 
damages are measured by the difference between 
fair market price before and after the injury. <4 38 > 
Where the injury is not of such lasting or endur-
ing nature as to be termed "permanent," a different 
measure of damages is applicable. On the theory 
that the cause of the injury can be corrected, only 
those injuries sustained up to the commencement 
of the lawsuit may be recovered. <439 > Because only 
present damages are recoverable, successive causes 
of action may be brought. In a flooding situation 
where the defendant claimed that a previous re-
covery barred the present action, the court said: 
There would be fo rce in the argument if the injury 
caused by the construction of the drain went to the 
destruction of the entire e tate . .. . Here, however, t he 
damages are not so permanent and certain in their char-
acter as to enable a jury to give compensation at once 
for the entire injury. It is in the nature of a continuing 
nuisance, and in such cases successive actions may be 
brought and sustained as long as such nuisance shall be 
maintained. ("°> 
The measure of damages for t emporary injuries 
is the cost to repair or restore the property to its 
condition prior to the injury plus an amount for the 
loss of use. The court has phrased this measure as 
"such sum as would put his property in as good 
condi tion as it was before it was injured by the 
flooding, together with compensation for any Joss of 
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use during the time it was rendered unfit for 
occupation."«41 > 
The damages recoverable for injuries to growing 
crops have been a source of controversy in Illinois 
decisions. The rule on the destruction of growing 
crops is clear; it is that "the measure of damages 
to growing crops which are not matured is the value 
of the crop as it was when destroyed. . . . [plus 
the value of J the right of the owner to mature and 
harvest it at the proper time."<• 4 2 > It is the means 
of arriving at this value that has been disputed. 
One view holds that the value at the time of 
de truction is ascertained by approximating matur-
ity value and deducting estimated future cultiva-
tion, harvesting, and marketing costs. <44 3 > Another 
view holds that the value at the time of destruction 
should be ascertained by e timating what the crop 
would have brought in its immature condition. This 
e timate would necessarily be based on soil condi-
tion and quality, nature of crop and probable yield, 
hazard of maturity, etc. <• 44 > 
A different measure is applicable to crops de-
stroyed before they have come up or before they 
have reached a point where their unmatured value 
is determinable. "When crops planted are destroyed 
before coming up, the measure of damages is the 
rental value of the land, the co t of the seed, and 
the value of the labor expended."< 44 5 > 
Certain questions arise when the party seeking 
to bring an action is either a landlord or a tenant. 
A tenant clearly has the right to recover damages 
for injuries to crops during his period of ten-
ancy. <44 G> However, the tenant may not recover if 
the condition existed at the beginning of his tenancy 
and he had knowledge of the condition. <447 > 
In addition to the rights of the tenant, the land-
lord may have a cause of action. "[I] f a person 
interferes with the tenant so far as to disturb his 
enjoyment of the use of the premises and thereby 
cause loss of rent or damages to the landlord, he 
[the landlord] may have action."< 445 > 
Just as the landlord-tenant relationship may 
affect the right of the particular party to bring an 
action, the grantor-grantee relationship may have a 
similar effect. An injury existing when land is 
transferred cannot be the basis for action by the 
grantee against the wrong-doer. The injury was to 
the grantor, and he is the proper party to bring the 
action. <449 > On the other hand, a grantee who comes 
into possession of land with a nuisance existing 
upon it cannot be held liable until he has first been 
notified to remove the nuisance. <450 > 
B. INJUNCTION 
The second of the two primary remedies for 
violation of rules of natural drainage is the injunc-
tion. An injunction is a judicial process whereby a 
party is required to do, or refrain from doing, a 
particular act. <4 5 1 > In general, the remedy is a 
preventive one, <4 02 > and its usual purpose is to 
restrain. <4 53> 
A quotation from a court opinion will best con-
vey the prerequisites for the granting of an injunc-
tion. Note the need for the plaintiff to show facts 
and also the extreme caution with which the court 
acts: 
To entitle a person to relief by injunction he must 
establish an actual and substantial injury, and not merely 
a technical or inconsequential wrong entitling him to 
nominal damages; and this is true whether the injury be 
single or continuous. The courts moYe with caution in 
granting any injunction ... .«"> 
It is clear that substantial and irreparable injury 
must be threatened. <450 > Conjectural apprehensions 
are not sufficient. <• 56 > Therefore, if it is not reason-
ably certain that injury will result, the issuance of 
an injunction wi ll be denied. <4 5 7 > 
The foregoing discussion presupposes that an 
order to cease or not to begin (i .e., a negative order) 
will prevent or terminate the injury. There are situ-
ations, however, in which only a positive act by 
the defendant will adequately protect the plaintiff. 
Such a situation gives rise to the mandatory injunc-
tion, a device that commands the performance of 
some positive act. Because this type of order is 
difficult to supervise and control, the courts do not 
favor the mandatory injunction. <455 > Despite the 
reluctance of the courts, however, this remedy has 
been used to compel the return of water to its 
natural channel <4 5 9 > and to compel the removal of 
an obstruction from a natural watercourse. <460 > 
The first general rule is that an equitab le 
remedy, such as an injunction, will not be granted 
when the plaintiff has another adequate remedy at 
law. <461 > The meaning of the rule is that the plain-
tiff may not obtain an injunction if damages will 
adequately compensate him for his injury. The 
Supreme Court dealt with this principle as applied 
to the subject of drainage when it said : 
It is true that to justify relief by injunction an actual 
and substantial injury must be shown . .. but t his does 
not mean that the injury must necessarily be great in the 
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pecuniary loss involved or impossible of compensation in 
damages. When an owner of property is about to be 
deprived of a legal right in connection with it by the 
wrongful act of another for which there is no legal redress 
the act may be restrained by injunction, or, if it has 
already been executed, may be required to be undone, 
if this is practicable. The irreparable injury necessary to 
give a court of equity jurisdiction in such a case is not 
one so great as to be impossible of compensation but one 
of such a character that the law cannot give adequate 
compensation for it. The fact that no actual damages can 
be proved, so that in an action at law the jury could 
award nominal damages, only, often furnishes the very 
best reason why a court of equity should in terfere in a 
case where a nuisance is a continous one.«"'> 
A second general rule is that an injunction will 
not be issued in equity until the existence of a 
nui ance has been established at law. The courts 
have long recognized, however, that strict applica-
tion of this rule would provide a formidable barrier 
to adequate protection of property rights. The rule 
was substantially discredited in 1875 when the court 
said: 
[T]o say that such a nuisance must be suffered to be 
created and continued until its character shall be for-
mally determined at law, would seem to be but little 
better than a mockery of justice to him whose residence 
is affected by it .<•••> 
Because of this realistic attitude, injunctions 
are useful and effective remedies in the area of 
drainage litigation. They have seen frequent use in 
preventing diversion, <464 l obstruction, <4 B5 l deposition 
of sewage, <466 l unlawful connection to a mutual 
drain, <4s7 > etc. In addition, since the rules of natural 
drainage are as applicable to highway authorities 
as to individuals, highway authorities have been 
the recipients of a portion of these injunction . <468 > 
C. LIMITATIONS ON GRANTING OF DAMAGES 
AND INJUNCTION 
The legal remedies discussed in the two preced-
ing sections are not always applicable. There are 
certain principles that may prevent the granting of 
either remedy even though a drainage rule ha been 
violated. For example, the plaintiff may not be 
entitled to the remedy he seeks because the time 
under the Statute of Limitations has run out(4 6n> or 
because the party he is suing cannot be made a 
defendant in a court of law or equity. <410> Another 
limitation might involve the different degrees of 
liability placed upon a highway authority, depend-
ing upon whether a ministerial or a discretionary 
duty is performed. <471 > 
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